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WITH THE VICTORIOUS BULGARIANS

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THE KING

WITH THE VICTORIOUS BULGARIANS

BY

LIEUTENANT HERMENEGILD WAGNER

War Correspondent of the "Reichspost"

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY I. E. GUESHOFF
PRIME MINISTER OF BULGARIA

WITH FIFTY-FIVE ILLUSTRATIONS
AND SIX MAPS

Withdrawn

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

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Président du
Conseil des
Ministres.

Sofia, *December 3/16, 1912.*

Dear Herr Wagner,

Enclosed you will find a few lines written by me in the Bulgarian language, and my latest photograph. I beg you to pardon the portrait being only a post card. The others, I have found, are not so good.

Hoping that you will be pleased with what I have written, I remain,

With kindest regards,

I. E. Gueshoff.

INTRODUCTION

IT was in the month of September, 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War. I had been thrown into the prison of Philippopolis. I was arrested because I had written to the London *Times* a series of letters on the Turkish atrocities of the year 1876 — the year of the Revolution.

One day there unexpectedly came into my hands a Constantinople newspaper, the *Vakit*, and I read in it that I was to be condemned to death.

To death! To death because I had had the courage to write about the grave malady from which Turkey was suffering and of which she was destined one day to die.

The Turks were incorrigible. Instead of removing the causes of the disease — the consequences of which I had demonstrated to be incompatible with the continued existence of Turkey in Europe — they condemned to death the man who had ventured to call the attention of the civilized world to its existence.

But the disease was allowed to pursue its destructive work. And when, thirty-five years after my wonderful deliverance from the Turkish executioner, I found myself at the head of the Bulgarian Government, the situation in Turkey was unchanged. The same anarchy, the same peril threatening the Christian districts and the peaceful borderlands, the same massacres at Uskub and Kotschana that Europe had witnessed with indignation at Batak and Peruschtschitza in 1876. Autonomous Bulgaria was

growing rapidly in every sense. The Bulgarian population of Turkey, instead of increasing in numbers and prosperity, was dwindling gradually and becoming continually poorer. A few more decades and this people would have disappeared.

After efforts many and vain to come to an understanding with the Ottoman Porte, by which time all Bulgaria was persuaded that any understanding with the Turks was impossible, the condemned prisoner of 1877 took a step that the entire Bulgarian people acclaimed with enthusiasm. He declared war for a great cause — for the deliverance of a million of miserable men from destruction, and for the extending of the frontiers of freedom and civilization.

I. E. Gueshoff.
[*Premier of Bulgaria.*]

WITH THE VICTORIOUS BULGARIANS

WITH THE VICTORIOUS BULGARIANS

CHAPTER I

THE BALKAN LEAGUE

IT will be for some future historian to write a substantial and accurate account of the rise of the Balkan League. Our data for some time to come must necessarily be scanty in amount and deficient in impartiality. From the Turkish side we hear little or nothing authoritatively; while on the side of the allies there is naturally a tendency to idealize everything that has to do with the initiation of the Balkan Alliance and the dawn of what, it is hoped, may prove the sunrise of a strong and united Balkan Power.

The cue of the allies has been to treat the omission of Turkey from the League of Balkan States as a regrettable one, due rather to the innate perversity of Turkish policy than to any deliberate idea of exclusion due to their own initiative. Hypocritical as the pretension sounds, it was one rendered indispensable by the attitude of the Great Powers and the relations mutually existing between them and Turkey. The instinctively feline diplomacy of this last power, it will be noted by historians, has been a tolerably faithful replica of that of the decadent Byzantine Empire of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The two objects which the Ottoman Porte has set before

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itself in the last hundred years have been, first, to work upon the internal jealousies of the nascent Christian powers within the peninsula, and, second, to manipulate with the same object the imperious rivalries and ill-masked suspicions of the great powers outside. The one vital, unifying principle which could possibly reconcile and combine the clashing interests of the Balkan kingdoms was the deep-rooted desire of all of them to wipe out the disgrace and remedy the disaster of the defeat of Eastern Christendom by an Oriental power five centuries ago. The Turks discovered what seemed to be an infallible recipe for thwarting the realization of this profound aspiration. It worked automatically and exacted a minimum of exertion on their own behalf. The ostensible good-will of the great Christian Powers towards their clients south of the Danube was neutralized by their pacificism — a policy, by the way, of almost incredible meanness and falsity when all the circumstances of the case are duly considered. On the other hand, the warlike ambition of the Balkan principalities was ingeniously stultified by their — carefully fomented — internal jealousies. The *status quo* — precious phrase — of a moribund empire like Turkey depended almost entirely upon these two factors. As soon as ever the faith of the Balkan powers in the integrity of the peace-principle was weakened, as soon as ever the Balkan powers could realize that the predominant interest of one of their number was identical with that of the other, at that very instant Turkey's panacea for the immobility of south-eastern Europe was bound to go by the board. Both conditions were fulfilled by the public-spirited leadership assumed by

Bulgaria (as we shall demonstrate) at the very moment when the disinterestedness of the peace policy enjoined by the concert of Great Powers was enfeebled and eventually undermined by the aggression of Italy, manifested in her truculent assault upon Turkey in the war of Tripoli. This war, the first that Turkey as a constitutional state had to wage with a great European Power, called forth among the Balkan peoples a desire to bring their old quarrel with Turkey to a decisive issue. Thus it was that various unofficial schemes were set on foot to bring about some enterprise for this object, while the Tripoli War was still in progress. We know that envoys of the Macedonians went to Rome to carry on negotiations for this purpose. The war must have had a specially encouraging effect in Bulgaria. There for some years many politicians had been putting forward the view that, notwithstanding all difficulties with Greece and Servia at the moment, a crusade against Turkey would no sooner be declared than these would sink of their own accord into comparative insignificance. As soon as combined action against the Turks appeared feasible, all differences between the co-operating Christian states might be safely postponed for later adjustment.

The Young Turk Era had the effect of a check upon the development of these tendencies — but only for a very short time. Contrary to expectation the policy of the Young Turks soon proved unmitigatedly Ottoman. The result of this was to exasperate the anti-Turkish feeling and to accelerate the movement. The continuance of the evil policy of the government in Macedonia (under which the

Bulgarians were the chief sufferers), the Cretan question still unsettled after long years of effort and hope, Servia's old aspirations after the Turkish territories that once were hers, and the sterility of the Montenegrin land inspiring a desire for the extension of the little state into a territorial power — all these were so many motives urging the Christian states of the Balkans to efforts for combined action. Gradually the idea assumed a more tangible shape among the leading statesmen of the Balkans themselves; Gueshoff, Pasitch, and Venezelos became familiar with it. Koromilas, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, played the part of a specially active promoter of the movement; and the simultaneous presence at Sofia of two enthusiastic supporters of the idea, the Servian minister Spalajkovitch and the Greek envoy Panas, may have helped to make matters move more quickly.

The internal dissensions and disorderly manifestations that had become more and more serious in Turkey since the summer; the discord in the Turkish army; the rising in Albania and the sensational advance of the Albanians on Uskub; the fall of the Young Turkish régime, and the alluring uncertainties of a transition period, would naturally act only as so many encouragements. For Bulgaria this was certainly the effect of the events at Kotschana and Istib; and the concentration of Turkish troops at Adrianople was the final motive of provocation. The Balkan States might well believe that they had a certain amount of support from Russian policy for an enterprise like this, since M. Iswolsky, in a speech in the Duma during the annexation crisis, had spoken of a Balkan

league — in which, however, Turkey was to be included — as "a desirable programme."

In the beginning of May, 1912, the understanding between the Balkan governments took shape in its general outlines. On the whole it would seem that the preliminary overtures took place between Servia and Bulgaria, then between Bulgaria and Greece, while between Servia and Montenegro Bulgaria acted as an intermediary. It is probable that on this occasion the first inspiration came from Servia, while at the outset Bulgaria was somewhat guarded, until, having thought things out, she seized the opportunity for taking the leading part into her own hands. Originally, however, the League was to have been only a political and economic combination, without having aggressive intentions of any sort. The military agreement only came into existence shortly before the war. The differences that have subsequently arisen seem to indicate that the territorial arrangements made between the allies at the beginning of the campaign can only have been of the most general and tentative order.

We have a significant indication that the rise of the League was brought about in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, in the fact that the leading statesmen of the Balkan Powers mutually attribute to each other the initiative in the creation of the alliance. So during the war Gueshoff greeted Pasitch as the creator of the League, while Pasitch and Venezelos returned the compliment to Gueshoff.

As to the prospects of the lasting character of the League, opinion is at present not unanimous. We may take it, however, that the great advantages the

Balkan States have so far derived from their alliance will be a conclusive argument for the continuance of such united action. And thus the Balkan War, which has had so many disagreeable consequences for Europe, will at least bring after it that lasting peace in the Balkan Peninsula that has so long been the earnest aim of European policy.

CHAPTER II

TOWARDS WAR

SHORTLY before the outbreak of the war between Italy and Turkey, M. Gueshoff had gone to Vichy for the sake of his health, and soon after it began he returned to Sofia by way of Vienna. He had at once taken the view that the interests of Bulgaria would be indirectly affected by the war in Tripoli.

During his absence the Italian envoy at Sofia, Count Bosdari, called upon the acting chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finance Minister, Theodore Teodoroff, and when he had notified to him the declaration of war against Turkey and at the same time referred generally to the situation of affairs, M. Teodoroff said with a smile, "We shall follow your example when the occasion presents itself."

With M. Gueshoff the sense of responsibility is very highly developed. He does not plunge into a course of action that has any uncertainty about it. He waited to see how this war in Africa and on the Mediterranean would develop, and how far Turkey would respect the neutrality of Bulgaria.

He made a stay in Vienna on his journey home, and invited the Bulgarian ambassadors, who were mostly away on vacation, to meet him there, and assembled them for a conference at the Hotel Krantz. At this meeting were present the Bulgarian minister to Paris, M. Stancioff; the minister to Vienna,

M. Salabascheff; the minister to Rome, M. Rizoff; and the minister to Berlin, M. Ivan Stepan Gueshoff, a cousin of the Premier. The public heard nothing of this conference, or indeed of many other matters of which we can speak freely, now that this war is over.

It was a very interesting meeting. The Prime Minister wanted to know how each of the assembled envoys would state his own appreciation of the position of affairs, giving the grounds of his opinion. It appears that the minister at Vienna, M. Salabascheff, was the first to speak, and it was to this effect: "In the year 1908–09 there was a more favourable opportunity for making war, than there is now, because Turkey was then all in confusion, yet I was even then in favour of a peaceful solution. I was at that time a member of the Government as Minister of Finance. I am all the more of that opinion now, chiefly because I cannot regard our relations to the other Balkan States as at all propitious to any policy of aggrandizement whatsoever."

It seems that M. Salabascheff did not wish to add any further grounds for the view he took. His opinion was shared by the envoy to Berlin, who, however, put the matter forward in a different form. He thought the time was not favourable for solving by force of arms the questions in dispute, complicated as they were by such deep-seated difficulties.

The name of M. Ivan Stepan Gueshoff is very closely linked with the history of Bulgaria's declaration of independence. He was then minister at Constantinople, and he did his best at the time to persuade his Government not to let pass the best opportunity that had yet offered for the radical

THE ROYAL GUARD

CAVALRY AT DISMOUNTED DRILL (SKIRMISHING)

solution of the difficult question between them and Turkey. He now held that as they had not ventured to go to war on that occasion, he could not vote for such a course now, when the firm adhesion of the Powers to the principle of the *status quo* made a warlike policy unadvisable.

The envoy to Paris, Dr. Dimitri Stancioff, did not agree with his colleagues, MM. Salabascheff and Ivan Stepan Gueshoff. He had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in the warlike Petkoff Cabinet, and had then (in the year 1906), notwithstanding the peaceful advice sent by King Edward, made a statement in the Sobranje that pointed to war. M. Stancioff now gave it as his opinion that too much importance need not be attached to the *status quo* policy of the Powers, especially as one of them (Italy) was actually waging war against Turkey, and no real guarantees had been given for any better prospect as to the lot of the Bulgarians in Turkish territory.

The warlike ideas which M. Stancioff clearly expressed received enthusiastic support from the energetic M. Rizoff, the envoy to Rome. Rizoff is a fiery speaker and an accomplished debater. He knows by experience what revolutions are like, and his whole bearing and his whole aspect alike seem a personification of the romance of a warlike policy. He it was, who, while the annexation of Eastern Roumelia was in preparation, incessantly urged upon Prince Alexander of Battenberg the "national necessity" of this step. I have reason to believe that what Rizoff said at the Vienna Conference was this: "What use is it saying any more about a mistake that cannot be repaired? Such opportunities as those of 1908 and 1909 will

not come back to us. And some day the war about Tripoli will also be a thing of the past, and once more there will come a dark time for our compatriots in Turkey. The Ottomanizing of the Bulgarians in Macedonia will be continued, with all its miserable accompaniments. The Turks will construct their strategic railways —they will find the money for them easily enough. And we shall have to submit to every provocation from Turkey until at last some humiliation will be put upon us of such severity that we can endure it no longer. Then Turkey will pour her armies into the south of Bulgaria, and we shall not have very much to hope for from Europe. At this moment Turkey is open to our attack, but later on it may be an easy matter for her to assail." Rizoff also referred to the Albanian national movement as an open wound for Turkey. And according to information I have obtained from well-informed political circles, he took the following view of the relations of Bulgaria to the other Balkan States: An alliance with them would be *useful* but not *absolutely necessary* before a declaration of war against Turkey. It would, of course, be useful in so far as it would give a certain amount of guarantee that no strife would arise between the Balkan States themselves. But one thing might be assumed as a certainty — whether there was a formal alliance or not, they would all throw themselves into the fight against Turkey, for they would be drawn on by Bulgaria.

Rizoff had been Bulgarian minister at both Cettinje and Belgrade, and at an earlier period consul-general at Monastir and in Greece, so he knew what he was speaking of, and he ended by saying: "The Bulgarian

Government is one of those governments that know (1) what should not be done, (2) what should be done, (3) and how to bring about the opportunity for the coming of that which should be done."

The Prime Minister, M. Gueshoff, has the reputation of a distinguished debater and was at one time President of the Assembly. By long experience he has acquired the habit of listening patiently to all sorts of opinions. As to what he thought on this occasion, he said nothing at the time. But next day he had an interview in the neighborhood of Vienna with King Ferdinand, who was just then on his way back to Bulgaria from his castle at Ebenthal. Gueshoff also returned soon after to Sofia, keeping locked up in his own breast all the reasons that were passing through his mind for and against a warlike policy.

But Bulgaria was moving towards war with giant strides.

In Sofia and throughout the country the cry arose for war! Nevertheless, up to the last days before the mobilization, hopes were built upon M. Gueshoff's well-known love for peace. But the time for this was long past. The cry for war arose from the united people themselves.

After the Democratic party in Bulgaria had missed the opportunity for hostilities on occasion of the declaration of independence in the year 1908–09, they lost all the sympathy of the youth of the country, and later on that of the people generally, who withdrew their former confidence from them. On various occasions demonstrations were made against the Democratic Government, and the Minister of the Interior,

M. Mihail Takaff, declared that he would have to expel the Macedonian leaders from Sofia, and confine them to assigned residences in the provinces. As a result of this the Democratic Ministers went in fear of their lives. A Macedonian, M. Liaptscheff of Monastir, who held the portfolio of Finance in the Cabinet, is said to have urged in vain that good use should now be made of the opportunity for declaring war, which had formerly been neglected. But his colleagues were of the contrary opinion, and indeed always took the view that was suggested to them from St. Petersburg. Another ministry with a different policy was a necessity. This was also the wish of the people, who at the elections for the Great Sobranje no longer showed any friendship for the Democratic politicians. King Ferdinand than called for the resignation of the Malinoff Cabinet, and a coalition of the "National" and the "Progressive" parties came into power. M. Ivan Eostratieff Gueshoff was entrusted with the formation of a cabinet representing these two parties. Dr. Daneff, the leader of the Progressives, did not wish to become a member of the Government, but introduced into it some of his chief followers, — Alexander Ljudskenoff, son-in-law of Dragan Zankoff, Anton Frangia, and Dimitri Christoff. With M. Gueshoff there entered the Cabinet the able Finance Minister, M. Theodore Teodoroff, and M. Stepan Bobtscheff. General Nikoforoff, who had been for several years at the Berlin Embassy, became Minister of War.

Dr. Daneff was chosen President of the Great Sobranje at Tirnovo, which met for the purpose of carrying through the revision of the Constitution neces-

sitated by the declaration of independence. After the accomplishment of this task, he continued to act as President of the Parliament. This was a necessity. For in difficult times, such as had now to be encountered, it was well that the Parliament should be under the guidance of a marked personality and a statesman of eminence, such as Dr. Daneff.

During the debates of the Assembly at Tirnovo, King Ferdinand had occasion to observe that his popularity in the country had been diminished by his peace policy. During the discussion of the Constitution there fell from the extremists of the opposition such words as "What is this Czardom for? What special business of ours is it if the Prince chooses to call himself a King?" There was no lack of outbursts of this kind, and this could not fail to have an effect on the King's mind.

King Ferdinand is the personification of the national aspirations of Bulgaria. Even before he was declared "King of the Bulgarians," he was conscious of this mission, and before the declaration of independence and the present war. Even in the first years after his arrival in the country, it was well known that Prince Ferdinand had not undertaken his adventurous journey to Bulgaria as a mere aristocratic pastime. He understood, from the history of Bulgaria, and from the Bulgarians themselves, what it meant when he was elected by the Great Sobranje at Tirnovo.

King Ferdinand knew something of the Bulgarians even in the days when he was a student at the Theresian Academy at Vienna. One of his fellow students was Dr. Stancioff, now minister of Bulgaria at Paris. Later on, Dr. Stancioff was his tutor in the Bulgarian

language. The King became a thorough master of it within a few years of his arrival in Bulgaria. He was a young man, only twenty-five, when he came thither, and he at once interested himself in everything, travelling about the country and learning to know it better even than the Bulgarians themselves. He has a brilliant style, and is one of the best public speakers in Bulgaria. When, even in the early days of his reign, he made a speech from the balcony of his palace in Sofia, the crowd would break out into a storm of applause, which at that time was called forth rather by his clear and well-chosen words than by any personal popularity — for this he had not yet made his own.

One can see in his eyes the expression of living thought. His glance never rests. At times the eyes are half-closed, as if he were trying to penetrate more deeply into the idea he is working out, or perhaps seeking to shut out the crowd of passing impressions. Once in the Sobranje a deputy of the extreme left, who belonged to no party and was indeed about to resign, broke out into an outcry against him. The King did not hesitate for a moment, but approached the enraged man, and putting on his *pince-nez* examined him through them as if he were a microbe, and asked, "What is all this about?" But he received no answer, for the man was all but demented. Another incident is characteristic enough to deserve recital. One day in his menagerie a fierce lion escaped from its cage, and stood free before its owner. The King did not in the least degree lose his presence of mind, but watched with curious interest the recapture of the animal, an operation which was the work, fortunately, of only a few seconds.

THE KING AND HIS STAFF IN FRONT OF KADIKOI

Politicians have often been presented to Ferdinand, who have not spared him in the press and in speeches in Parliament. He is always friendly with them, and often will ask them some such question as, "But have you carefully considered the matter?" Such critics have for the most part become later on his most devoted servants. So with the leader of the Democrats, Petkoff, who, addressing the King, said to him, "Your Majesty, I am all for you!"

The Premier Petkoff had at the outset of his career taken a directly hostile line against the King in his zeal for the opposition, but when he came to take the helm of affairs it was precisely on account of his immoderate zeal for his sovereign's cause that he was assassinated, after he had closed the University in order to suppress its propaganda of extreme ideas and anti-royalist doctrines.

Karaveloff, who was under Russian influence, and was an undisguised enemy of the "Coburger," once said, after the King had invited him to a council at the palace during a ministerial crisis, "We have indeed a splendid Prince!"

With a touch the King can give a new turn to events. At the outset the parties in opposition to him were very unfriendly. And with the then existing constitution it was almost impossible to govern. Hence the malicious remark of a former Russian consul at Tirnovo to an Italian journalist: "Now every Prince of Bulgaria — unless he is a Russian — must break his neck under the Constitution." But King Ferdinand did not break his neck, neither did he break the Constitution, or even suspend it, as was expected. On the contrary, he induced the turbulent politicians

to adopt the only truly constitutional method of mutual forbearance and coöperation. How he did it is his own secret. One thing is certain. All the politicians of Bulgaria are now loyal and devoted to him.

Yet before the declaration of war his popularity had seriously diminished. This was a result of the lost opportunity of 1908–09, when the Democratic Cabinet of Malinoff, largely under the influence of Iswolsky, failed to take the line of action that the nation desired. Yet the people did not abandon their hopes of seeing their aspirations realized by the King. Men knew that he would draw the sword as soon as the nation demanded it of him.

After the Turkish massacre at Istib, there came the still more terrible and exciting news from Kotschana.

This was in the midsummer of 1912. A few days later, while meetings were being held all over Bulgaria, and the streets rang to the loud cries of "War! War!" the peace-loving King looked back over his reign of twenty-five years, and saw everywhere before his eyes the most brilliant results of this prolonged period of peace. And now? — the peasant on his farm, the clerk in his office, the merchant at his business, the Ministers at their council, were all crying out for war!

On August 25 came the jubilee of the King's twenty-five years' reign. And as he had done a quarter of a century before, the King, erect in the saddle, rode into Tirnovo, the city of the old Czars of Bulgaria. On the historic Marno Polje, a plateau amid the mystery-haunted hills, there was a great review of the army, the greatest yet held. The troops were concentrated for the coming manœuvres. Nearly all the politicians,

including most of those from the Opposition camp, were present.

> The troops, with the Crown Prince Boris at their head, marched past before the King, who was on horseback, making a keen inspection of his wonderful army. The people, and indeed all who were present, were, as it were, electrified. The bayonets flashed in the rays of the rising sun, and reflected them to the southwards. . . . The contours of the hills of Tirnovo, lately so dimly seen, assumed now a material brightness clear and well defined.

So wrote on this day, in an article in the "Vetscherna Posta," the young Bulgarian author and diplomatist, Constantine M. Georgieff. I have quoted this article with its glimpse into the future, because it took my fancy at the time, and confirmed me in the belief that I would soon go as a war correspondent to Bulgaria — the land I knew so well, and in which I had for years been so deeply interested.

After the march past, the King heartily congratulated the generals, bestowing decorations on some of them, and promoting others to a higher grade. When he grasped the hand of General Fitscheff, the Chief of the Staff, he held it in his own for a long time. Then came the ceremonious reception in the royal pavilion, where the diplomatists and ministers assembled. In his reply to the diplomatic corps, who offered their congratulations through their *doyen*, the Italian envoy, Count Bosdari, the King said that Bulgaria could now claim her befitting place as "the sun of the East." After these words he paused a while, raised his eyes from the paper from which he read the speech, and turned a searching look upon the circle of ambassadors and military attachés.

Another characteristic incident in the story of this review is the speech addressed by the President of the Bulgarian Parliament, Dr. Daneff, to the King, who had till now been such a lover of peace. After Dr. Daneff had traced in impressive language the remarkable results obtained in the successful reign of King Ferdinand, he ended his greeting with the words: "And that which is yet wanting, O Czar, will come in due time."

The review was a war demonstration. It was the prelude to the royal proclamation that gave the Bulgarian army the order to cross the Turkish frontier.

We may say that King Ferdinand had waited twenty-five long years for the moment in which all Bulgarians without distinction would be united together, and would set their hopes no longer upon Europe, but upon him, "the Czar of the Bulgarians," the commander-in-chief of their army. For he had methodically prepared the two greatest factors in the victorious war — a spirit of union and enterprise in the army through his firm and just supervision of its discipline, and the reasoned community of outlook among political parties, arising from the sound national feeling with which he had inspired them.

The people of the conquered lands call the King "the Czar Liberator." The Nationalists at Sofia already speak of him as "Ferdinand the Great."

In his name M. Gueshoff made the war. For ten years Gueshoff was in the Opposition as the leader of the National party, and he had the opportunity of following in a closely critical spirit the preparatory steps for the liberation of Macedonia. In the Sobranje, and in the organ of his party in the press, the "Mit,"

PRINCE CYRIL

THE CROWN PRINCE BORIS

he had protested on various occasions against "sabre-rattling" — to use his own expression. He had received most of his education and training in England, is always moderate in his views, and prefers to accept accomplished facts. Thus he is very conservative. But slow as he is to decide upon a question, all the more quickly does he carry his decision into effect, and this he always does with a kind of old Roman self-possession.

When in succession to Malinoff he took over the Foreign Office and the premiership, he felt at once that he would have to do what his predecessor had let pass. Accordingly, soon after his acceptance of office, he made a tour through the larger towns and cities, and delivered speeches in explanation of his programme. In these he declared emphatically that he was in favour of a peaceful policy and one friendly to Turkey, but always on condition that the line taken by the Young Turks was not such as would excite public opinion in Bulgaria. This keen-sighted statesman, who always appealed to the public opinion of the country, was regarded even by his opponents, and not without reason, as the greatest parliamentarian of Bulgaria. And the public opinion of the country was soon excited by incidents on the Turkish frontier. Amongst these was the treacherous murder of a Bulgarian captain by Turkish soldiers. Later on, there were more occurrences of the same kind on the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. Meanwhile the Tripoli War broke out. This was something of a surprise for M. Gueshoff, who had not foreseen such a development, when planning his policy.

The Bulgarian Prime Minister is an exceedingly

interesting man. As all who know him say, it is almost impossible to find out what he means to attempt. His official declarations are strongly Conservative. But in his action he is now Conservative, now Liberal, precisely as the circumstances of the time dictate. In an interview with him one is captivated once for all by his quiet self-possession and the style of his conversation, and one almost imagines one is speaking to an English statesman. His ideal is Lord Salisbury. He gives one the impression of a politician who is a deep thinker and something of a philosopher. But he does his work very practically and, invariably taking a carefully thought-out line of action, reaches his ends. Not only in politics but in private life also he has gained all that he aimed at.

M. Gueshoff comes of one of the oldest and wealthiest families of Philippopolis. After his studies in England and France he had the opportunity of obtaining a further many-sided culture through extended travel in various countries. He first made his mark as a poet, and his youthful work, "The Hidden Treasure," will have an honoured place in the history of Bulgarian literature. Then he won the attention of the public as the coming authority on financial matters, and under Kristevitch Pasha's Government of Eastern Roumelia he was appointed Director of Finances. After the annexation of Eastern Roumelia he went to Sofia. There he played a prominent part in political life, in which his conduct was always absolutely above reproach. All these qualities, and his gift of fluent speech, made him, after Stoiloff's death, the leader of the National party, which ranked as the strongest in the country.

T. E. GUESHOFF, PRIME MINISTER OF BULGARIA

No war can be carried on without financial preparation. The Minister of Finance is of no less importance than the Minister of War. M. Theodore Teodoroff also is one of the leading men of the National party. He is in his fifty-ninth year, and has the energy of a young man.

M. Teodoroff, thanks to his vehement eloquence, has been nicknamed "The Tiger," and the caricaturists show him in this guise in the cartoons of the daily papers that are hawked about the streets. When he begins a speech one has at first the impression that he will keep to a clear, logical, and matter-of-fact style of oratory. But suddenly he begins to warm up, a sparkle comes into his speech, and when he is excited by interruptions he hurls at his opponents words full of meaning and with the flash of a sword in them. M. Teodoroff is an inexhaustible orator. Again and again he has spoken for hours at a time, improvising on the spur of the moment, and yet in such a finished style that he has no need to be anxious about the printed report of his speech.

He lived a long time abroad, mostly in Paris. He was over thirty when he came back to Bulgaria. We observe him making his mark during the revolution at Rustchuk, when the country refused any longer to endure the Regency, and was anxious to have a Prince at its head. At meetings held in the streets M. Teodoroff protested against the oppressive political measures that Stambuloff's following, in their excess of zeal, were bringing to bear upon their opponents. And when towards the close of the year 1893, Stambuloff indicted Clementius, the Archbishop of Tirnovo, in the law-courts, for interference in politics, Teodo-

roff appeared as his counsel, and distinguished himself by a brilliant speech for the defence. This incident signalized him still further as a coming politician, and secured him a place in the Ministry of Stoiloff. Under this leader he became in the year 1894 President of the Sobranje, and two years later Minister of Finance.

In this position he showed an unusual capacity for dealing clearly with figures. Not one of the Opposition was his equal in discussions on Budget statements and railway projects. In connexion with the latter he co-operated with his colleague, the equally clear-sighted Minister of Railways, M. Madjaroff. Theirs were the plans for constructing the railways through the hills of the Staraplanina, a work that greatly improved the communications and the commercial activity of the country.

M. Teodoroff holds a distinguished place at the head of the Finance Ministry in the Gueshoff Cabinet, now in power. Almost without any help in the way of loans from abroad, he has prepared the financial groundwork of the war. He has the gift of grasping with marvellous quickness all the details of a piece of business. After he had found, during his stay in Paris last summer, that, in view of the critical situation, a loan, even under conditions it would not be easy to accept, would be impossible, he sought for ways of providing the necessary resources in Bulgaria itself. To the fifty million kronen already in hand and the savings he had himself already effected, thanks to his foresight and accurate calculations, he was able to add an issue of one hundred millions in banknotes, and to make also an issue of two hundred millions of paper money, without a crisis arising from these oper-

ations. A further substitute for a foreign loan was found in a well-organized system of requisitions.

M. Teodoroff had carefully weighed the facts of the situation, and showed how the best advantage could be derived from them. "With us," he said, "the peasant is a successful man. He has his land besides his personal property, and of late has got in very good harvests. Besides, this year, towards the middle of October, a holiday time begins for him, with the exception in some cases of a little late vintage work. In the latter part of the autumn and in winter the peasant, in this happy land of ours, has nothing to do. He eats the food he has stored up, the so-called 'Zimovischte' (winter provisions), and he sleeps. If we declare war, the peasant will not mind having to go through a campaign. His horse and his oxen will be requisitioned, but according to law he will receive a very good payment in compensation. Besides the state will provide him with food and clothing. Thus for the country folk a war in autumn is absolutely no loss, and this is the main point. The townsfolk will make the best of it. Besides, every one except the old men, the women, and the children goes to the war."

Thus it came about that the Finance Minister Teodoroff asked General Nikoforoff, the Minister of War, if he also were ready, though when he asked he already knew perfectly well that such was the case. M. Teodoroff was decidedly for war. Even during his political campaign against the warlike party of Stambuloff and the Democrats, he had more than once said, with significant emphasis: "Either friendship with Turkey, or if the Turks will not, or can-

not, be friends, then by all means — War! But for God's sake no blustering! That is not the right thing for a country that possesses an army like ours."

After the massacre of Bulgarians at Istib, M. Teodoroff said to the Prime Minister, "I am ready for any eventuality so far as regards the finances." This was last summer, after Dr. Daneff had returned from Livadia, where he had gone at the head of a mission to greet the Czar of Russia in his palace by the Black Sea.

What are M. Teodoroff's views as to the financial position of Bulgaria after the war?

So far the Budget of Bulgaria has amounted to about two hundred millions. According to the estimates of the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, it will rise to three hundred and fifty millions in the year 1914. For Bulgaria will not only have to reorganize her army and strengthen it as much as possible, but will also construct a railway to the shores of the Archipelago. Probably a bridge will also be built over the Danube near the Roumanian village of Karabia. By this means the lines to Russia and to Buda-Pesth, Vienna, Berlin, and Hamburg will be linked up with the Bulgarian railway that will be constructed to Salonica (if that city becomes Bulgarian), and otherwise to Kavalla. The distance to these two points is about the same. Bulgaria will also construct strategic railways.

For all these reasons we may anticipate that King Ferdinand's Government will raise a large foreign loan, and if possible carry through a conversion of the existing funded debt.

CHAPTER III

ON THE EVE OF THE CONFLICT

THE mosque known as the Djul-Dschamija is one of the interesting landmarks of Sofia. In the midst of the modern city its slender minaret rises up like a memorial of long vanished times. And yet only a few decades have elapsed since the muezzin from its airy height droned out his call of "Allah-il-Allah" over the Turkish city of Sofia.

The mosque has a dome. Its height and width are about ten metres. Its form and plan remind one of the Roman Pantheon on a smaller scale. According to local tradition the Emperor Trajan erected the building as a heathen temple. Under Constantine the Great it is said to have been consecrated as a Christian church, and dedicated to St. George. When the Turkish hordes came pouring in, the church was changed into a mosque, and the minaret was built. And still to this day the Koran is read in it.

There are two other mosques in Sofia — the "Tscherna Dschamija" (Black Mosque), which is now an Orthodox church, and the "Bujuk Dschamija," in which the National Museum is installed. The mosques are a memorial of the Turkish past of Bulgaria, and there are reminders of the part the Muscovite power has played in the Bulgaria of to-day, in the massive monumental church built in memory of the "Czar Liberator," and the gilded Kremlin-like cupola of the new Russian church. Minaret and

gilded dome rise close together, almost touching each other — types of the causes of the present war.

Behind a high strong railing, through the reddening autumn foliage in the cool darkness, comes the light from four windows of the "Dvorec Schlösschen," the royal residence. There the keen-sighted "Coburger" is still at work at this late hour of the night, the King who with patient tenacity has brought Bulgaria to the front as the leader of the neighbouring states now banded together against Turkey. King Ferdinand had intended to start to-day for the headquarters at Stara Zagora, but at the last moment he again deferred his departure.

The Bulgarian army has taken up its positions along the front of its advanced base, ready for the forward move that is intended to be made on Adrianople and Kustendil. It is now awaiting the arrival of its "War Lord" to begin active operations. Everything is ready for the advance. This evening the Turkish ambassador went away in a saloon carriage to Rustchuk. In edition after edition the newspapers are giving — so far as the military censorship permits — sensational news from the frontier. Men know that there is now no going back. And they want war, they are willing enough to measure themselves with the Turk, the traditional enemy of their country.

And yet this evening in the hotels and cafés of the city a report that, after all, it would not come to war found some credence. This is, perhaps, worth noting in forming a judgment of the mental attitude of, and the feeling that animated, the Bulgarian people on the eve of a terrible and sanguinary war. After talking with officials and officers of rank one had the impres-

sion that the Bulgarians had no wish to go to war for the sake of war itself, but faced it as an inevitable fact. Outwardly they seemed calm and self-possessed, but as they spoke there came — almost softly whispered — the anxious question, "Shall we win?"

On my journey from Belgrade to Sofia I had occasion once more to recognize tokens of the wide cleavage that has from old times existed between the Servian and the Bulgarian character — a gap that now seems to have been bridged over by comradeship in war.

As I soon informed my newspaper by a telegram, I had for my travelling companion in the same railway compartment the famous Servian guerilla leader, Jevitch. Beside him sat the Bulgarian envoy, Generol Liaptscheff. The veteran leader of guerilla bands organized by the national "Committees," a regular Fra Diavolo figure in the costume of the Macedonian Serbs, threw out flashes of hatred against Austria, avoided conversation with the Bulgarian, and showed unconcealed jealousy at any praise of the brave men of Montenegro. He spoke with scorn of these brothers of the Servians, and gave it as his opinion that Prince Nikita would never have been able to raid Albania if he had not known that its western border was "well watched" by others. He raged against everything that was not Servian. He worked himself up into an excited megalomania that tore itself to tatters. As I listened to his blustering talk, there came involuntarily to my mind the Croat proverb, coined to satirize the Gascons of Servia: "Srpsko nebo, srbska boja, u njem stanuje srbin bog, srpski mu andjeli i srpska mu glasba svira" — "A

Servian heaven with Servian colours, a Servian God dwelling therein, and Servian angels praising Him and playing Servian music to Him."

Of course our "Komitadji" would like to make all Macedonia Servian, and the bounds of his "Greater Servia" would extend from the Adriatic to the Archipelago. In his fancy Danube, Save, and Drina were easily marked out as its frontier rivers. It is truly remarkable that the Servian never understands that he must reckon with actual realities, that he can learn nothing from history. Of course there are in the Servian kingdom common-sense men who take things as they really are, but they seem to be still in such a small minority, in comparison with the thoughtless shouters, that they cannot exert any serious influence on the destinies of their country.

There was also in the same compartment a traveller from Belgrade, the proprietor of a hotel and a cinematograph show. He was a comfortable-looking, thick-set man of forty-six years of age. He had lived for twenty years in Constantinople. His manner and expressions showed a strong touch of the Turkish fashion. It was amusing to see how out of the very eyes of this good man, whose cap was the only military thing about him, there stared a terror of hand-to-hand conflict with the Turk. He had never had a "shooting-iron" in his hands, and now, with bayonet and quick-firing rifle, he must take vengeance for the battle of the Kossovo Polje.[1] He freely unbosomed himself of his ideas on the policy of the Prime Minister Pasitch, and his voice became louder and louder, and he gesticulated, as he told us with scorn that he

[1] The great defeat of Servia by the Turks in 1389.

DEPARTURE OF TROOPS

THE LAST LEVY (PARTY OF ARMED PEASANTS)

would like to see Pasitch himself with a rifle and bombs tramping off into Old Servia, and proving the justice of his policy over there. But for the matter of that they are always speaking ill of Pasitch, and as if to confirm their mistrust of him they point out that he happens to be of Bulgarian extraction.

The sending of the Servian Timok and Morava divisions to Bulgaria was regarded with very mixed feelings in Servia. It was said that, instead of being placed under Bulgarian command and sent against Adrianople, these two divisions could be employed elsewhere with more advantage to Servian interests.

As the train, travelling at a slow rate, passed through the Dragomir defile, now guarded by armed Bulgarian peasants, General Liaptscheff became extremely animated. His eyes flashed with the fire of youth, as he pointed out to me from the carriage window the scenes of the battle of Slivnitza. There — on the left of the line — was the bare rounded summit of Petroff Krist, where Bendereff, with a small force of Bulgarians, performed prodigies of valour. There to the right were the heights of Breznik, where, in a struggle that lasted four days, the Servian flanking column tried in vain to break through. Further back by the mouth of the defile, on the hillside, was the place where the "Battenberger" had his headquarters.

"Yes, it was a grand time," said this veteran of Slivnitza as he ended his explanation. Then pointing with a smile to a Servian transport column marching in the direction of Küstendül, he remarked that once, over there near Vel-Budscha, the Servians had actually defeated the Bulgarians after a furious fight. A

sketch of the positions at Slivnitza, which General Liaptscheff drew in my note-book, will be for me a pleasant souvenir of the interesting explanation of the battle given to me by this veteran,who took part in the victory. A deep and genuine patriotism, inspiring a belief in the natural development of his race, rang in every word of this highly cultured man.

Now for a few military observations: — I saw several groups of men belonging to the first and second divisions of the Third Levy of Servia. Judged by our standard the Second Levy is good enough. They are strong young men. But the Third Levy is altogether a strange affair. Of military appearance they have generally speaking not a trace. They are a mob of underfed, sullen-looking peasants. One cannot understand why these people were called out for military service, for they can be only an absolute encumbrance to the troops of the line, and this to a very appreciable extent. Granted they may be of some use in watching the railway line. But I cannot possibly imagine them acting as a garrison worth the least consideration in the newly constructed earthworks that flank the bridge-head at Semendria. If one thinks of the struggle that raged for days around the Russian works at Mukden, and of the nerve, the physical endurance, the tenacity and the discipline that infantry in such a position must possess, the responsibility of sending forward combatants like these seems nothing less than awful. I heard in Nish that a considerable number of the Third Levy of the other divisions, — such a proportion of them, roughly speaking, as was not required for guarding communications — were to go into the fighting line on the Turkish frontier. How

these people were to bear the hardships of military operations in a difficult mountain region would be a puzzle for any one who had seen these awkward-looking figures in their strange field kit.

The troops of the line and the greater part of the Second Levy are, on the other hand, very good, — well set up and well armed. All wore the new grey uniform with stout winter cloaks. Though a good many were tired with marching, they held themselves well. And there was very little fault to be found with the general discipline. There was a fairly large number of officers called back to the service, and many of these one would hardly take for officers, not even in uniform, unless one could see the badges of rank. One remarked that the packs of the men were apparently not excessively heavy, though they had to carry a lot of cooking-kit, kettles and pans, all brand-new and bright.

Some cavalry, that I happened to see, looked good. The little Bosnian horses seemed sound enough, with plenty of endurance. I hear that the Servian artillery teams also show remarkably good material. A regiment that I saw setting off for Küstendül by rail had not brought a single horse with it. The horses, I was told, were "in camp" at Caribrod.

The mobilization of the Servian reserve formations, according to the accounts given by well-informed persons, appear to have been completed with unexpected smoothness and speed. The First Levy was complete within six days. The people bravely responded to the call to arms, even though, as I had the opportunity of convincing myself in several actual instances, they had not always any clear idea as to the

object and the necessity of war. Outside the population of the districts near the frontier, the Servian peasants of the central districts and the north of the country understood nothing about the purpose of the war. There was discontent — political discontent with the Radical Government, — but mistrust of the "Gentlemen at Belgrade," and most of all of Pasitch, is chronic and characteristic of the internal state of feeling in Servia. And this discontent found expression in the frankest words.

In Bulgaria the situation is essentially of quite another kind. Here the war is regarded as a national necessity, a conjuncture that knows nothing of going backwards, but forwards only without regard for the sacrifices that may be required. During these days I had frequent opportunities of conversing with the officers. They hoped for victory, relying on the long years of previous preparation. This confidence, however, was of a kind that had some reserve in it, and not like that of a Servian captain at Caribrod railway station who shouted to me an invitation to "meet me again in Stamboul."

The spirit of self-sacrifice shown by the Bulgarian people was altogether admirable. There was a mother who sent her favourite son to the army, though he was not legally liable to military service, and she already had two other sons with the colours. The President of the Assembly, Dr. Daneff, has two sons. Both went to the army and their father with them. So it was with nearly every one in the country. At Sofia a card party in a café was pointed out to me — they were a professor, a lawyer, a physician, and a business man. They were having a quiet game, and three of them

were to set off next morning for Macedonia to serve in a guerilla band. It appears that they were Macedonians by birth.

The training of the volunteers for this guerilla warfare in Macedonia was interesting. In their "Camp" in a meadow out to the west of Sofia they were being taught to shoot and to throw bombs. As soon as a certain number had been thus drilled, they were united in a group, and went across the frontier. Men of all classes were to be found in such detachments. It is a curiously interesting fact that one of these "Komitadjis" was a violent Social Democrat. At the hotel Zum Goldenen Hirschen the Social Democrats had a table of their own, where they discussed current events. And amongst them the keenest opponent of the war was the aforesaid guerilla recruit and pupil in the art of bomb-throwing.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR

BULGARIA is above all a country of farmers and peasants. Three fourths of the population are engaged in work on the land. The remaining quarter, the townsfolk, live in the cities and towns, and it is these who to a greater or less extent busy themselves with politics. Naturally from the politician's point of view the country people form "the unorganized mass."

The originator of this phrase, "the unorganized mass," was the leader of the Democratic party, the former Prime Minister Malinoff. And he it was who showed that a cabinet need not always have the support of a great number of professional politicians in order to secure victory at the elections. For when M. Alexander Malinoff was called to take the helm of public affairs, he had only two supporters in the Sobranje, or more strictly speaking only one, for notwithstanding the limited numbers of the party he could hardly count himself as one of his own supporters. At the same time one need only remember the circumstances of the Bulgarian declaration of independence in the year 1908 to realize how firmly he held the rudder of the state.

The fact is that as a general rule the Bulgarian farmers and peasants give their votes to whoever happens to be at the head of affairs, on condition, of course, that they feel they can trust him, and above

all his promises to them. But as one can imagine, this does not always happen. Then, too, it may not be possible for a party to remain in power that at another time seemed well fitted to form the ruling element in the state. Thus, in view of national interests only, at certain times even the National party itself was not always in the best position for conducting the government. For various reasons the population of the country districts was often more favourably disposed to the more moderate parties, or to the Democrats.

Naturally, the wise policy of the King makes him nearly always play a considerable part in the formation of a government. In very many cases the King has preferred to carry through with the help of this or that party a policy that was not in their original programme, or that they had even on various occasions opposed.

Thus, for instance, the Democrats were strong opponents of any declaration of independence being made before Macedonia was liberated, and they would have nothing to do with "Czardom." This very policy of declaring the independence of Bulgaria was, however, a leading point in the programme of the Liberals under Dr. Vassili Radoslavoff and M. Dimitri Tontscheff. But in the year 1907, when Prince Ferdinand had made up his mind to proclaim himself, at the first opportunity, the "Czar" of an independent Bulgaria, he did not call to the helm the ex-Premier and leader of the strongest party in the country, Dr. Radoslavoff, who had been so fiercely attacked by the Democrats for his "Czar-making policy." On the contrary, the man he chose was the lawyer, M. Alexander Malinoff, who had gained popularity solely on account of his

bitterly hostile policy against Radoslavoff and Tontscheff, and after the death of Petko Karaveloff had been elected to his place as leader of the Democrats.

In the same way when, later on, the King had become convinced that war would soon have to be declared against Turkey, — for the Young Turks were going beyond even the excesses of the Hamidian régime, — he still did not turn to the old bellicose party of Stambuloff, which he had so long maintained in power in days when his object was, while avoiding war, at the same time to get the army thoroughly prepared for it. No. The sharp-sighted King thought at once of M. Gueshoff, the leader of the Conservative Nationals, who were being attacked as the greatest of Turcophiles, not only in the newspaper organs of the war party, but also at meetings in the streets. And it is in fact quite correct to say that M. Gueshoff was friendly to the Turks, and above all a friend of peace.

But King Ferdinand, who can see through every man he has once spoken to, knew something. He knew that there could be no question of mere ambition to hold office in the case of a politician like M. Gueshoff, who was considered to be, next to himself, the richest man in Bulgaria; who was now over sixty years of age; and who would not be likely to have for a second time the opportunity of becoming the head of a cabinet. M. Gueshoff had long had the reputation of being one of the most highly educated men in Bulgaria. He had been recognized as a statesman even in Prince Alexander's days, and indeed he had played a distinguished part as one of the plenipotentiaries in the peace negotiations at Bucharest between

the Servians and Bulgarians after the victories of Slivnitza, Zaribrod, and Pirot. M. Gueshoff had also been Minister of Finance in Stoiloff's Cabinet under Prince Alexander, and had introduced many regulations in his department, that are still in force.

But he could not rest upon his earlier laurels. All who know Ivan Eostratieff Gueshoff well — and above all the King — can easily understand his "heart's desire" — "I too want to do something for my fellow countrymen!" And the words "for my fellow countrymen" have a very special significance for M. Gueshoff. Even in the old days of Turkish rule he was working for the national cause of Bulgaria. This was why he was thrown into prison by the Turks, and brought almost in sight of the gallows. It was only at the most critical moment that he was saved by the intervention of the British consul at Philippopolis. Gueshoff meant to link his name with the history of Bulgaria. This few fully understood, but it was on this account that King Ferdinand called to the helm Gueshoff, "the lover of peace," and his "peace-loving" party.

It is a fact worth noting that in this country where the democratic spirit is so strongly marked, among all political parties indifferently, the organization of the "Nationals" — that is the party of which M. Gueshoff is the leader — maintains such an iron discipline in its proceedings that the young people who attach themselves to it become assimilated to their leaders and elders, after the shortest possible of probations, by following their methods. One does not observe the same thing in the other political parties. One need only refer to the divisions that have arisen in all of them.

The Liberal party, which like the Conservative (now the National) party began with the creation of the Constitution, split up into all manner of sections. First there were the Liberals under Dr. Vassili Radoslavoff, and the Russophiles under Dragan Zankoff. Then the latter divided into the Karavelists (the Democrats of to-day), and the Zankovists (now the Progressists, under the able leadership of Dr. Daneff). Stambuloff, when he became dictator, broke off from the Liberals under Dr. Radoslavoff, and called the party that supported him the "National Liberals." They are now under the leadership of, on the one hand, Dr. Nikola Genadieff, on the other, of General Ratscho Petroff, Dr. Goteff, and Dr. Stoikoff.

Later on there was formed in the Liberal party of Radoslavoff yet another wing under M. Tontscheff, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Radoslavoff's party is naturally the strongest "Liberal party," strong in itself and by itself. But all the same it does not form a united whole, like the Conservative party, which under Stoiloff took the name of "National," and since his death has, under the same name, had M. Gueshoff for its leader. It is remarkable that the former Conservative, now the National party, though it, too, has had its critical moments, has never split up into sections, while the old Liberal party has experienced a division over every great event.

This has been the result of, above all, the character of the party leaders. When the Constitution was being framed in the historic capital of the old Bulgarian Czars, the leaders on the Liberal side were for the most part men who had acquired their influence in the

THE LAST ROLL-CALL BEFORE MARCHING OUT OF BARRACKS

DETACHMENT OF RESERVISTS WAITING TO GO OFF BY TRAIN

country in the days of the struggle over the separation of the Bulgarian church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Such, for instance, were old Dragan Zankoff, Marko Balabanoff, and the poet Ratscho Slaveikoff. These men had a tendency towards Russia.

When the Government at St. Petersburg saw that it could not impose a Russian Prince on Bulgaria, there was no further thought of introducing an autocratic régime in the newly created principality. But Russia meant to play a part in Bulgaria, and this, too, as directly as possible. This was why the Russian consuls of that time influenced MM. Zankoff, Balabanoff, and Slaveikoff in favour of a very Liberal constitution. And so it came to pass that it was the autocracy of Russia that suggested an ideal constitution for Bulgaria.

M. Radoslavoff was then very young, and while he was a member of the Great Sobranje he was actually busy with the preparation of his thesis for the Faculty of Law of Heidelberg. He, too, could not at that time escape from Russian influence. One must also remember that the Liberals of the day were mostly men of the Revolution. Many of them had taken part in the insurrection in Bulgaria in the year 1875, which was the prelude to the Russo-Turkish War. A Revolutionist in the front ranks of the Liberal party was the young Stambuloff, who had carried the flag of the famous national hero and lyric poet Christo Boteff. Amongst the framers of the Liberal constitution was also Stepan Stambuloff, who on account of his free-thinking ideas had been expelled from the Russian Seminary at Odessa, and sent out of Russia.

Men of quite another kind formed and led the Con-

servative party. It was made up of well-to-do townsfolk, of the so-called "Tschorbadja" (i. e., people who can afford to have soup and meat every day). One can easily understand that the "Tschorbadja" had always to be more or less the losers by disturbances of any kind. So even under the Turkish rule they were good friends with the Turks, and were always dreaming of peaceful reforms and of a slow and sure development of "the rights of man." The "Tschorbadja" were always in favour of some line of action that was to be carried through chiefly by the Church, and they had also been active in the solution of the ecclesiastical question as to the separation from the Patriarchate, and the erection of the Exarchate in Constantinople. The Revolutionists on the other hand — the Liberals of a later date — had taken for their watchword the saying of the Revolutionary leader, Ljuben Karaveloff, "Freedom needs no Exarch, but only a Karadja!" (Stepan Karadja was a rebel, who had died heroically for the freedom of his country.)

And who were the leaders of the Conservatives? They bore names that were quite new to the people. First there was Dr. Constantine Stoiloff, a man of culture, educated at Robert College, the American school of Constantinople; then at the University of Heidelberg, and after that in Paris. He had a rare gift of eloquence. Then there was Grigori Natschovitsch, who had studied at Paris, and returned from Vienna, where he had lived many years, to help his native land in the Russo-Turkish War.

Beside Stoiloff and Natschovitsch stood Dimitri Grekoff, who had also studied in France, and after

having practiced for many years as an advocate at Braila in Roumania, had lately returned to his native land. The leaders of the Conservative party were "new men" — "Westerns" as the Russians called them. In fact what drew these three leaders together was their education in western Europe. Otherwise Stoiloff, Natschovitsch, and Grekoff were rather different in mind and character. Probably these men felt like strangers in their own land, from which they had been so long absent. But each of them had brought back with him from the West a considerable ballast of knowledge and experience. Stoiloff was the youngest of the three. He was hardly twenty-five years of age. But his whole bearing, his charm of eloquence, his simple courtesy, brought him to the front. Natschovitsch, the one who survived his comrades, is a splendid conversationalist though no orator, exceptionally clever, a singularly hard worker, and so astute that in the opposing camp he was nicknamed "Beelzebub." Grekoff was a tall, strong Bulgarian with a spontaneous eloquence, and at the same time a very gifted and able lawyer. Moreover, he was always very self-possessed and cautious in his proceedings.

These "Westerns" at once perceived the danger from Russia. Though they were much better qualified than the leaders of the Liberals — who with the exception of young Radoslavoff were no jurists — to understand the meaning of international and constitutional law, they were at the outset not particularly pleased with the idea of an English constitution — without English citizens, but with only Russophile electors! The leaders of the Conservatives would have preferred a more restricted constitution.

Such was the origin of the divergent policies of the two parties, "Conservatives" and "Liberals." Out of the controversies in the press and the debates in the Sobranje there came the nickname of "the peace party" for the "Nationals" and "Progressists," that is for those who now form the existing coalition under M. Gueshoff, who has had to declare war; while the "Nationalist parties" became the current description of the "Liberal" party under M. Radoslavoff, and all the sections that broke off from it, which were as we have seen — the "Young Liberals" under Tontscheff; the "Stambulovists" under Genadieff; the "Dissident Stambulovists" under General Ratscho Petroff, Goteff and Stoikoff, and the Democrats under Malinoff; — that is to say, all the parties that cried out for war, but for various reasons never got so far.

Of course there are also Social Democrats in Bulgaria. They are represented in the Sobranje by a very intelligent and moderate man, Janko Sakazoff. The Social Democrats of Bulgaria, belonging as they do to a thoroughly practical minded people, are really Opportunists, and it is fairly certain that M. Janko Sakazoff will before very long be a minister in a *bourgeois* cabinet. During my journey to Kadinkoi I saw him making a pilgrimage to that place, where amongst those who fell, when it was stormed by the Bulgarians, many enthusiastic Social Democrats died like heroes.

This singularly industrious and frugal people of Bulgaria has had great political leaders, distinguished men, both in the past and also in the present time. One need only mention Stambuloff, who during eight years as dictator carried on with successful results the struggle against the would-be predominance of Russia.

How many plots against him and against the as yet unpopular Prince were engineered from Russia! And how thoroughly Stambuloff destroyed all the conspiracies of the Russians and swept from his path all the difficulties they put in his way! Stambuloff was a wild and singularly clever Revolutionist, who had come unscathed out of the strife against the Turkish enemy among the hills of Bulgaria. But he was also a fatalist, and one can easily trace the results of this, and of his romantic temperament, in the violent excesses of his internal policy. When he had come down from the hills and been repulsed from his home as a good-for-nothing son of the household, he left his native place, wonderful historic Tirnovo, and went away to Rustchuk. There he practiced as an advocate and soon became a recognized authority on criminal law. Then he went in seriously for politics, in which Machiavelli was his teacher and Bismarck his model. With his musical, though somewhat metallic, voice he soon made his mark among the Liberal speakers, and later formed out of a section of them his "National Liberal" party.

Stambuloff quickly showed that he was a clever journalist. With the help of some of his earlier friends of revolutionary days, the author Zachari Stoianoff, and Dimitri Petkoff (later on his successor), who had lost his left arm at the Schipka Pass, he founded his newspaper the "Svoboda," which had great influence. But Stambuloff knew his own deficiencies, and though he slept little in order to read much, he felt his need of the "Westerns" and sought to win them to his side.

He drew to himself first of all Natschovitsch, then Grekoff, and finally Stoiloff also. Stoiloff had lost his

post as chief of the Private Chancellery of the Court on the deposition of Prince Alexander, to whom he had remained loyal to the last.

When Stambuloff became Regent, the internal disorders stirred up by Russia soon made him realize the pressing necessity of finding a suitable Prince for Bulgaria. With this matter to be arranged he had recourse directly to Stoiloff and Grekoff, and later to the astute Natschovitsch, who was then Bulgarian envoy at Bucharest, where he had enough to do to foil the intrigues of the Russians.

After the election of Prince Ferdinand, and from the day when he first set foot on the soil of Bulgaria on the bank of the Danube at Rustchuk, Stambuloff was Prime Minister for eight years in succession. He had the superhuman task of maintaining order in the country and keeping Prince Ferdinand on the throne, despite the ill-will of Russia. Stambuloff had once more to work in co-operation with the leaders of the Conservatives, and Stoiloff, Grekoff, and Natschovitsch received portfolios in the ministry. These three Conservatives were his greatest and most direct helpers in his work. But he had also indirect assistance from the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Sofia, Baron Burian, and the cabinets of London, Berlin, Rome, and Vienna, on whose support Prince Ferdinand could depend. That Stambuloff received good counsel from these capitals, when the Prince required it, may be gathered from the Memoirs of Francesco Crispi.

That Stambuloff always felt an attraction for anything or anybody of a kindly nature is some proof that he himself was of a kindly disposition. But the

frequent plots that were directed against him, and the stern measures of police repression that were the consequence of them, destroyed at last all ethical standards of policy in his thoughts and feelings. His hands were deeply tinged with blood. His friend Stoiloff, and then Natschovitsch, found that they could no longer defend his actions. Grekoff remained in the Cabinet, for he was a *bon vivant*, and had need of his official income. But foreign countries too began to pass adverse judgments on Stambuloff's unscrupulous methods of government.

He neglected a good opportunity of resigning and spending a few years in voluntary exile, after the marriage of Prince Ferdinand to the daughter of the Duke of Parma. The young Princess Maria Louisa regarded Stambuloff as a terrible man. The protests and demonstrations in the streets at meetings of citizens and students could no longer be repressed, and at last Prince Ferdinand, who valued the veteran dictator and had often given him proofs of this, accepted on June 1, 1894, the not altogether voluntary resignation of Stambuloff. From the windows of his palace the Prince was a spectator of the painful scenes that followed, when Stambuloff drove away to his house amid open threats and the stones hurled at him by the mob excited by the Opposition. In this fashion the direction of affairs was resigned by a great statesman, who ought then to have left Bulgaria for some time, in order that with the lapse of a few years the severities of his dictatorship might pass into oblivion. Thus, too, he might have escaped the tragic and close-impending fate that his friends foresaw for him.

These general remarks on the period of which

Stambuloff was the hero will suffice to make the political evolution of Bulgaria intelligible. We shall have to refer to these events again in connexion with later occurrences. Here we may note that it would be a mistake to judge the severity that Stambuloff used against his opponents — which sometimes degenerated into wild excesses and into quite a systematic persecution of the Opposition — as the outcome of his temperament or of his Eastern education. The success, moreover, with which the dictator himself was finally hounded from his lofty place has this result, that one cannot compare him with his model, Bismarck. One thinks rather of Richelieu or of Mazarin, or again of Cæsar Borgia at Florence, when one analyzes the details of Stambuloff's policy. He began to play a really leading part at the age of thirty, and he was only forty-five when, a year after his fall, still pursued by the hatred of his enemies, who were urged on by Russia, he was struck down by assassins in one of the streets of Sofia. His tragic end evoked a large store of latent sympathy, and inspired a calmer judgment of his splendid political services to his native land.

The annexation of Eastern Roumelia in the year 1885 was prepared by young politicians like the highly gifted Dimitri Rizoff, now the envoy of Bulgaria at Rome. Prince Alexander journeyed from Tirnovo to Philippopolis. On the way, as he passed over the heights of the Balkans, he felt, as he had never felt before, the burden of responsibility arising from the long desired annexation that he was to proclaim at Philippopolis. On one of the mountain heights once more the question was debated of the

complications that were so easy to forecast. Stambuloff feared that the matter might perhaps be delayed, and that then Russia, which took a hostile view of the proposed annexation, would be able to prevent it. So he spoke, with the energy and feeling that was all his own, the words: "Prince, make the sign of the Cross and go on to Philippopolis, for henceforth there are only two roads open to you — the one, across the Danube — to Darmstadt — the other to Philippopolis!"

Stambuloff was somewhat shy and restrained in his relations with the Court, and although Prince Alexander did not regard him the less favourably on this account, yet he hardly expected that after his mysterious abduction Stambuloff would venture to go in quest of him, and invite him to return to Bulgaria. On this occasion he showed himself the best servant of the Prince, who would certainly have remained in Bulgaria had he not received at Rustchuk a telegram from the Russian Emperor Alexander III conveying the sharpest of warnings. The result was that after his splendid reception at Sofia, Prince Alexander made up his mind — *bon gré, mal gré* — that he would no longer rule over Bulgaria, and, in the midst of the tears of his people and of his friends, went away to embark on a steamer on the Danube. Stambuloff accompanied him as far as Turn Severin, and there bade a touching farewell to his Prince, the victor of Slivnitza, and then returned to assume the most difficult of responsibilities as Regent of Bulgaria.

Soon after this he had to bathe his hands in blood and mercilessly hunt down and punish the politicians and officers who had been hypnotized by Russia into

attempting a revolution, and who failed to escape to the country whose agents they had become. These measures cost Stambuloff himself many tears. For one of the victims was his best friend, Olympii Panoff, a hero of Slivnitza. So instead of Prince Alexander it was the Regent who had to go onward over thirty corpses. But Stambuloff had now the army in hand, and with M. Radoslavoff, whom he called to the Premiership, he freed Bulgaria from Russia, which had freed the Bulgarians from the Turks.

The quest for another Prince was no longer impossible, though it was difficult enough. When Stambuloff, under the newly elected Prince Ferdinand, felt once more the anger of Russia, and a conspiracy against the Prince was discovered, another hero of the Servo-Bulgarian War, the famous Major Panitza, was condemned and shot by sentence of a court-martial. But Panitza had many friends, especially among the Macedonians, and enjoyed also an immense popularity in Bulgaria. A friend of Panitza's was the present Bulgarian ambassador at Rome, Dimitri Rizoff. He was also a personal enemy of Stambuloff, and he warned him that he would yet be driven into exile abroad, in a letter he wrote to him before the execution of Panitza. After Panitza was shot his friends were persecuted. Thus, for example, Rizoff, who was an enemy neither of Prince Alexander nor of Prince Ferdinand, had himself to go into exile, on account of his strong protests against the sanguinary régime of Stambuloff. He was condemned to death in his absence for having written to Stambuloff that the head of the dictator would also fall.

It was a failing of Stambuloff's that he trusted too much to his agents, and in this way drove men of strong character out of the country. But from abroad they carried on a most energetic campaign against him. Thus M. Rizoff went away to Belgium and France; old Dragan Zankoff, with his son-in-law, the present Minister of the Interior, M. Alexander Ljudskanoff, to St. Petersburg; and besides these there was a crowd of other refugees who went abroad, men of intelligence and education who, once they were safe out of the country, worked and wrote mostly against Stambuloff personally, but sometimes against the whole government of Bulgaria.

Those who remained in the country saw how actively the energy of Stambuloff displayed itself in many directions. In the first place the army was reorganized, improved in many ways, and rearmed, by the Minister of War, Savoff, the generalissimo of to-day. Officers were sent to study in the military schools abroad, but only in those of western Europe. Others were sent on special missions to the manœuvres in Austria, Germany, and Italy, and later on in France also. Under Stambuloff's government large barracks were built, and the military school of Sofia erected. But he gave his attention not only to the army, but also to education, finance, railway development, and the improvement of the economic condition of the people.

He was the first Bulgarian statesman who clearly foresaw what would be the future relations of his country with Turkey, and with this in view began to prepare Bulgaria for its task. That he believed in war rather than in peace with Turkey is shown by the deep interest he took in the army, and by his choice

of Savoff, then holding the rank of major, to be his Minister of War. Savoff had attracted him by his brilliant intellect, his inexhaustible energy, and his extraordinary patriotic zeal.

A dictator of such rare capacity as Stambuloff could, of course, accomplish great things in eight years, and, even if his thoughts turned to war, he could not leave the blessings of peace out of account. Thus he was particularly accessible to the ideas of Natschovitsch, and he sought to conclude with Turkey some kind of friendly understanding, in the hope that in this way Bulgarian influence would be increased, and the idea of a Greater Bulgaria would gain strength in Macedonia and at Adrianople. For this purpose he himself went to Constantinople, where the Sultan Abdul Hamid gave him a brilliant reception at Yildiz. But thanks to Russian opposition the attempt came to nothing, and soon after the "Turcophile" Stambuloff began to send now and then an occasional "ultimatum" to the Porte, which, by the way, was always in haste to give him satisfaction. For the Sultan used to say that Stambuloff was "a mad fellow," and capable of anything.

Thus this energetic statesman was concentrating all the "Nationalism" of Bulgaria against Turkey. Once he gave Servia a sharp lesson when she was creating difficulties in Macedonia. Perhaps in order to recall the memories of Slivnitza he allowed the following words to appear in the organ of his party: "If the Servians continue this kind of policy, we shall see the ravens gathering over the Servian embassy in Sofia, as they now gather on the roof of the empty Russian embassy." (Under Stambuloff's régime

Russia had no representative at Sofia.) As to his relations with the neighbouring states, one may say, broadly and generally speaking, that they were excellent, especially those with Roumania and Turkey. If events do not actually repeat themselves in history, there is often a strong parallelism between one period and another, and it is possible that before long the way will once more be prepared for a policy of conciliation with Roumania and Turkey, if indeed this may not already have begun at Chatalja.

Prince Ferdinand wished that if possible the policy of the internal consolidation of the country, begun by Stambuloff, should be continued by the Stambulovists and Conservatives, but without the dictator, whose resignation he had accepted. Dimitri Grekoff, who had not left the ministry with Natschovitsch and Stoiloff, but who had remained with Stambuloff until his downfall, was, at the Prince's request, to undertake the formation of a cabinet. Although Grekoff knew that he was now the *persona gratissima* of the Court, he was too closely bound to Stambuloff to regard with calmness his dismissal from the premiership. Perhaps it would have been better for Stambuloff if Grekoff had remained at the helm, for it would have certainly been easier for the latter to save the fallen dictator from the assassination that threatened him. The attacks made at the time upon Prince Ferdinand, in which it was alleged that he had sacrificed the ex-dictator, are clearly baseless, if only because of the fact that he wished to have in the premiership the trusted friend of Stambuloff, Grekoff, who, however, declined the task of forming a ministry.

There was then nothing left for the Prince but to turn to Stoiloff, whose name was suggested to him by the whole of the Opposition themselves. And now Stoiloff formed the great coalition cabinet of the year 1894, with Radoslavoff and Tontscheff. Natschovitsch was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Gueshoff, who after the conclusion of peace with Servia had gone back to Bucharest, undertook the Finances. Under Stambuloff these had been very well administered, first of all by Natschovitsch, and then by the present envoy to Vienna, M. Ivan Salabascheff.

At the elections a few months later misunderstandings arose in the coalition, which was made up of the Conservatives under Stoiloff and the Liberals under Radoslavoff. The Conservatives, though in no sense a Russophile party, felt themselves obliged to initiate a friendly policy towards Russia. For the people demanded that the Crown Prince Boris should change from the Catholic to the Græco-Oriental Church. Stambuloff had incurred a good deal of ill-will in the country when he altered the article of the Constitution which set forth that the Crown Prince must be a Græco-Oriental. If, however, this change had not been made at the time (in the year 1892), Prince Ferdinand certainly could not have married the Princess Maria Louisa, and thus strengthened his position in the country by the founding of a dynasty. The "Western" Stoiloff and the Russophile Natschovitsch adopted a policy of friendliness to Russia. Its result was the reconciliation of the St. Petersburg Government with Prince Ferdinand, and the Czar Nicholas, represented by Kutosoff, acted as the godfather at the baptism of Prince Boris. Then

the Bulgarian officers who had taken refuge in Russia came back to Sofia, and at their head, reinstated in his rank of colonel, was the soldier who is known to-day as the hero of Kirk Kilissé, Lule Burgas, and Chorlu.

As one can easily understand, the officers directly responsible for the abduction and dethroning of Prince Alexander — Bendereff and Grueff — remained in Russia. Stoiloff had refused to receive them back on any consideration, although Bendereff had specially distinguished himself as a tactician of real genius at Slivnitza. Old Dragan Zankoff, too, came back to Sofia; and the leader of the Democrats, the ex-Premier Karaveloff, who on account of his dangerous hostility against the Prince had been imprisoned in the "Tscherna Dschamija" (the Black Mosque) was set at liberty.

The excitable and often impulsive Democratic politician, M. Dimitri Rizoff, was amnestied, and returned from his exile at Brussels, to devote himself to the Macedonian question. Although he was a political opponent of Stoiloff (as he had been of Stambuloff), he was sent by the Government as consul-general to Macedonia, where he was probably the first to lay the foundations for the future Macedonian revolt. M. Rizoff is a Macedonian from Monastir, and it was only with reluctance that the Turks consented to accept his appointment as consul-general. Stoiloff denied the insinuation that he had sent Rizoff to Macedonia in order to get an embarrassing member of the Opposition out of the country. Prince Ferdinand liked Rizoff, notwithstanding his brusque ways in politics, and perhaps

also because, even when he was in the midst of his hard fight with Stambuloff, he had foiled a plot against the Prince.

Under Stoiloff the Macedonian movement began, and for the first time arose the idea of a "Balkan League." True, he was busy enough with the carrying through of his programme of internal consolidation. He completed most of his railway projects with the help of his Minister of Railways, the very capable M. Mihael Madjaroff, now Bulgarian ambassador in London. Stoiloff did good service in the economic development of the country, but for this he had as his fellow workers in the Cabinet such exceptionally clever and practical men of affairs as Ivan Eostratieff Gueshoff, the present Prime Minister, and Theodore Teodoroff, now Minister of Finance, who, as we shall see, did such good service in the preparation and the carrying on of the war with Turkey.

But occupied as he was with these matters, it is none the less true that Stoiloff carried on a secret Nationalist policy with such great results that it could not remain entirely hidden. In the year 1895 an insurrection broke out in Macedonia. When this happened the fanatically Conservative M. Natschovitsch talked of resigning his post. But on its tragic failure he decided that he would remain at the head of the Foreign Office, making it a condition that henceforth precautions should be taken to prevent a premature revolt breaking out in Macedonia.

Nevertheless the Macedonian movement went on, even though there were to be no insurrections. Stoiloff agreed that committees should be formed throughout Macedonia. The Macedonian Lieutenant

Sarafoff retired from the Bulgarian army to devote himself to the task of liberating his country. Several other officers followed his example — about a third of the Bulgarian officer corps is made up of Macedonians. The first president of the Macedonian Central Committee at Sofia was General Mikulaeff, then on the retired list, and later, after he had left the Committee, Minister of War under Malinoff.

Stoiloff established several new consulates in Macedonia, and he erected sees for Bulgarian bishops at various places in Turkey. He was able to do this by making the waiving of any objection on the part of the Ottoman Government the condition on which Bulgaria remained neutral in the year 1897, when the Græco-Turkish War broke out.

After the conclusion of peace, Stoiloff was anxious to establish good relations with the defeated Greeks, and sent a Bulgarian ambassador to Athens. Notwithstanding the criticism of the Democrats that the budget was being burdened with the cost of "useless embassies," he also established an ambassador at Cettinje. Improved relations with Servia culminated in a meeting of the Servian and Bulgarian Ministers at Nish. And then came the visit of King Alexander of Servia to Sofia. This more friendly state of feeling between the two countries was the work of the Bulgarian envoy to Belgrade, M. Mihalaki Georgieff, and the Premier, M. Gjoko Simitch, a moderate Radical, formerly Servian ambassador at Vienna. But the newly restored friendship broke down on account of the exaggerated ambitions of Servia, and on the occasion of the visit of Prince Ferdinand to Cettinje accompanied by his representative at Belgrade, M.

Mihalaki Georgieff. For the policy of Servia was irreconcilable with that of Montenegro, chiefly for dynastic reasons. This was the end of Stoiloff's efforts to coöperate with Servia.

Stoiloff's Cabinet was succeeded in 1899 by that of the Grekoff-Radoslavoff coalition. Meanwhile the ex-King Milan had come back to Belgrade, and notwithstanding the brotherly meeting of Servians and Bulgarians at Nish, he made a speech in that very place as commander-in-chief of the army, in which he said that he would yet put gold on the iron decorations bestowed on the Servian officers who had been wounded at Slivnitza. The relations between Sofia and Belgrade became worse and worse, and the Bulgarian newspapers quoted the words that Karaveloff had once used: "The way for Bulgaria to Macedonia and Salonica lies through Nish!"

Even under the next administration at Sofia, that of Ivantschoff and Radoslavoff, the relations between Bulgaria and Servia continued to be very strained. And, on the other hand, the mutterings of the Macedonian agitation became louder and more menacing. Radoslavoff was extremely favourable to the Macedonians, who had by this time got together considerable resources for the revolutionary movement. Boris Sarafoff was at the head of the Committee at Sofia, and was working with feverish energy. The Macedonian organization had no lack of funds, and was able not only to arm a great part of the population of Macedonia itself, but also to distribute rifles to young men in Bulgaria, who, when the moment arrived, would be enthusiastic enough to cross the frontier and fight for the freedom of Macedonia. The organi-

zation had also money enough to found daily papers of its own at Sofia and in the provinces. This was the origin of that important Bulgarian newspaper, the "Wetscherna Posta," whose publisher as well as most of the staff were Macedonians.

The Macedonian cause had in a short time won the sympathies of the better classes, and it was now a difficult if not an impossible matter to restrain the general impulse towards a conflict with Turkey. It is true that Dr. Daneff tried to weaken the influence of the Macedonian organization (which he did not like), when after Karaveloff's administration, under which he had been a Minister, he formed a purely "Progressist" Ministry. But he only drew upon himself the hostility of a great part of society, without obtaining any serious result by his efforts. In Dr. Daneff's opinion the Macedonian organization was of less consequence than the project of a Balkan League. He sent Dimitri Rizoff as ambassador to Cettinje, and then to Belgrade, with the mission of bringing about closer relations with the two Balkan states, and especially concluding a customs convention with Servia.

Meanwhile the Macedonian agitation had become so ripe for action that Dr. Daneff, unable to prevent the insurrection of the year 1903, handed in his resignation. His successor in the premiership was a resolute and most energetic man, General Ratscho Petroff. He chose as his colleagues in the new Cabinet — for the Ministry of War, General Savoff; for the Ministry of the Interior, M. Petkoff, the leader of the surviving Stambulovists; and as Minister of Commerce, the well-known Macedonian, Dr. Nikola Genadieff. Gen-

eral Ratscho Petroff, who had before this been in close relations with the Macedonians, was decidedly in favour of their movement, and assisted it in every possible way, all the more because Turkey was then in a stiffly unaccommodating mood towards the interests of Bulgaria. Under Ratscho Petroff's Cabinet Macedonian policy became so bound up with that of the country, that the only possible solution could be war, sooner or later. The hopeless rising of the year 1913 so excited the feelings of the educated young men of Bulgaria, that many of them went off to Macedonia and campaigned with the local guerilla bands by the Vardar and Struma rivers, where thousands of their kinsmen of the Bulgarian race were massacred in their villages.

In the year 1904 another insurrection broke out in Macedonia, as awful and sanguinary as the first. The Cabinet of General Petroff wanted war, and showed its mind was made up by getting the army ready. Contracts for this purpose were placed in foreign countries. General Savoff hurried them forward, even though he had to pay high prices, for he was persuaded that war would have to be declared in 1906.

Meanwhile the Macedonian leaders — who had survived the risings in the hills and the attacks that the two parties in Macedonia made upon each other — were working with indefatigable energy. As early as the year 1902 the question as to when a rising should be attempted in Macedonia had produced a wide rift between two groups of leaders. Those who lived in Macedonia, and looked to Sandansky as their chief, wished the rising to be put off as long as possible so that the most complete preparations might be

made. But the refugees from Macedonia, who could no longer live under Turkish rule, grouped themselves round Sarafoff, and would not hear of waiting any longer. In another place I shall have more to say of the Macedonian Revolution and its heroes. But it is absolutely necessary to call attention to it here, as otherwise one would have to give up any attempt to explain the policy of a series of cabinets beginning with those of Dr. Daneff and General Petroff. Otherwise how could one understand — for instance — how it was that the Prime Minister Petroff, on the one hand, sent to Constantinople the most peace-loving of all Bulgarian politicians, the Turcophile Natschovitsch, first on a special mission and then as ambassador, while, on the other hand, guerilla bands were crossing the Bulgarian frontier and making their way into Macedonia?

After the terrible tragedies that had marked its course the Macedonian revolutionary movement could no longer be held in check. On the other hand, the idea of General Petroff and General Savoff was to prepare for a war with Turkey, in which they could reasonably count on victory, and this needed time. But in the year 1906, when Savoff wanted to strike the blow, and had the army at the climax of efficiency, he had to fall in with the arrangement for a mere concession of a limited autonomy to Macedonia, carried through by the concert of the Powers — though he did so most reluctantly.

A misunderstanding that arose between Petroff and Russia and the Russian ambassador at Sofia led to the resignation of Petroff's cabinet. M. Petkoff took his place as Prime Minister. The policy of the

Stambulovists was at times harsh and high-handed, and there were such increasing clamours against them that they were using patriotic pretexts to further their own private interests. They lost their self-control, and thought they could suppress the attacks of the Opposition by taking stronger measures against them. Then a serious strike of the railway men broke out, and the students of the University made imposing demonstrations in the streets and squares of Sofia. The Prime Minister Petkoff closed the University, and dismissed the professors. In the briefest space of time he had incurred the hatred of the public. Men forgot the great talent he had displayed as Burgomaster of Sofia under Stambuloff; they forgot, too, with what heroism he had fought at the Shipka Pass, where he had lost his left arm. He was shot in the street by a fanatical anarchist.

For a few months after Petkoff's death his party remained in office under the premiership of Dr. Gudeff, who till then had been the President of the Sobranje. Then Alexander Malinoff with the Democratic party came into power. The policy, or — to use a better word — the mission, of the Democrats, was very different from what one would have expected from their party programme. It was the declaration of the independence of Bulgaria and the proclamation of Prince Ferdinand as King. The Democrats had kept the army ready during the critical times when Turkey was thrown into confusion by the Revolution of the Young Turks and the counter-revolution. But they did not declare war, though most of them were inclined for it. The Prime Minister, however, had replied to an exaggerated claim for compensation

made by the Turkish Government — "If it comes to that, we shall pay only with blood!"

M. Iswolsky, whom the declaration of independence and the annexation of Bosnia had made very ill, exerted all his influence on General Paprikoff, the strongly Russophile Minister for Foreign Affairs at Sofia, with such a moderating effect that the General, notwithstanding the hostile criticism not only of the press but also of most of the Democrats, resigned his portfolio. On leaving the Foreign Office, Paprikoff was sent at once as ambassador to St. Petersburg. A little later the Democratic Cabinet made a demonstration against Turkey by mobilizing the Tundja Division. The result was that some ephemeral concessions were made to the Bulgarians. Meanwhile the Turks were disarming the Macedonians and Albanians in the usual Turkish way. At the same time many Bulgarian schools in Macedonia, that had received legal recognition even under the Sultan Abdul Hamid, were closed by the Young Turks. The relations with Turkey could no longer be of the normal kind.

CHAPTER V

THE BULGARIANS. THEIR HISTORY AND CUSTOMS

A HUNDRED and fifty years ago the Bulgarian nation was shrouded in oblivion. Under the Turkish yoke, and as the result of the unceasing efforts of the adherents of the Greek Patriarchate to eradicate by every possible means all traces of Bulgarian culture, it had lost all consciousness of its national existence. The Greeks used in those days to speak of the Bulgarians much as the Servians now talk of the Albanians.

These same Greeks, who had brought the Turks into Europe to fight for them against the Bulgarians, enjoyed under Turkish rule all possible privileges on a system that had its centre in the Patriarchate. There were no Bulgarian schools, but only some teaching given in secret in the monasteries, in the so-called "Kilias," the cells of the Bulgarian monks. There were no roads and hardly any intercourse between the towns and villages. There was darkness everywhere. Under this twofold yoke, Turkish and Greek, the Bulgarians lived and died without knowing more than that things ought not to be so, and that they had not always been so.

A wave from the French Revolution reached as far even as Mount Athos. In one of its monasteries an intelligent monk, Aez Paissii (Father Païssü) wrote a history of Bulgaria[1] "in those high woods, a place for rest and prayer," to quote the national poet, Ivan

[1] *Istoria Slaveno-Bolgaoska*, 1762.

Vazoff or Wazoff. The monk's history begins with these words:

O unreasoning slave! why art thou ashamed to call thyself a Bulgarian? Had not, then, the Bulgarians a dominion of their own, a czardom, whose armies more than once pressed victoriously onward to the gates of Constantinople? What of the famous Czar Krum, who drank the foaming wine out of the gilded skull of the conquered Nicephorus? What of Simeon the Great, before whom the proud Roman knelt and handed over the keys of the gate of Constantinople? What of Samuel the Mighty, who conquered Greece and marched into Durazzo? Were there not Czars of Bulgaria to whom the Greeks were tributary? O unreasoning slave, recollect thyself, and be proud to be a Bulgar. Learn to know thy nation and thy full sounding language!

It would be difficult to name any other little book that in so short a time produced in the mental attitude of a whole people such a rapid and complete change — such a revolution — as did this brief history by Aez Paissii. He found imitators, who wrote in secret by the light of a little oil lamp other stories of Bulgaria, which were with due precautions copied and circulated.

The young Bulgarians, who meant to be no longer slaves, took to the hills and thence carried on an irregular warfare, as best they could, against the Turks. These were the "Haiduks," whose exploits are so celebrated in the traditional folk-songs of the Bulgarian people. They took to the hills in order to breathe the air of freedom, and wander at will under the blue sky, whose horizon was soon clouded with smoke, now here, now there. This generally began in the spring, when the snow was melting, on St. George's

Day. Then the Haiduks killed some lambs, that first had been crowned with wreaths of twigs and leaves from the meadows by a "pope" (priest), who prayed over them as he did so. The lamb was roasted on a spit, and the red wine was blessed by the priest. Thus the clergy and the Haiduks stood together, especially at the outset. This custom of the Haiduks and later of the Revolutionists is probably the origin of the traditional saying that over there in the Balkans war cannot go on till the snow melts. The people soon talked of nothing but the Haiduks, and the girls were enthusiastic for them. So it was quite a matter of course for a Bulgarian woman to sing as a lullaby for her child in the cradle the folk-song —

"Sleep, sleep, my little one,
You will grow to be a great man.
You will be the King of the Mountains."

It was thus the national struggle began in Bulgaria, and gradually developed into a revolutionary war against the Turkish yoke. There was an inner and an outer organization. The greatest hero of the inner circle was the deacon, Vassili Levski, who gave up the life of the cloister and ended by being hanged by the Turks at Sofia. The Bulgarian Government under Stambuloff erected a monument to him on the scene of his execution. Amongst Levski's comrades were Hadji Dimitri and Stepan Karadjata. The finest poems and odes of the national poet, Ivan Wazoff, are dedicated to the memory of the Revolutionists of this period.

The outer organization had its centres in Roumania, especially at Braila, where there is still even now a large Bulgarian colony, and at Bucharest. The

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PEASANT WOMEN BID GOOD-BYE TO TROOPS

CHEERS ON CROSSING THE FRONTIER

great hero of this organization was Christo Boteff, a man of more than ordinary talent, with a genius for lyric poetry. His best verses tell of the life of the Haiduks. We can quote only the following lines, in which there is so much of the music of the Balkans: —

"Nastane vetscher
Miesez izgrje,
Zvjezdi obsipat
Svodat nebe sen;
Gora zaschumi,
Vieter povje,
Balkanat pje
Haiduschka piesen."

Which may be translated: —

"Evening comes
And shines the moon,
Stars are sprinkled
O'er the sky;
Leafy woods,
Rustling winds,
The Balkan sings
A Haiduk song."

Christo Boteff made an adventurous crossing of the Danube at the head of his band — two hundred men wearing the national costume — and started an insurrection near Vratza. But he was killed there in a fight with the Turkish troops. A monument was also erected to his memory by Stambuloff in the town of Vratza. Stambuloff had been a friend of Christo Boteff, and as a young fellow had been his standard-bearer in the rising. Other comrades of Christo Boteff were the Bulgarian author, Sava Rakovski, who studied law in Paris, and Ljuben Karaveloff, a friend of literature and the elder brother of Petko Karaveloff, the future Prime Minister.

All these Revolutionists would have no part in the more patient and, in many respects, safer plan of the Moderates — namely, the emancipation of the Bulgarian Church from the Greek Patriarchate. This 1872 project was a well-directed effort pushed home with eventual success, and resulting in the nomination at Constantinople of a Bulgarian Exarch, under whom all the Bulgarians were united in their national aspirations as around a common centre. The efforts of the Revolutionists produced a series of risings, the suppression of which was stained by the massacre of helpless old men, women and children, as, for instance, at Peruschitza and Batak, where in a single night 14,000 were massacred by the Turks. This death roll was ascertained by an international commission in 1874.

After the Russo-Turkish War, at the peace of San Stefano, the historic claims of Bulgaria were recognized. Bulgarian Nationalism received its next great impulse from the victories of Slivnitza, Zaroibrod and Pirot, during Prince Alexander of Battenberg's conquering march on Nish. It was only before the gates of that city that his advance was stopped by the intervention of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador.

When one arrives in Bulgaria from western Europe one can hardly see anything "Oriental." The tourist from the West is in this respect somewhat disappointed, especially at the outset. To find anything of the kind one must cross the Rhodope, say, for instance, to Kirdjali, where European surroundings come to an end. But it is a far cry to Adrianople. We have to speak first of the Bulgarians.

The first impression one has of them is that they

are easy-going Southerners with a full, sonorous way of talking. In their faces one sees above all the expression of strength, and this harmonizes with their physical build. Except in a few towns and villages on the southern slope of the Balkans, where the roses bloom so freely, the warm rays of the sun and the dry cold of winter have tended to maintain their ancestral hardihood. If one studies the Bulgarian national type, one thinks at once of the mixed elements in the race, which is not like the other Slavonic peoples. One recognizes in them Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Slav traits, and sometimes a touch of the Latin race. When one hears them speak, one notices that the general tone of the language is much more energetic than the Servian and more sonorous than the softer Russian. If one goes to the Sobranje and listens to the speakers there, such as M. Genadieff, the leader of the Stambulovists, and others, one might imagine from their rhetorical style that the orators came from the Paris Chamber of Deputies. One is not in a Latin country, or in Hungary or Greece — although here and there one can note a tone or expression that reminds one of the Greeks; and we may almost say that one is not in a Slavonic country! Bulgarians, after all, can best be compared only to Bulgarians, for one has recognized something original in them, something, if one may say so, foreign to all other European races.

There are various theories as to the origin of the Bulgarians. Professor Strauss, of the Oriental Academy of Buda-Pesth, who has had the best opportunities of knowing them, calls them "the first cousins" of the Hungarians. He is even struck by the resemblance of the national names, "Bulgar" and "Ungar."

Then there is a whole series of words that are almost the same in Bulgarian and Hungarian.

But the theory that is most generally accepted in Bulgaria and in foreign countries tells us that the Bulgarians originally came from the region of the northern Finnish races. They then spread to the Volga, and a tribe of them under the chieftainship of Kubrat moved, under the leadership of one of his sons, Apparuch, from the steppes of southern Russia into the old Roman province of Mœsia, between the Danube and the Balkans. This country was then inhabited by the Slovenians, who had invaded the Roman territory from the north after it had already been devastated by the Huns. In the year 680 A. D., during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine Pogonatus, Apparuch founded here his Bulgarian kingdom.

The victors soon adopted the speech, manners, and customs of the conquered Slovenians, and the combined people accepted the name of Bulgarians. Later the Bulgarians pushed on into Thrace, and under their Czar Krum appeared before the gates of Constantinople. As the Bulgarian annalists say, Czar Krum "washed his feet in the Bosphorus."

In the year 870 the Bulgarians adopted the religion of the Greek Empire, their Czar Michael was baptized and became ecclesiastically subject to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. But under his son, the Czar Simeon (888–927), who, in his victorious march advanced to Constantinople, and styled himself "*Imperator* Bulgarorum et Græcorum"—"Emperor of the Bulgarians and Greeks"—the Bulgarians had a Patriarchate of their own.

Simeon's times are known in the history of Bul-

A ROLL-CALL IN THE FIELD

A SUPPLY COLUMN

garian literature as the "Golden Age." Simeon himself was an author, a highly educated man who had made his studies at Constantinople. As Ivan Wazoff puts it, "When there was no one to conquer, he wrote books to rest himself." In his time lived the two Bulgarians Kyrill and Methodii (Cyril and Methodius), natives of Salonica, who invented the Bulgarian alphabet — the Kyrilliza, or Cyrillic letters — which was later adopted by the Russians, Servians, and Roumanians. (These last used the Cyrillic alphabet up to a very recent date.) Then came the highest development of the Bulgarian language, having, like Greek and Latin, its inflected forms of speech. Its literary development was especially the work of the author John the Exarch, who, like all the men of letters of the time, enjoyed the exalted patronage of the Czar Simeon.

This "Classical Bulgarian" language passed into Russia and Servia when those countries were converted by Bulgarians to the religion of the Greek Church. The Old Bulgarian became the ecclesiastical language of Russia and Servia, though, as was to be expected, certain modifications of form were introduced in those countries. This Old Bulgarian, used in the liturgy, and from which the Bulgarian language of to-day has come by a natural development, is markedly different from the Russian and Servian languages. The Servians do not want to admit that the language of their liturgy is the Classical Bulgarian, and they say it is "Slovenian." On the other hand, the Bulgarians say that while the Bulgarian language of to-day is "the legitimate daughter" of the language that was introduced into Russia and Servia with the Bulgarian

Cyrillic alphabet and the Christian religion, so the Old Bulgarian language of that time is the "Mother-Bulgarian."

The Czar Simeon also directed that the Roman law of the period should be translated into Bulgarian and made the national code of the country. The Bulgarians proudly emphasize the fact that Simeon, a contemporary of Charlemagne, was a highly cultured man of letters, while the famous Emperor of the West, genius though he was, could only sign documents by making a mark at the end of them.

A powerful Bulgarian aristocracy came into existence under Simeon, and after his reign a period of absolutism followed, that was a considerable factor in the subsequent downfall of the state. As we follow the history of the nation further, we hear of repeated wars with the Byzantine Emperors, and internal strife among the "Boyars," as the Bulgarian nobles were called. A great and terrible enemy of the nation was Basil, the Emperor Basil II, Bulgaroktonos, "the Bulgar-slayer." A painting of the Czech artist, Makvitschka, now living in Bulgaria, shows how a multitude of Bulgarian prisoners (some 50,000), taken by the soldiers of Basil, had their eyes put out, only a thousand of them being left with one eye and sent back to the Czar Samuel. When Samuel, who had extended his frontiers as far as Durazzo, saw this proof of Basil's terrible deed, he fell down in a fit and died soon after.

Bulgaria was raised up again for a time by the brothers Asên, Ivan, and Peter. Their youngest brother, Kaloyen, besieged Salonica, and was actually preparing for his triumphal entry into the city, when he was treacherously murdered by the Greeks, but the

story was spread in Salonica that Kaloyen had been struck down by an angel in the night.

After the Bulgarian kingdom had been divided among rival princes, its downfall came in the fourteenth century. Sultan Bajazet, the victor of the Kossovo Polje, defeated the Czar Shishman before Tirnovo, and his brother, who had long been at variance with him, was in the same way defeated before Widdin. King Sigismund of Hungary and his allies were also routed by the Sultan at Nicopolis on the Danube. In this period of disaster it was only isolated places here and there in the eastern region of the Balkans, and especially in the Rhodope, that maintained their independence of the Turks. There were the villages of the Pomaks, Bulgarian aristocrats, who, later on, embraced Mohammedanism. I shall have something to say later on of these "Pomak Republics." The Turkish domination gradually became an oppressive yoke for the Bulgarians. By degrees it broke down their soldierly character. But the Bulgarian revival, which commenced with the pen of Paisii, was to be consummated with the sword; and regenerate Bulgars have now once more turned fiercely on the Turk in the victories of Kirk Kilissé, Lule Burgas, and Chorlu.

The region inhabited by the Bulgarians extends from the lower Danube southwards to the shores of the Archipelago. On the seaboard they are found chiefly in and around Salonica, Kavalla, and Dedeagatsch. Eastward their lands stretch to the Black Sea, and they are to be found in Bessarabia and the Dobrudja. Westward the region extends along the

Bulgarian Morava, and as far as Lake Ochrid. Naturally the Bulgarian population along the shores of the Archipelago is mingled to a great extent with Greeks and Turks. Moreover, by the Ochrid Lake and along the Bulgarian Morava there is a mixed race of Servo-Bulgarians. Then on the Black Sea one finds Greeks, and about Rodesto and in the villages near Chatalja there is a considerable Greek and Turkish element.

The climate of Bulgaria, except in the southern districts conquered in the war against Turkey, shows a gradual transition from that of the Mediterranean region to the climate characteristic of Continental Europe, and it is very healthy. One finds in Bulgaria the vegetation of the Mediterranean coasts mixed with that of the interior of the continent. One sees wheat, rice, gourds, and vines growing in the same district, and there are also cotton and tobacco plants and fig trees. The roses of the valley of Kesanlik are world-famous. As the Bulgarian is used to both the Mediterranean and the continental climate, he feels himself equally well and comfortable on the seacoast and in the interior of Europe — even in Russia.

The country is mostly hilly, with wide intervening plains, especially in the valleys of the Maritza and the Isker and in the neighbourhood of Sofia. This varied nature of their country has helped to form the characteristic qualities of the Bulgarians, who are an industrious, high-spirited, provident and clever people.

The Bulgarian is said to be descended from the old Finns, but he does not look very like a Finlander

of to-day. The face is oval, the nose straight or very slightly curved. The hair of the Bulgarians of the purest race, such as one finds in the Western Balkans and about Lovatsch, is a dark blond. The cheek-bones, as well as the chin, are strongly developed. The eyes are very often slanting. The whole expression of the face is intelligent, serious, and very energetic. The shoulders are broad and the muscles strong.

The Bulgarian is the only Slavonic language that has articles (*-to*, *-ta*, *-to* = the). The article is attached to the termination of nouns and adjectives. It is also the only one that has no infinitive and no declension of the noun. Instead of declining it, prepositions are used as in English and French. In the conjugation of the verb, in which the vowel-changes of what grammarians call the "strong conjugation" are not used, there are forms that are wonderfully expressive of shades of meaning in wishing or asking for anything.

The national Bulgarian costume is now to be seen only in the country districts. The men do not wear — as is still the custom in so many of the Balkan lands — the Turkish fez, but the "Kalpak," a lamb-skin cap. They wear wide breeches (poturi), a red sash (pajas) girdling the waist, a jacket (abba), shoes tied with long laces (opinzi), and in winter a sheepskin (djubé). The shirt, a good deal of which is shown, is embroidered with various colours. In the costume of the women, colours have a more considerable part. The sleeves of their jackets are generally embroidered in yellow and red, and their skirts are also often coloured. On their heads they wear white, red, and green kerchiefs (schamia). The young girls wear the skirt shorter and twist the "schamia" only round

the crown of the head. Girls and women alike wear many ornaments, necklaces (ozarlitza) and strings of bright coins (naniz).

In Mœsia, on the Danube and in the neighbourhood of Sofia, the costume of the country people is lighter in colour, and in western Bulgaria almost entirely white. In these districts, too, the men wear white, close-fitting breeches. This use of a white costume is supposed to be a survival from old Roman days. In Thrace the colour of the dress is always darker; in Macedonia it is here bright and there dark.

When a young man is of the age to choose a girl as his wife, he winds the long shoe-laces up to his knee. He will generally choose a girl near his own age, and preferably one older rather than younger than himself. In the country especially marriage comes early in life, usually in the sixteenth or seventeenth year. In the times of Turkish rule the men married at fifteen, and the young girls in the towns often at thirteen or fourteen. In those days three generations, grandparents, parents, and children, would live together in one common homestead or "zadruga." The old people lived in the house and the sons built round it little huts (kolibi). The "zadrugas" are still to be found in other Slavonic lands, but in Bulgaria, after the liberation of the country, they began to be broken up — for the old patriarchal way of life felt very soon the dissolving pressure of the new spirit of individualism. The rapid development of society, the facility for travelling about, and, above all, the experience of the barracks brought this old patriarchal life to an end. Ten years ago the new

ON THE WAY TO THE RAILWAY STATION

A REGIMENT ABOUT TO LEAVE SOFIA

civil code of law omitted even to mention the "zadruga."

The people of Mœsia, the district of Sofia, and Macedonia are also remarkably like each other in their way of thinking. They are much more practical than those of Thrace, who are inclined to be romantic in their ideas. Thus, too, the farmers and peasants about Tirnovo are more wide-awake than those of Philippopolis. The people of Widdin and Sofia have also the reputation of being very astute. It is worthy of note that under the rule of the Turks, while everywhere else the Bulgarians learned to speak Turkish, the people of Sofia, instead of speaking Turkish, forced the Turks to learn Bulgarian. The country people about Sofia are very conservative, and perhaps this is why they have kept to their white costume, which certainly dates from a very long time back. The literary form of the Bulgarian language is based chiefly on the dialect of the old city of Tirnovo and the adjacent district. The dialect of Mœsia and the Sofia district is more forceful, more precise, and lends itself better to rhetorical oratory. That of Thrace is less defined and has a sing-song tone. The Macedonians have a very strong accent, and accentuate the first syllable. The Northerners put the accent on the end of the word.

The psychological character of the Bulgarian people is also very different from that of the population in the other Balkan lands. The Bulgarians are uncommunicative and inclined to be cautious and suspicious. One hears remarkably often the expression, "How can one know?" Of verbal promises they take very little account, and their indifference

on this point gives rather a bad impression of them. Their motto is, "Tscherno na bjelo" — "Black and white for me." The word "patilo" (which may be freely translated "experience") is a favourite among them. So they say, "Pitai patilo" — "Ask some one who has had experience of it," or, "who has tried it." If one asks a Bulgarian, one of the common people, "How goes it?" he will not reply, "Very well, thank you," but "Spoliate," which means, "Well — *but it might be better.*" It is interesting to remark that he will never admit that he is quite satisfied. It is not his way. He would like to have things better and better.

He is not inclined to tell one what he has done, and he will hardly ever say a word of what he means to do. What he likes is the accomplished fact. If he can manage to do so, he will conceal from his neighbours even the simplest things. These peculiar characteristics are preëminently a natural development of the five centuries he spent under the Turkish yoke.

The Bulgarians are hospitable, but much less so than, for instance, the Russians. Thus one finds an inn, even in the smallest village, which is much more unusual in other Slavonic countries. If the Bulgarian is well off and contented, he shows no sign of it, for he thinks that "tscherni dni" — "black days" — may come round again, and so he never considers himself really fortunate. Perhaps, too, this is because he is somewhat superstitious. With few exceptions one may say that all the politicians and statesmen of the country are superstitious. The Bulgarian fulfils any duty he has to discharge quietly and very silently. This was remarked during the Turkish War.

And yet, hidden away deep in his soul, there is

something of the romantic. It reveals itself especially in his folk-songs. Bulgarian literature is rich in songs. Like those of Hungary, they have mostly a mournful tone. Since the deliverance of the country from Turkish rule a considerable number of novels and romances have been published. The Bulgarian novel literature, like the drama, dates from only thirty years ago. Ivan Wazoff's novel, "Under the Yoke," has been translated into every European language, and has been received with flattering criticisms abroad. The best of the older writers of fiction was Ljuben Karaveloff. Of the more recent writers the most popular are Aleko Konstantinoff, who describes in his very successful work, "Bai Ganin," the life of a small Bulgarian town and the speculations and anxieties of one of its citizens; and Mihaleki Georgieff, first in business at Vienna and then envoy to Belgrade, who uses, with remarkable effect, the local dialect of Widdin to set forth the opinions of every-day people on the rapid progress of the country and the introduction of European ideas. Among the lyric poets the highest place is accorded to Christo Boteff and Wazoff. Among the epic poets the greatest are the elder Slaveikoff and his son Pluscho Slaveikoff, who wrote the "Karvava Pjesen "(the "Song of Blood"), which at his early death he left still incomplete. King Ferdinand called this epic "the Bulgarian Iliad." Javroff and Kyrill Christoff are the favourite lyric poets of the present time. Both have written much on the Turkish yoke, and Javroff went to Macedonia with a guerilla band to fight the Turks in the late war.

At Sofia, not far from the royal palace, there is a

fine theatre, and an opera house is now being built. In recent years none of the Balkan lands has been so well represented in any exhibition as Bulgaria was at the great exhibition held at Philippopolis in the year 1892.

The University was founded at Sofia under Stambuloff, and under M. Gueshoff there is now being built in the same town a technical and higher industrial school, the cost being provided by money left for this foundation by the minister's uncle Evlogii Gueshoff, one of the country's benefactors. M. Gueshoff, the Prime Minister, has himself taken an active part in the educational development of Bulgaria, and has for some years been the President of the Academy of Sciences, of which he is also the founder. But the most important promoter of the many-sided educational progress of the country has been King Ferdinand.

Compulsory education was introduced in Bulgaria thirty-three years ago, so that in the younger generation it is very rarely that one finds an illiterate. The best and most important of the school laws was carried through by Stambuloff in 1891. Its leading idea was to make the schools as far as possible independent of the local authorities, and to bring them under the direct supervision of the state, as the local governing bodies were not in a position to pay the teachers well. But his real reason was the view that the education of the future citizens should not be influenced by narrow local considerations. Stambuloff wished to have a patriotic education, replete with national sentiment, given to the youth in the schools; he desired to protect them against various Socialistic tendencies dis-

seminated from Russia. One may say that Stambuloff was for the youth of Bulgaria the best teacher of Nationalist ideals. He took care that the scholars should be accustomed to discipline, and should be brought up to be Revolutionists in the external sphere — that is, against the Turks. Almost the whole of the literature that was made familiar to the pupils' minds, through the works of Boteff, Wazoff, Rakoski, and Karaveloff, was full of aspirations for the liberation of Macedonia, and prompted the cry: "Over the Rhodope!" This was why the guerilla movement was from the very outset so closely connected with the students' societies and those of the higher schools. There has been such a rapid development of primary, secondary, and high schools that even the leader of the Democrats, Petko Karaveloff, once said in the Sobranje, "We have a proletariat of scholars."

Although the Bulgarians have a university of their own at Sofia, it is quite common for them to go abroad to the universities of Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and to England also. This is not merely the result of their love of science; there is also the attraction of the civilization of the West. Under Turkish rule the chief influence was Eastern — from Moscow; but the present influence, dating from the liberation of the country, is Western. In every Bulgarian government office, in the banks, as well as in the other great state or private establishments, are to be found men with a university training, very many of whom have completed their studies in the West. During the mobilization in Bulgaria for the declaration of war one could see day by day what numbers of young students, coming back from

abroad, crowded the trains on the railways and the passenger steamers on the Danube.

The following extracts from a private soldier's diary will give some idea of the spirit of the Bulgarians: —

On November 20, the Kirdjali division received orders to make a forced march in the direction of the town of Gumuldzina. On November 21, the whole division set out upon its march in three columns. The weather was cool with a cloudy sky, and the march was pleasant enough, although on this day we got over forty kilometers (twenty-five miles) without a rest. Towards three o'clock, without having anywhere met with an enemy, we reached the end of the colossal mass of the Rhodope. At half-past three we were already in the plain of Gumuldzina, and the town was in sight. Our mountain artillery took up its position in an old Roman fortification, and began to send shell and shrapnel into the town, but received no reply.

The cavalry were sent out to reconnoitre in the direction of the town. In an hour we were told that the place had surrendered; and forming up with flying colours and bands playing we marched out across the plain. At the very outset peasants, men and women, from the neighbouring Bulgarian village of Derekioi came to meet us. All were rejoicing to see the Bulgarian troops, and tears ran down their careworn faces. A peasant told me that they were not quite sure that we would come down from the mountains, but that they had made up their minds to go, at the peril of their lives, to meet the Bulgarian troops, whom they had been expecting for a week. Many of them marched beside us as far as Gumuldzina with bare heads, having thrown away the fez.

At seven o'clock we were met, just outside the town, by the mufti with the leading men of the place in a carriage, over which waved a large white flag. They presented themselves to the commander of the column, General

Geneff, and surrendered the town to him. Then the leading Greek residents came to bid the Bulgarian troops welcome to their town. Three Greeks seated in a carriage beckoned to me to come nearer them. They asked me if I knew Turkish or Greek. I replied "No," and then there began a conversation in German with one of them. He was a doctor. The two others were a manufacturer and the manager of a factory. When they heard that I had received a university education they were all astonished, and one of them said, "These Bulgarians are wonderful, for here we find men of university training serving with them as private soldiers." Then they gave me cigarettes and invited me to get into their carriage. I told them in reply that a Bulgarian soldier could not leave the ranks without permission. Then they cried out together, "Bravo!" and clapped their hands.

At eight o'clock the band played "Schumi Maritza," and with a small detachment of troops we marched in triumph into the town. Many men and women watched us in the streets and from the windows. I got permission to leave the detachment, and went in search of a hotel, in the hope of there being able to deal in good time with an attack of dysentery that I was beginning to suffer from. I met with a Bulgarian and asked him if he could direct me to a Bulgarian inn. He took me to the wine-shop of Gadschanoff, a Bulgarian. As soon as I entered with some other soldiers, all who were there began to shout "Hurrah" and threw away their fezes. Every one was kissing our hands and offering us drinks. I asked to be excused as an invalid, but all the same I had to take two cognacs.

After a while we were introduced to the leading man of the Bulgarians of Gumuldzina, Wlaco Mihajloff, who offered us his hospitality. When we went to M. Mihajloff's house there was a touching scene. "Stand up," he said to his people, "our liberators are entering our home. Kiss them." Every one kissed us on the forehead, and their tears flowed freely. They lavished all kinds of dainties

upon us. M. Mihajloff showed me the iron bars with which he secured his doors, while he was at every moment expecting to be killed.

Soon the Bulgarian school-teachers of the town, men and women, came in, and were introduced to us. One of them, M. Anastasoff, asked me if I was the editor of "Teacher's Library," of which he had several parts. When I told him that this was so, he asked what he could do for me, and begged me come and pass the night at his house. M. Mihajloff would not agree to this. The dispute between them was, however, brought to an end by a cavalry soldier arriving with the message that the General was coming to stay for the night with M. Mihajloff.

. . . . . .

The Bulgarian people have a deep-seated affection for their Archbishop, Methodii Kussewitch. He is a hale and hearty old man of seventy. He gave me an interview in his study. Its eastern wall was covered with ikons, bright with gilding, before which a number of candles were burning. On the writing-table lay the Archbishop's latest work, an essay on suicide. Methodii Kussewitch is one of the great men of Bulgarian literature. Abroad, however, he is best known for his importance in politics. He has the reputation of having been one of the King's most trusted councillors since the death of the Metropolitan Gregorii of Rustchuk. He played a distinguished part in the period that followed the separation of the Bulgarian from the Greek Church. He then came to the front as an orator and a diplomatist.

Kussewitch was an intimate adherent of Dragan Zankoff, the founder of the Progressist party, which is now in power in coalition with the National party of M. Gueshoff. The Archbishop, always a fearless

champion of Bulgarian independence, emphasizes the words of Zankoff to Russia: "We will have no honey from you, but also no thorns." Methodii Kussewitch was, at the time of the projected reunion with the Catholic Church, one of the most zealous supporters of that proposal. A Bulgarian deputation then went to Rome under the leadership of Zankoff and Sokolski of Grabova, and had audiences with the Pope. Sokolski completed the act of union and was made a bishop. The object of the reunion was entirely Nationalist. After the Bulgarians had waited so long in vain for the satisfaction of their political ambitions with the help of the East, they had thought of seeking support from the West. This wavering between East and West has been a characteristic of the Bulgarian programme for thirty years. It was very interesting to hear how Methodii Kussewitch spoke of this epoch. At his advanced age he still has a clear memory and a keen intellect. He it was also who, not long ago, took the initiative in the address of thanks to the Anglican Church for help given to the oppressed Christian population of Macedonia. To him fell the delivery of the address after the reading of the King's manifesto on the war; and when King Ferdinand arrived at Stara Zagora, the first thing he did was to pay a visit to the venerable Archbishop.

The Archbishop gave me coffee and "slatka," and talked of the situation in Macedonia, of which he has a precise knowledge. Indeed, he is himself a Macedonian. "The Turks," he said, "have a striking saying with reference to Macedonia: 'Bitschalken alan misch' — 'We conquered with cold steel, and we will only leave it with cold steel.'"

"The Turks," continued Methodii Kussewitch, "know very well that their last hour in Europe has struck. But the words I have quoted are too deeply fixed in their minds. The prosecution of a programme of reform by the Turks themselves always has been and is altogether chimerical. The Turks by themselves can effect nothing. The Slav is always needed. However sincerely he may promise reforms to Europe, the Turk, for this very reason, is unable to effect them—hence in a large measure the disparity between promise and performance. The Turk is an extremely amiable man—in his relations with his co-religionists. But as soon as he has to deal with those of another faith he is a reckless ruler, and considers he may do things that otherwise he would never permit to himself. The Turks who live in Bulgaria are good subjects, for they are very tractable; but then they do not rule. I can assure you that I have some personal friends among the Turks. But it is good work in the interests of civilization to take from them the right to rule over Christian peoples."

This distinguished man bade me a most friendly farewell, expressing at the same time his firm confidence in the coming victory of the Christian arms.

The "Pomak Republic," of whose origin I have had something to say in the earlier part of this chapter, is now a thing of the past.

On the middle course of the river Arda and on its tributary streams to right and left, lie the mountain districts of Kirdjali and Sultan-eri. They are fairly thickly populated. From the national point of view the population is mixed, Turkish and Bulgarian. But

from the religious standpoint it is all the same — Mohammedan. The chief place in the district is the village of Kirdjali, on the river Arda.

The name of Kirdjali was often mentioned during the second half of the last century in connexion with the atrocities repeatedly perpetrated by the inhabitants of the district on the Christians of the surrounding region. By the Treaty of Berlin the district was divided into two parts. The one, with about ten large villages, was placed under the administration of Eastern Roumelia, and the other remained under Turkish rule. But for both the one and the other this was done *only on paper*. The ten villages would have nothing whatever to do with Bulgarian officials, and the Pomaks nominally living under Turkish rule have ever since ignored the Sultan's officials, and refused to pay any taxes.

Once when the Turkish Ministry of Finance sent a tax-collector to the district to get in the arrears of taxes, he was brought before the head men of one of the villages, and they gave him a lamb, with this message: "Take this to your master who has sent you here for the taxes, and give it to him as a present from us. But tell him plainly that if he sends us another tax-collector *we will send back to him not a sheep, but the head of his messenger!*"

These mountaineers, with their blunt ways and strong arms, formed here a regular republic, that no one of their neighbours dared to meddle with. In the administrative records of the former province of Eastern Roumelia, the Pomak villages appear under the name of "villages not subjected to the Government." They had, indeed, some strategic importance,

but otherwise they were a superfluous burden upon the country. Soon after the proclamation of the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria (in the year 1885), the Karaveloff Cabinet absolutely ceded the villages to Turkey, and Bulgaria was undisguisedly pleased at getting rid of them.

For many a year after that, no one either in Bulgaria or Turkey troubled himself about this little nation of mountaineers. But at last, on the fourth day after the proclamation of war (it was October 22), a detachment of Bulgarian troops pushed forward towards Kirdjali, to occupy the points of strategic importance in the neighbourhood. The chiefs of the Pomak people came, in seeming friendship, to meet the Bulgarian troops, and received them with the usual Bulgarian greeting, "Dobre dosli!" — "Welcome!" The soldiers followed them into their village — only to find a well planted ambush of Turkish soldiers, who fell upon the small Bulgarian detachment. The Pomaks immediately joined the Turks, and then began a frightful struggle that ended in the rout of Turks and Pomaks. The Bulgarian troops forthwith occupied the whole of the Kirdjali district, and levelled to the ground some of the Pomak villages where the fiercest resistance had been made. So the "Republic of Kirdjali" ended in blood as it had for centuries been upheld mainly by bloodshed.

I may here add a few words as to the relations between the different religions in Macedonia.

The Mohammedans, who are found here and there in larger or smaller groups among the Christian population of Macedonia, are not unfriendly, and the other

races get on well enough with them. It is the same with the Turks who live in Bulgaria. A southern Slav proverb says: "Poturica je gorji od Turcina" — "One who has become a Mohammedan is worse than a Turk." But in Macedonia this proverb is, generally speaking, inapplicable. Both the pure-blooded Turks, who in some places are known under the name of "Jurutzi," in others under that of "Konjari," and the descendants of converts to Mohammedanism are very industrious and live on very good terms with the Christians. This is perhaps partly due to the fact that at least those among them who are better off draw a profit from the Christians. They rent their lands to the latter, and the hard-working Christians get good harvests, of which the wealthy landed proprietor has his share.

The rich Turk is generally, moreover, a benevolent man. In districts ill supplied with water he has wells and fountains made and decorates them with pious inscriptions. He builds bridges, founds orphanages and spends money on the poor. All set great value on friendliness and good neighbourliness (komsiluk) —and this not merely with their own co-religionists.

CHAPTER VI

THE BULGARIANS UNDER ARMS

FOR twenty-five years Bulgaria had been directly preparing for war with Turkey. And these preparations kept exclusively in view, as their object, action on the offensive.

Besides the fortifications about Sofia, Bulgaria had no defences against a Turkish invasion. Even on the main line of advance — that by way of Adrianople and Philippopolis — the invader could have penetrated into the country without meeting with any obstacle, if the Bulgarian army could not stop him. For the entrenched bridge-head at Semenli is of very minor importance.

The Bulgarian army was accordingly organized and trained for the attack only. And the whole idea of the measures taken by the Bulgarians in this department was, to put it shortly, to secure the most powerful possible concentration of all the forces and means the state had at its disposal for the object of the war. With a population of only three and three quarter millions, Bulgaria put into the field, in the recent campaign, an army the total strength of which — including line-of-communication troops — may be taken to have been half a million combatants, so that fifteen per cent of the total population fought in the war, a percentage that has never been reached even by France.

The financial resources of the country must also

WAGONS OF THE FIRST LINE TRANSPORT SENT BY RAIL TO YAMBOLI

TRANSPORT WAGONS CONVEYED BY TRAIN

have been heavily drawn upon in order to meet the demands of war preparations on so large a scale. Thus, for example, the budget of 1911 amounted to a total of about one hundred and seventy million kronen, out of which some thirty-seven and a half millions were exclusively set apart for military purposes.

The abnormal strength of the fighting power of Bulgaria is the result of the fullest use being made of the law of universal liability to military service. Every man is under this obligation from the age of twenty to that of forty-six, and exemption is allowed only to the Mohammedans. Even those whom the medical examination shows to be not quite fit are liable to be called up for a four months' training, and in war-time also the yearly classes of men from seventeen to twenty years of age can be called up.

On account of the great proportion of men who are quite fit for service, and the relatively small peace establishment of the army, a considerable number are at once passed into the general reserve. Each year there are about 90,000 liable for service, and of these about 30,000 are taken as the annual contingent of recruits. The infantry does two years' service with the colours, the other arms, three years'. According to the budget of 1911 the peace establishment was about 3750 officers, 56,000 men, and 10,000 horses. In case of war the military forces immediately available, including those drawn from the first and general reserve, amount in round numbers to about 8500 officers and 385,000 men, to which further additions can be made.

To complete her supply of horses, Bulgaria depends on buying in foreign countries, especially in Austro-

Hungary and Russia. In peace there are usually 10,000 horses in hand, besides 4000 more for the artillery, of which private individuals have the use. The requirements in war amount to about 70,000 horses for saddle or draught.

The infantry is armed with the 8 millimetre repeating rifle, Mannlicher system, and the repeating rifle of 1895. The artillery of the first line divisions has quick-firing guns of the Schneider-Canet system. The reserve batteries have 8.7 centimetre Krupp breech-loading guns. The mountain artillery — 32 batteries with 146 guns — has a Krupp quick-firing mountain gun, and some Krupp and Schneider guns of older patterns. Of heavy artillery the Bulgarian army has 36 modern 12 centimetre howitzers, of the Schneider model, and some older guns.

In peace the army is divided among three "military inspection districts," to each of which are assigned three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. An infantry division is made up of two brigades, each of two regiments, one regiment of field artillery, one transport company, one divisional field hospital, and one divisional ammunition column. It thus includes sixteen battalions, four machine-gun companies, nine batteries of field artillery, and two squadrons, to which there is sometimes added a detachment of mountain artillery.

In war the Bulgarian forces are organized in three armies, corresponding to the three military inspectorates. The normal strength of an "army" amounts to three infantry divisions. Each division is made up of two infantry brigades, each of two regiments; an artillery regiment made up of three subdivisions,

each of three batteries of quick-firers; two squadrons; a battalion of pioneers (engineers); and half of a technical company, besides the divisional pontoon train and telegraph detachment, and ammunition, hospital, and supply (army service) units.

Each divisional district also includes a reserve brigade (really equivalent to a division), which has at least two regiments of infantry of four battalions each, and a certain number of Krupp field batteries (three at least), and units for the usual auxiliary services. The normal protection of the frontier is entrusted to sixteen "Frontier Guard Companies" from the divisions whose districts touch the frontier.

General Savoff's reorganization contemplated the duplication of each of the nine line divisions of the peace establishment on mobilization, and arranged for a sufficient number of trained men being available to execute this plan. At the outbreak of the war, however, this reorganization had not yet been completely carried into effect, and the Bulgarian army entered upon the campaign nominally with nine divisions and as many reserve "brigades." But, nevertheless, the actual numerical strength of these units was so great that one may practically say that each divisional district put an army corps into the field.

Of the four allied Balkan States, Bulgaria was the one to whose lot fell the most serious task of all. She was to shatter the shield of the enemy and then deal him the death-stroke. And in the main Bulgaria had to accomplish this task alone, and without direct support from any of the allies. The great problem whether, and to what extent, the Balkan States would succeed in carrying through their plans, depended on

whether the Bulgarian army would possess a sufficient superiority of striking force as compared with that of the main Turkish army; and further be able to maintain this superiority at the same level for a long enough time.

But for its task — the most difficult of all — Bulgaria possessed, besides the warlike efficiency of its army, the advantage of having the shortest way into the centre of the enemy's power. When one considers that every prolonged offensive movement made in advance produces a serious effect in wasting away the numbers available for the actual attack, and when one reflects how gravely the chance of victory is thereby reduced, we can realize what a great advantage the Bulgarians derived from the fact that they had (so to speak) only to step out of their door in order to come to close quarters with the main force of the enemy; that they could strike the first blow from the very threshold of their own house; and that to penetrate into the very heart of the enemy's power they would have only a relatively short distance to traverse.

Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé, the first two bulwarks of the enemy, were only about two short days' march distant from the Bulgarian frontier. And to the Chatalja lines, the last Turkish defences in front of Constantinople, there were in a direct line only from eight to ten marches. When the sphere of the offensive is so decisively limited, those who direct the army, as well in the actual leadership in war as in the preparations for it, have a much simpler problem to solve than when one has to reckon with an offensive advance of five or six hundred miles or even more.

In a short advance much more can be demanded

of the army, and it needs much less in the way of reserves and supplies. With the great modern armies bringing enormous masses into the field, the problems connected with maintaining their numbers by a steady stream of reinforcements are very delicate, on account of their extensive requirements and the limited endurance of many of the men. But the Bulgarian army staff, thanks to the comparative nearness of the objective of the war, coupled with the endurance and the modest requirements of the Bulgarian soldier, was able to solve these problems by much more primitive means than the leaders of the armies belonging to the great military powers of Europe would have ventured to adopt, having regard to the very much larger theatres of war in which they would have to operate.

If by the combined effect of state policy and military leadership the Bulgarians could avoid a long-drawn-out campaign in the open, and force the Turks to a decisive action in a situation that would, in the event of their being defeated, imperil their retreat on Constantinople, the Bulgarian lion might hope, with two leaps and a couple of heavy blows of his claws, to strike down his opponent, and end the whole war in a few weeks. Under these conditions a considerable part of the forces and supplies, which in other armies would, in consequence of the nature of their task, be claimed for the lines of communication far to the rear, could, in the case of the Bulgarians, be pushed up to the fighting-front of the army, without the successful result of the campaign being thereby imperilled. But even within this more limited compass the whole plan in its broad lines, and all the details of its execution, had to be worked out with the greatest exacti-

tude. Otherwise there would be the risk of encountering unpleasant and even critical developments.

The short but energetic advance of the Bulgarian army would not have been possible — even with extraordinary exertions on the part of the troops — if the whole organization of the supply and line-of-communication departments had not worked splendidly. The coöperation of the Intendance with the General Staff was ideal, and of this I had myself repeated and convincing evidence in what I actually witnessed. It was not only that the Government had placed at the disposal of the General Staff, for the immediate preparation and conduct of the war, all the forces and all the resources of the country. Further than this, the commanders of the army were able to rely upon the intelligent coöperation of the whole people — officials and private individuals of every class — for the finding of supplies for the army and for the care of the wounded. But, all the same, it was plain that in this perfectly smooth working of the whole mechanism of the Bulgarian army what was accomplished was the result of a long preparation in the years of peace, carried out on broad lines and with direct and well-considered reference to a great crisis that was to come.

Such preparation was in this instance an absolute necessity. For certainly one must admit that it was a singularly serious undertaking to bring into the field, ready for action, out of the total war strength of Bulgaria, a force equivalent to eleven army corps, almost all in one mass, in the theatre of war in Thrace, and to provide the supplies for such an enormous concentration of troops. And this, too, had to be done under difficulties arising from the unfavourable

ARTILLERY OFFICERS

INFANTRY OFF TO THE FRONT

character of the communications in the chosen theatre of war. For what would have been the best and most direct line of supply was barred by the fortress of Adrianople, while, on account of the rapid succession of great battles, the army had to be kept pretty closely concentrated.

And in yet another respect the machinery of the Bulgarian army worked very exactly. Annual manœuvres on a large scale had helped to train officers of higher rank in the handling of great masses of troops. The mobilization was facilitated by the local distribution of the army and by very careful organization in advance, and thanks to the patriotic and warlike spirit of the people no one thought of being absent from his place.

When the mobilization orders were issued for the war with Turkey the reservists called up for service presented themselves with a rapidity and a completeness of numbers that is without parallel. Even the poorest peasant in the hills regards war service for his native land as an honour, and if any one had tried to evade this duty he would have been driven from the society in which he lived and dishonoured for the rest of his life. Even of those who had been dismissed as not quite fit for service, or who were no longer liable to it, large numbers came to enrol themselves as volunteers, and among them were veterans of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78.

In the very first days of the mobilization more than ninety-five per cent of the reservists came in, and daily hundreds of Bulgarians resident abroad returned to fulfil their duty as soldiers. Some of these came from America.

Forty of the Assembly, though exempt from military duty, enrolled themselves as volunteers, and all the deputies handed over their salary as members of the Sobranje to a fund for presenting an aeroplane to the army. The city of Sofia, too, raised a very large sum of money for the relief of poor families whose bread-winners were called up for service.

Sofia, the capital of the country, was the centre of all its warlike activity, and the extraordinary degree in which every class of the people participated in it produced, to an exceptional extent, a general excitement about the war. When I arrived at Sofia during the last days of the mobilization, most of the business houses had closed, for principals and employés were alike with the colours. Although this was bad for business I did not hear anywhere a word of complaint, or a wish expressed for the restoration of peace. Until their "enslaved brethren" were free from Turkish oppression no one wanted to do any more business.

But the dealers in arms were an exception. Their shops were like regular arsenals. All kinds of old weapons that might have come out of a museum had been got together. In the shop windows antiquated flintlocks lay beside modern Browning pistols. There was also a brisk trade in campaigning clothing and kit. Costly Russian furs, sheepskins roughly dressed for the occasion, leather gaiters, boots, putties — all went off like lightning. In the "Judengasse" of Sofia Macedonians were haggling with the wholesale dealer Ezza F. Konfino, a Levantine Jew, over the price of old cotton socks and second-hand breeches. Every moment one feared that some one would be killed.

VETERANS WAITING THE ORDER TO MOVE OFF

Yesterday there was still to some extent a prevailing animation that coloured the life of the city. Today the last laggards are already at the frontier. The city police — horse and foot — marched past the King's palace. Flowers were again and again showered upon them, and in the muzzles of their rifles, which they carried in the Russian fashion, they had stuck red and yellow blossoms. As they passed the palace the air trembled with the war cry "Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!" The police were on their way to the army to serve as field gendarmerie, and made this demonstration in honour of the King.

However, King Ferdinand was now no longer at the palace; he was already on his way to his headquarters at Stara Zagora. In recent years a kind of mysterious veil has often been drawn around the person of the "Czar of the Bulgarians." Even when the royal standard waves above the roof, and the sentinels of the guard, with bayonets fixed, and still as figures carved in stone, are posted at his gate, this is not always a proof that the "Coburger" is at home, or that he is staying in Sofia. "Even we ourselves cannot say," remarked an elegant officer of the Guards with a smile. It is well known that King Ferdinand travels a good deal, and when he makes a stay in his chief city at the foot of the Witoschka Hills, it is mostly incognito.

The people saw more of his Queen — "the Czarina." Some days before the order for mobilization she came back to the capital from Euxinograd, and busied herself in the various hospitals with making arrangements for the care of the wounded. It is well known that during the Russo-Japanese War the Queen

took an extremely active part in the work of organizations for the help of the wounded. She has become very quickly popular on account of her goodness of heart.

A telegraph messenger brought me a dispatch. He was a pupil from one of the upper classes in the High School of Sofia, who had now put aside his Greek and Latin, and slung a postman's bag over his shoulders to serve his country thus, as best he could. For all the postmen are with the army.

Almost the whole of the postal staff had been called up for military service, and besides these the cooks, waiters, porters, clerks, butchers, in fact everybody. At the table d'hôte in the best hotel of the city, the Bulgaria, an old shoemaker was acting as a waiter in the emergency. *C'est la guerre!*

For three days one could not get bread, or meat or poultry. Everything was requisitioned. A servant girl was carrying through the street a fowl which she thought herself lucky in having bought for a high price in one of the suburbs, but in a moment she was stopped by a patrol with flashing bayonets and the fowl was requisitioned. Cordons of troops were placed before the bakers' and butchers' shops. First the soldier must be provided for, then the others — that was the axiom during these days.

The tramways were no longer working, or women were acting as conductors, but the need for such means of communication was the less felt because the streets were gradually becoming empty, and business activity slowing down to a standstill. The farewells of the soldiers and their relations were marked by an almost touching cheerfulness. One saw very

THE QUEEN AT YAMBOLI STATION AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF THE WOUNDED FROM LOZANGRAD

AMBULANCE TRAIN AT YAMBOLI

few women in tears, and the troops marched along the streets singing patriotic and warlike songs, with their rifles and bayonets decked with flowers, and accompanied by the excited cheering of the people.

And in all this there was to be seen, in the whole conduct of the population, a manifestation of their singularly determined state of mind. All knew they were entering upon a life and death struggle, a fight for the very existence of the state and the nation. The army must bring back victory with them — otherwise! A defeat would throw back the development of the country for a whole lifetime, and produce the most awful internal convulsions. Now they have conquered — these brave Bulgars! — thanks to their splendid army and the noble patriotism of the whole people. The preparation had lasted for a quarter of a century, and then, when the decisive moment came, at the call of their King one might say that all who were capable of bearing arms hurled themselves upon the enemy to destroy him.

CHAPTER VII

THE ENEMY

A MILITARY alliance of the four Balkan States for an attack on Turkey appeared to be, so far as the Balkan Peninsula itself was concerned, the eventuality that must be regarded by the Ottoman Government as the most perilous of all possibilities. But those who best knew the Balkans, and the mental attitude of their peoples, had long been of opinion that such an alliance was altogether out of the question. For the marked rivalries and mutually opposing interests of Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece made it appear that even a temporary combination of these states for united action would be impossible. And Turkey in its defensive arrangements counted upon this, and considered that the most that would be possible would be some frontier raids, against which it provided only by the distribution of its forces, without taking into account the necessity of their being actually kept in constant readiness for war.

But when, contrary to every expectation, all the states that were to be reckoned with as enemies of Turkey banded themselves together for a united struggle against her, and put aside all the questions that divided them, the Turks had suddenly to face the necessity of carrying on a war along all their European frontiers. Moreover, although the allies taken separately might indeed be counted as minor states with a small population, they were nevertheless

well equipped for war, and united together would be able to carry on the struggle, for some months, with a military force superior in numbers to that which the Ottoman Government actually had in Europe.

It is true that the process of reorganization of the Turkish army had been nominally taken in hand in the year 1909; on paper the numbers were truly formidable, and the army in the year-books constituted a very imposing fighting power. The army, which under Abdul Hamid had been divided into seven Ordus, that is, military districts, was to be organized in four field armies. Of these the First and Second were to be assigned to the European theatre of war, though they were to be brought up to their full strength largely by contingents from Asia Minor.

The First Army, in Thrace, was distributed on both sides of Adrianople and between that place and Constantinople, with the Bulgarian border as its front. It was made up of the First Army Corps, headquarters Constantinople; the Second Army Corps, Rodosto; the Third Army Corps, Kirk Kilissé; and the Fourth Army Corps, Adrianople. According to the reorganization plan it was to have an effective strength of twelve divisions of Nizams,[1] eleven divisions of Redifs of the first class, and six Redif divisions of the second class, with five cavalry brigades, giving a total fighting force of 220,000 bayonets, 6000 sabres, and 454 guns.

The Second Army in Macedonia was to be still

[1] *Nizams* are the soldiers of the first line of the regular army; *Redifs*, the men of the second line, a kind of Landwehr, the militia of the old Turkish army organization.

stronger. It was to be made up of four army corps and three independent divisions, and these without the Redifs of the second class would count thirty-two divisions with 340,000 men and 500 guns. And further it was calculated that if the war lasted for any length of time strong reinforcements could be brought over from the districts of the Third and Fourth Armies in Asia.

But all these imposing figures were only on paper. Instead of having erected a new, firm and stately edifice, the reorganization of 1909 had only destroyed what was good in the old army and disarmed the Ottoman Empire.

The external political situation with regard to Turkey made any disturbing change a risky matter. For in view of the permanently critical state of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula, Turkey had to be always ready to enter upon a war; and she could have been prepared for this only if the changes in the army had been carried out step by step, without undermining the existing structure. In circumstances such as these the new army ought to have been built up under the protection of the old, as a new finger-nail grows under cover of the old one.

The army reform of the Young Turks was in its results very like that of the great Sultan Mahmoud II in the twenties of the last century. He, too, wanted to clear the ground for his plans of reorganization, by the reckless abolition of the old army. His were radical and sanguinary methods, for, as every one knows, when the Janissaries opposed him he simply had them shot down. But the effect of his scheme was the same as that of the Young Turkish reform. The new army

was only in the stage of its first beginnings when the Russian invasion of 1828–29 followed, and Diebitsch's advance with a comparatively small force to Adrianople compelled defenceless Turkey to sue for peace.

In a similar way the attack made by the allied Balkan States came upon the Turkish military forces when they were yet involved in a process of change, and though on paper they were a national army, organized on modern lines, they were in reality quite incapable of carrying on war on a large scale. The Turkish army of 1912 had behind it only three years of development and training. For the first time there had been autumn manœuvres in two successive years, but most of the generals had as yet had no opportunity of practising themselves in the handling of large masses of troops. There were not enough regimental officers. The reserve men were untrained, often without any knowledge of the rifle that would be thrust into their hands when they were called up for war. The organization of the supply and medical services and of the whole of the working of the line of communications was altogether insufficient.

The mobilization of the army, and its concentration on the frontier, where it was to act, suffered from the drawbacks of a defective administration and the wretched state of the internal communications of the empire. In Asia Minor especially, this state of things entailed weeks of delay, so that a great part of the troops arrived in a condition that made them no longer fit for service, or only reached the front after the decisive battles had been fought.

Last, but most important of all, a fatal mistake was the enlisting of Christians in the army. Whilst

Bulgaria had most wisely given exemption from military service to the Mohammedans living in that country, the Young Turks inposed the obligation on the whole Christian population, who until then had not been liable to it. The Bulgarians, Greeks and Servians, who were now compelled to enter the ranks of the Ottoman army and fight against their compatriots, were naturally an element on which little reliance could be placed. And even if their numbers were, comparatively speaking, inconsiderable, nevertheless the common feeling arising from unity of faith, that had hitherto bound the Turkish troops together, was destroyed. And thus while the armies of the Christian states of the Balkan Peninsula marched against the Moslem enemy with the sign of the Cross, the Ottoman army had to go into the field deprived of its strongest moral support.

A conversation that I had with an Armenian among the prisoners at Stara Zagora affords clear evidence of the unreliability of the Christian soldiers in the Turkish army.

A fresh convoy of prisoners of war had come in. There were three hundred and forty-two men and two officers, a captain and a lieutenant. They had been taken at Kadikoi. A party of these Turkish soldiers had, as soon as they entered Stara Zagora, at once thrown away the fez, the sign that they were Ottoman subjects, and put on the Bulgarian tricolour badge. They were Armenians, Greeks, and Bulgarians.

One of them, a great broad-shouldered giant with the look of an ancient Assyrian — he was an Armenian — told me: — "Why are we prisoners wear-

THE TURKISH RESIDENTS OF STARA ZAGORA

ing Bulgarian colours? Do you know, sir, as soon as the first shots went off, they ordered us Christians into the front line, where most of us would be hit. There we Christians were to be mere food for powder, in this war against Christians. We never wanted to have anything to do with this war, and they could not compel us. For we fired in the air. And when our battalion went to pieces we were all glad, sir, really glad!"

Finally the Turkish army was already weary of fighting before this war began. It was tired of the long years of conflict against the risings in Albania, Arabia, and the rest, and of the continuous strain of keeping in readiness for action during the war with Italy and in presence of the danger of a conflagration resulting from it in the Balkan Peninsula. At a most inopportune moment — in the beginning of September — those reserve men who had till then been kept with the colours were dismissed and sent back to Asia, and in the middle of September the annual contingent that had completed its colour service was also set free. On September 23, under the pretext of manœuvres, the mobilization of ten divisions of Redifs on the Bulgarian and Servian frontiers had been ordered, but this was being carried out very slowly. And now, in the beginning of October, when the mobilization in the Balkan States gave warning of immediate danger of war, there was not sufficient time available to carry through and complete the mobilization of the army by a sufficiently early date.

The Turkish army went to meet its chief antagonist in Thrace, with insufficient numbers, with generals largely unpractised in their work, with a large propor-

tion of untrained men, and a wholly inadequate organization of its auxiliary and supply services for the campaign.

In response to the calling out of their forces by the Balkan States, Turkey adopted measures of defence that fell far behind what was required. This was the result of the numerous defects in the Turkish army organization which I have tried to explain. In the Macedonian theatre of war, instead of an imposing "Macedonian army" of 350,000 men to defend the frontiers towards Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, there was actually a total of barely 100,000 men available for operations. In other respects, so far as the Thracian theatre of war was concerned, Turkey was hopelessly behindhand compared with its opponent Bulgaria, although here, besides the railway from Constantinople to Adrianople, oversea communications by the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora were available for the mobilization and concentration of the troops.

At the date of the declaration of war, of the four corps of the First Army, the Fourth Army Corps was at Adrianople, the First and Third about and in advance of Kirk Kilissé, and the Second between Kirk Kilissé and Adrianople. Other forces were being brought up from the south along the railway, but at the outbreak of hostilities were not yet available for operations.

According to the plan of campaign proposed by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz the Turkish army in Thrace was at the outset to remain upon the defensive. This fundamental idea of the plan was

based on realities, for on the Turkish side they had to reckon with a superior readiness for war on the part of Bulgaria as a firmly established fact, and because to take the offensive with an unready army would have meant certain defeat.

As the army was now by its whole character and condition unfit for undertaking an offensive campaign, in order not to expose it to decisive defeats in the very first conflicts with the Bulgarian enemy, Von der Goltz proposed that the concentration of its main force should not be made close up to the frontier, but in a district at some distance back from it, and that only outpost detachments should be actually pushed forward to the frontier.

The Turkish General Staff regarded as the most favourable position for defence that which lies behind the upper course of the Ergene River, on both sides of Chorlu-Chereskoi. It possesses great natural strength, which could be easily increased by entrenchments; and the supply of food and ammunition and the removal of the wounded could be readily carried out by means of the railway line to Constantinople, which runs along the rear of the position. This last was a factor of the greatest importance in the consideration of the problem, having regard to the cumbrous, and in many respects quite unorganized, auxiliary services of the Turkish army.

In order to advance against the front of this position the Bulgarians must first overcome the resistance of Adrianople; or if they decided to march round that fortress to the eastward, they would have to deal with Kirk Kilissé. The great importance of Kirk Kilissé arises from its position with respect to Adrianople,

and the fact of its relation to the eastern line of advance leading to Constantinople.

Adrianople bars — as has been already mentioned — the main line of advance from Eastern Roumelia towards Constantinople, without, however, commanding the district eastwards towards the Black Sea. In this region the country between Kirk Kilissé and the Black Sea does not count for anything in connexion with the movement of great armies. The range of the Istrandza Dagh, which stretches out in this direction, is a region of mountain country in great part covered with oak and beech woods that are like dense thickets. It is thinly inhabited and little cultivated. There are only a few lonely villages, and hardly any roads. It is only at Kirk Kilissé that the country begins to be suitable for operations on a large scale. And here a second road to Constantinople runs by way of Bunarhissar and Viza-Chatalja, and forms the shortest line of operations against the Turkish capital for an assailant coming from the north.

It had long been recognized that it was necessary to bar this line of advance if the entrenched camp of Adrianople was not to lose the greater part of its importance. When in the year 1882 the Turkish Government set about securing the district assigned for the concentration of the army against Bulgaria by the construction of various fortified camps, after Adrianople the greatest importance was attached to Kirk Kilissé, and next after that to a point on the Ergene — Lule Burgas or Baba-Eski. The plan was, however, only partly executed, and the fortification of Kirk Kilissé came to a standstill soon after it was begun. Apart from a few hasty entrenchments the only

THE KING GOES TO SEE THE TROOPS WHO ARE BESIEGING ADRIANOPLE

THE KING AND HIS STAFF STUDYING THE MAP ON A HILL BEFORE ADRIANOPLE

works erected were three permanent forts, which were close in to the town, were soon out of date, and, at the outbreak of the war, were in a very neglected condition.

To-day in Turkey they are on the lookout for a scapegoat for the defeats they have suffered, and they have already picked out Baron von der Goltz, and are laying all the blame on his defensive plan of campaign. But this plan was based on the assumption that Kirk Kilissé, as well as Adrianople, was actually a strongly fortified entrenched camp, a fortress, in short, that would be in a position to delay the advance of the invader for some weeks, or at the very least compel him to detach a large force to mask it. That Kirk Kilissé would be rushed and captured at the very first onset, not even the blackest pessimist on the Turkish side or the greatest optimist on the Bulgarian side would have ventured to predict.

And if it was to succeed, another condition of Von der Goltz's plan had to be fulfilled, which might, indeed, most easily have been the case. When on October 17 the Sultan sent to the Turkish army, which was yet far from being ready for active operations, the order to attack and cross the frontier, it was clear to every one, who knew the real condition of affairs, that the advance of the Turkish army would soon turn into a deplorable retreat.

At the outset of the war the judgment of the experts was mostly inclined to the view that the salvation of Turkey lay in a bold use of the "inner lines," and that only by an immediate offensive against the nearest and most dangerous of their enemies could the Turkish armies hope for victory. The course of the

war must already have sufficiently proved how mistaken was this judgment, and even the most enthusiastic advocates of "the offensive at all costs" must now be convinced that the exaggerated application of this principle would have resulted, for the Turkish army of to-day, in even greater disasters than have actually befallen it.

As the Turkish army was not in a condition to assume the offensive, it might have all the more readily abandoned the idea, seeing that the political situation gave no prospect of any of those advantages being secured, which are under other circumstances to be hoped for from a successful attack. From the political point of view Turkey found herself in a position in which a defensive plan was absolutely dictated to her, and all that was necessary to obtain the objects of her policy in the war was merely to repulse the hostile attack. The best chance the Turks had of a successful result from the war really lay in this opportune coincidence of its political aims with the total unreadiness of the state for offensive military operations. For the Balkan States victory was a necessity, but Turkey needed only to avoid defeat. Therein lay the greatest advantage on the side of the Turkish leaders in the war. That they did not know how to gain any profit from this, that they squandered the limited effective force of their army in objectless offensive movements, was, after the neglect of the fortified positions in the frontier district, the most serious factor in the defeats which the Turkish army has suffered.

For if it could not have conquered, it could at least have made a successful resistance if it had been commanded in a way that was better adapted to its

THE FIRST WOUNDED FROM KURT KALÉ

WOUNDED BULGARIANS AT THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, STARA ZAGORA

special conditions. One should not *attack* with such an army. Troops like those of the Turkish army are best fitted for the defence of redoubts and lines of trenches, where they have only to hold their ground, and are not required to carry out complicated manœuvres. In a shelter trench with plenty of cartridges beside him the Turkish soldier is still the same as he showed himself to be at Plevna. So at Adrianople-Kirk Kilissé and at Lule Burgas on the defensive he showed that he was a stubborn fighter. This the Bulgarians themselves have acknowledged. Take, for instance, the words of a wounded Bulgarian soldier, who described to me the first fight at Kurt Kalé, southwest of Mustapha Pasha.

"It was midday," he said, "when we came within range of the Turkish blockhouse. On a steep height the Turks were aiming at us from their black loopholes. We did not long content ourselves with merely exchanging fire with them, but we went up the heights at the double in alternate sections. It was no easy matter. The Turks fired as if they were possessed. The moment the line of skirmishers rose up to dash forward, their fire knocked over a lot of us. It lasted three hours, and finally we were up. But the Turks fought desperately and would not surrender. We set fire to the blockhouse, and all the same they still kept up the fight in the burning building. It was awful to see how these Turkish soldiers held on and fired back at us from loopholes, out of which the thick black smoke was now pouring. All in the blockhouse were killed, and only fourteen who fought in the open surrendered. They had fought like lions. If all the Turks are like these," said the soldier as he ended

his story, "we shall have a tough handful at Adrianople!"

A properly arranged plan of defensive operations would have also made it much easier to feed the army and send up supplies of ammunition. And with the whole military organization in such a defective state as it was in Turkey, this in itself must be counted as a serious argument in support of the adoption of the defensive.

Instead of this, the Turks attacked at all the decisive engagements, at least on part of their frontier; and the result was of course defeat. This result must have been forecasted by any one who had learned to know the Bulgarian army. In fact before Kirk Kilissé I had already telegraphed to my newspaper, as soon as I heard that the Sultan had given orders for the offensive, "*The Turks by the Sultan's orders have decided to assume the offensive. This means certain victory for the Bulgarians.*"

Strategists are agreed, no doubt, that the offensive is the only form of war that gives positive results; but the condition for this is that the army which commits itself to it possesses the necessary qualities and conditions for the offensive. Otherwise by its aggressive operations it only hastens its own downfall.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DECLARATION OF WAR

A STATE of war between the opposing Powers did not come all at once, but very gradually. And meanwhile both parties, while continually protesting their desire for peace, were doing all they could to hasten the mobilization and concentration of their armies. So of course their excitement against each other grew from day to day.

After Bulgaria and Servia had on September 30 ordered a general mobilization, measures were taken on both sides that were equivalent to directly hostile action, as, for instance, the embargo placed by Turkey on ships and war material. And though so far no serious encounters were reported, there were nevertheless, at various places, skirmishes between the troops watching the frontier, for which each side tried to throw the blame on the other.

Notwithstanding these desultory engagements, which in some places (for instance, at Djachadie and Breze in the Sanjak and at Kartabunar and other points) meant fairly sharp fighting, so far it had not come to a rupture of diplomatic relations, and on the Bulgarian side especially there was still continual talk of a hope that means would yet be found to preserve peace; but in truth an outbreak of war was inevitable.

In Europe people could not understand the apparent hesitation of Bulgaria to declare war. For there generally prevailed an opinion — quite right in prin-

ciple — that the salvation of Bulgaria lay in opening the war with as sudden and speedy an attack as possible. In the existing situation, therefore, it seemed that every day lost meant a serious diminution of Bulgaria's prospect of victory.

When reports came from Constantinople that the Turkish troops in the region of Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé had by October 13 reached a strength of 180,000 men, and that every day 10,000 more arrived from Asia, many thought that Bulgaria had already let slip the right moment for the attack. Only one of the English newspapers had in the second half of October published a statement as to the lack of readiness for war in Turkey, and the backwardness of the concentration of the Turkish main army. As the events that followed showed, this statement corresponded with the facts.

The Bulgarians had an equally accurate knowledge of the military backwardness of their opponent. The Bulgarian General Staff had secured the most admirably complete information, not only as to the theatre of the coming conflict, but also as to the conditions prevailing in the Turkish army. It knew that the Bulgarian army might quietly complete its mobilization and concentration, and make every other necessary preparation for the commencement of military operations, without any chance of their advantage over the Turks being thereby seriously affected.

At last the formal declaration of war came simultaneously from the Bulgarian and the Turkish side. On October 17 at half-past ten in the morning the Bulgarian envoy at Constantinople, M. Sarafoff was

ARRIVAL OF KING FERDINAND AT MUSTAPHA PASHA

According to an old Bulgarian custom, the King, as he treads for the first time on hostile territory, tramples on a captured Turkish weapon

THE KING WHISPERING IN THE EAR OF PRINCE BORIS

told to take his passports and leave Turkish territory; on which he handed to the Turkish Government the Bulgarian declaration of war.

On the same day, at half-past eleven A.M., King Ferdinand of Bulgaria left Sofia and proceeded to his headquarters at Stara Zagora, where he issued the following war proclamation: —

BULGARIANS!

In the course of my reign of five-and-twenty years, devoting myself to the peaceful work of civilization, I have always striven for the progress, the happiness, and the glory of Bulgaria, and my wish was to see the Bulgarian nation making continual advances in this direction. But Providence has decided otherwise.

The moment has come when the *Bulgarian race* is called upon to renounce the benefits of peace, and to grasp its weapons in order to solve a great problem.

On the other side of the Rilo and the Rhodope our brethren in blood and religion, even at this day, five-and-thirty years after our own liberation, have not been so fortunate as to secure for themselves a life that is endurable and fit for men. All the efforts that have been made to attain this object, whether on the part of the Great Powers, or on that of the Bulgarian Government, have not availed to bring about a condition of affairs that would permit these Christians to enjoy freedom and the rights of men.

The tears of these slaves of the Balkans and the lamentations of millions of Christians cannot but thrill through our hearts — the hearts of their brothers in race and religion, who have ourselves to thank a great Christian Liberator for our freedom and our peaceful life.

And the Bulgarian nation has remembered the prophetic words of the Czar-Liberator — that the holy work must be carried on to the end. Our love of peace is tired out. In order to assist the Christian peoples of Turkey no other means is left for us but to draw the sword. We

see that only in this way shall we be able to secure for them the protection of their lives and property.

The anarchy in the Turkish provinces is even a menace to our own national life. After the massacres of Istib and Kotschana, instead of, as was befitting and as we demanded, doing justice and giving satisfaction, Turkey ordered the mobilization of its military forces. Our forbearance was thus put to a severe test.

My feelings as a man and as a Christian, the sacred duty to hasten to the help of one's brethren when they are threatened with extermination, and the honour and dignity of Bulgaria, have imposed on me the imperative duty of calling to the colours those sons of the fatherland who have been trained for its defence.

Our task is a just, a great, and a holy one. With devout trust in the protection and help of the Almighty, I make known to the Bulgarian nation that war has been declared for the rights of the Christians of Turkey as men.

I hereby order the brave Bulgarian army to begin its march into Turkish territory.

The armies of the Balkan States allied with Bulgaria, those of Servia, Greece, and Montenegro, are fighting with us and by our side, for the same object and against the common enemy.

And in this war of the Cross against the Crescent, of freedom against tyranny, we shall have the sympathy of all who love justice and progress. Encouraged by this sympathy let the brave Bulgarian soldier remember the heroic deeds of his fathers and forerunners, and the valour of his teacher the Russian Liberator, and hasten onwards from victory to victory. Forward! God is with us!

CHAPTER IX

THE BULGARIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

IF the chiefs of the Bulgarian army had been so ill informed as was the whole of the newspaper press of Europe about the condition of the Turkish military forces and the fortresses on the frontier, it is probable that they would have urgently dissuaded their Government from war with Turkey. For it is clear that if Kirk Kilissé had possessed the strength that was erroneously ascribed to it in Europe, and if for example it had been able, like Adrianople and Scutari, to make a prolonged resistance, a Bulgarian offensive against the Turkish army, occupying a strong position well to the southward, would have been a very serious and anything but propitious undertaking.

For in the actual military and political situation of Bulgaria it was an absolute necessity to obtain a swift and decisive victory, and under the supposed conditions this would not have been practicable. If besides Adrianople the Turks had had a strong entrenched camp at Kirk Kilissé, and perhaps another at Lule Burgas, all possibility of the Bulgarians carrying through decisive operations would have been so restricted, that even the most lavish previous preparation of means for the reduction of these fortresses (such as the provision of a numerous train of heavy artillery, etc.) would not have given any sufficient guarantee for the successful result of the war. For to

secure a success that would have any effective results; the Bulgarian generals must obtain decisive victories at such an early date that they might anticipate any ideas of foreign intervention. And this would have been impossible when once the war had developed into a long-drawn-out struggle around strongly fortified positions.

In the last few years before the war a thoroughly complete knowledge of the conditions under which the enemy would have to fight had been secured by careful reconnoitring of the ground and of all important places and positions. This made it possible for the Bulgarian staff to draw up a plan for the overthrow of the enemy, that took the fullest account of the actual facts of his military situation.

The authors of this plan were General Savoff and General Fitscheff, the former the real commander-in-chief of the Bulgarians in the war, the latter his chief of the staff.

The higher commanders in the Bulgarian army had already taken part in the campaign against Servia. Even then, after the victory of Slivnitza, it was felt that the distinguished officers who had now passed through their special school of war experience in that campaign, would have to fulfil the really serious task of their lives on other battlefields. Suddenly abandoned though they were by their Russian instructors, during this Servo-Bulgarian War young men of marked capacity and strong personality came to the front, rising like guiding stars above the horizon of the blood-stained ground, which the white snow was covering up round Slivnitza, Zaribrod, and Pirot.

The generalissimo, Savoff, who officially appears as

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GENERAL SAVOFF

the military adviser to the King, was born on November 14, 1857, in the little town of Haskovo on the Turkish border. After having received his early education there, he entered the Military School at Sofia, completed his course there with brilliant success, and in 1879 received his commission as lieutenant in the artillery. He was one of the first group of officers that passed into the army from a Bulgarian military school. In Eastern Roumelia, which under the terms of the Berlin Treaty was then administered by a governor-general, there was a local militia, and to the half-battery of artillery connected with this militia Lieutenant Savoff was attached. Soon after he was sent to the Academy of the General Staff at St. Petersburg, where once more he passed through a course of special studies with distinguished success.

Savoff then had opportunities for gaining a knowledge of the armies of western Europe at their great manœuvres. He visited in this way France, Austro-Hungary and other countries. When the Servo-Bulgarian War broke out, Savoff was a captain, and he was on the left wing at Slivnitza. After that victorious engagement he was promoted to the rank of major.

After the death of Colonel Mutkuroff, Minister of War and formerly colleague to Stambuloff in the Regency, Savoff was placed by Prince Ferdinand at the head of the War Office. As Minister of War he gave the young army, that had been deserted by its Russian military instructors before the beginning of the war with Servia, a completely new organization. He developed the fighting strength of Bulgaria, giving his own personal exertions freely to the work and

paying special attention to the artillery. He rearmed the infantry with the new Mannlicher rifle, and the artillery with Krupp guns. He remained at his post for five years, and retired from it on the eve of the fall of Stambuloff.

After he had, during three years of private life, travelled over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula, and especially Turkey, and made visits to Western Europe, he was appointed by Stoiloff, President of the Military School at Sofia. Here the future generalissimo, with untiring energy and clear knowledge of the end in view, developed the studies on all the the lines required for the education and formation of promising officers. From the very outset he made them realize that they were to devote themselves to the army and to a military career, in the name of the cause of Macedonian liberation. The most modern methods of military training were carried out by him after he had adapted them to the basis of the Bulgarian mental character. All the officers who have displayed so much heroism and skill in the conflict with Turkey have been his pupils and disciples.

For eight years Savoff directed the Military School of Sofia, which reached such a standard in general educational work that it was the rival of the classical and modern schools of the highest grade in the country, and many a head master made himself acquainted with the methods of this school of educational reform.

In the year 1903 Savoff entered the Cabinet of General Ratscho Petroff as Minister of War. During the five years that he held this position he excelled even himself. His aim was an aggressive war against Turkey, and he quite realized that this was an excep-

tionally difficult task. Therefore he immediately introduced into the Bulgarian army everything that he saw most up-to-date in other countries. During the Russo-Japanese War he took an exceptionally deep interest in the tactics of the Japanese. No expense was great enough to make him hesitate when it was a question of introducing new improvements. And he had a way of getting out of the Parliament, what now and then the Minister of Finance had refused to grant to him. Savoff secured all that he could in large quantities — the new heavy artillery, shells, ammunition and war material of all kinds.

But his open-handed expenditure on the army raised up much opposition against him. In the Sobranje the Democrats called upon him to give explanations and justify his action. Then by his speech in defence of his policy Savoff showed that he was not only destined to be a great military leader, but also that he was a gifted orator. Notwithstanding the interruptions of the extremists he was, thanks to his great presence of mind and his powerful voice, easily able to compel the attention of his hearers, and he then went on to make even the most difficult military matters plain to non-military hearers. That afternoon Savoff spoke for six hours, and proved to the Democrats, as he had already done to his officers, that he was a man of great intellectual gifts for war and military science.

No one in Bulgaria, not even a Socialist or any one else who had opposed him, raised the slightest objection when, on the mobilization, the King appointed this leader of such marked genius to be his chief "military adviser." It was known too that Savoff

possessed the confidence of all the officers, and that there was no spot in that part of Turkish territory which was to be the theatre of war, with which he was not thoroughly acquainted. General Savoff possesses also that great quality of a leader in war, the readiness to accept responsibility in its widest sense. He said during the mobilization, "I would stake my head on it that we shall beat the Turkish army in a few days." And this was what happened under the personal leadership of another commander of genius, General Radko Dimitrieff at Kirk Kilissé, Lule Burgas and Chorlu.

General Nikoforoff is an officer who stands in very high favour at court. Before he entered on his present position at the War Office, he was for several years ambassador at Berlin. Nikoforoff was born at Lovatsch on April 12, 1858, and was educated at the "Realschule" at Darmstadt and the Military School of Sofia. He was commissioned as a lieutenant in 1879. He was always a capable administrator in the army, but later on devoted himself to a diplomatic career. In the Turkish War he presided over the administrative work at the base and on the line of communications.

General Fitscheff, the Chief of the Staff, is regarded as one of the younger officers. Born at Tirnovo on April 15, 1860, after being educated at the high school of his native city, he went to the Military School of Sofia and passed out as lieutenant on the very eve of the war with Servia. He at once attracted the notice of his chiefs by his conduct in the repulse of the Servians from Widdin, when the young lieutenant had a chance of showing his ability as a company commander.

After peace was concluded, he was sent to Italy to study at the Staff College of Turin. Here he won the friendship of all his teachers, and especially of Professor Barone, who visited him at headquarters during the recent campaign. The young student took a particular interest in the literature of war, and soon began to display talent as a writer.

On his return to Bulgaria he was appointed Director of the Department of Military Education at the Ministry of War. Here he gave free scope to his bent for literary work, and published a whole series of military studies. Amongst these his work on the action of the northern detachment of the Bulgarian army during the Servian War, published under the title of "The Siege of Widdin," and his essay on the "Theory of Mountain Warfare" secured for him a high reputation.

Fitscheff held a number of appointments in the General Staff, besides doing some regimental service. As commander of the Sixth Tirnovo Regiment he distinguished himself as a most capable instructor of his officers. Later he held the post of chief of the First and then of the Second Thracian Division, and devoted himself with special zeal to making himself thoroughly well acquainted with the southern frontier of Bulgaria along the Turkish border. He made excursions over all the tracks and byways of the Rhodope, and brought his division up to the highest modern standard.

From the command of the Second Division he was promoted to the General Staff. When in 1908, on the occasion of the declaration of independence, it seemed for the moment that war with Turkey was unavoid-

able, General Fitscheff was summoned to Sofia and appointed Chief of the General Staff. In this high position his first work was to form a special corps of officers qualified for staff duty, and to revise and complete the plans for a war against Turkey. He had already before his mind the part that siege work might play in such a war, and he organized a series of siege manœuvres in order to provide that everything required should be ready for the reduction of Adrianople without too great a sacrifice.

In 1909, when Bulgaria seemed to be once more on the brink of war with Turkey, he conducted the great manœuvres in the neighbourhood of Stara Zagora, the royal headquarters at the outset of the late campaign. On this occasion he showed his wide grasp of the science of war, and confirmed the confidence that all felt in the Chief of the General Staff.

He had a reputation with the public through the popularity of his writings; this was increased by his activities as Chief of the Staff, while among the officers his credit stood very high. Fitscheff was always working, quietly and methodically, and with earnest zeal and a deep sense of duty. He inaugurated a series of lectures and discussions for the officers of the Staff, and nothing new in military thought in Europe escaped his notice. His idea was to analyze every fresh suggestion and adapt it to the conditions existing in Bulgaria. He made the General Staff into a veritable academy of military science and art. Officers were called upon to set forth their ideas on one problem or another. Sometimes a young officer would admit that the problem was insoluble for him and went beyond his mental grasp. Then General Fit-

GENERAL FITSCHEFF, CHIEF OF THE BULGARIAN STAFF

scheff would begin to explain the matter, and would generally throw out a suggestion that would illuminate the whole question like a searchlight, complicated and insoluble though it had hitherto seemed. In his own quiet style, with a thoroughly logical train of reasoning, he would thus elucidate for the younger officers everything that he deemed essential to their scientific training in their profession. He communicated to others his own store of knowledge, and became as it were a centre of light for the whole army.

With his gentle and thoughtful character, and his absolute fairness, General Fitscheff had soon won the hearts of all the officers, as he had by his military genius gained the confidence of the whole army. He enjoys, moreover, the strongest physical health. During the time of the great battles the windows of his workroom at headquarters were lighted up all night long. Perhaps he worked thus zealously because he knew that a rival of his from the Turin Staff College, the Minister of Marine, Mukhtar Pasha, was with the Turkish army at Kirk Kilissé. Mukhtar had the same plan of campaign, but conversely, and indeed the Pasha's plans were destined to be turned upside down. But the greatest credit for Kirk Kilissé belongs to the able commander of the Third Army — the most heroic of all the armies in this campaign — General Radko Dimitrieff.

Another officer, who is counted one of the most capable men upon the Bulgarian General Staff, is General Ratscho Petroff. Thanks to his gifts as a brilliant strategist and an energetic politician, Petroff's name is not unknown even in foreign countries. He is, comparatively speaking, a youngish man, for he is

only in his fiftieth year. His birthplace was Schoumla, but he has spent nearly all his life at Sofia. When after a remarkably successful course of studies at the Academy of the General Staff at St. Petersburg, he returned to Bulgaria, he was destined to play more than one prominent part in the national life of his country, for he is not only a soldier. He has a brilliant intellect, which he has applied with distinguished results to more than one field of activity. He speaks several European languages, and his whole bearing reminds one of a western European. The expression of his face is very energetic, and his look tells of an active mind.

So, from the very first, he was entrusted with duties that involved a serious responsibility. In the Servo-Bulgarian War, although he was then only a young captain, he was appointed Chief of the Staff. He was the first Chief of the General Staff in Bulgaria, and was the most highly valued counsellor of Prince Alexander. It was Ratscho Petroff who chose the battle-field, decided on the plan, and made the victory of Slivnitza. In recognition of this, Prince Alexander bestowed upon him the highest decorations. He was one of those officers who, to the very last, paid Prince Alexander the noblest and highest tribute of loyalty and admiration.

With Stambuloff he opposed the revolutionary movements excited by Russia in the new Bulgarian army. He was Minister of War in Stoiloff's Cabinet. But he handed in his resignation because he could not agree with the Russophile policy, that was then adopted in order to conciliate the Russian Government.

After the fall of the Radoslavoff Cabinet in the year 1900, he became Prime Minister, and after Dr. Daneff's resignation he took the helm for the second time, and formed a Stambulovist Cabinet. Savoff was Minister of War under him, and together they prepared for an aggressive war against Turkey, which was intended to be begun in the year 1906, but was not actually declared on account of the action taken by the European Powers. In the recent campaign General Petroff was the commander of the "Reserve Army," and was sent by King Ferdinand to Salonica with Prince Boris and Prince Cyril.

From the political objects in view and the conditions of the military situation it resulted that there were for the Bulgarian army two completely separate theatres of war, the eastern in Thrace and the western in Macedonia. From the very outset, the most important focus of the whole war was in its eastern theatre, for it was there — on the main line of communication between the two capitals and the shortest route to Constantinople — that the battles would be fought that would decide the ultimate result of the whole war.

Along the great highway that for centuries has been the shortest road into central Europe — from Constantinople by way of Adrianople and Sofia — all the most important events in the Balkan Peninsula have taken place. It was by this line of entrance that the Turks carried out their invasion of Europe. Their withdrawal from Europe has now been for many years in progress, and they are carrying out their retirement along the very same line by which in the past they forced their gradual advance.

In the Russian wars of invasion in the last century,

the decisive movements took place along the line that leads by Adrianople to Constantinople. And in the same way the main attack of the Bulgarians had to follow this line of operations between the two capitals. The adoption of the offensive by the Bulgarians at once transferred the active operations on every line of advance to Turkish territory, and for the operations of the main army a special importance was attached first to the hollow of Adrianople and to the spurs running out from the range of the Istrandza Dagh towards the valleys of the Maritza, the Tundja and the Ergene.

Clearly recognizing the great danger that menaced the capital of the Ottoman Empire from Bulgaria, the Turks had barred the main line of invasion along the Maritza valley by the entrenched camp at Adrianople with its two fortified bridge-heads. This place, only a day's march distant from the Bulgarian frontier, was therefore the first bulwark of Turkey. It directly barred the line of the Bulgarian offensive, and could only be reduced by a regular siege or a prolonged investment.

But the leaders of the Bulgarian army could not afford to let the success of the campaign turn upon this. For in the war Bulgaria had, so to say, staked everything on a single card, namely, on obtaining a decisive victory in a great battle that would have to be fought within a very few days after the outbreak of hostilities. To conquer in this battle Bulgaria had been arming for twenty-five years, had strained her strength to the utmost, had called the whole nation to arms, and had claimed all the material resources of the country. This was a strain upon her powers that even the most thoroughly prepared and strongly organized

state could endure only for a short time; and both on political and military grounds it necessitated a plan of campaign that would stake everything on the offensive, with a view to an immediately decisive result.

A military policy that peremptorily throws all the forces of the nation into the front line must carry on the war on the principle of the phalanx, and aim at overthrowing the enemy with one single annihilating blow. In such a war the leaders would be only depriving themselves of their trump cards, if they allowed themselves to be held back and tied down in front of fortified places and involved in blockades and investments; or if they gave the enemy the opportunity of carrying on a long-drawn-out war of positions behind lines of entrenchments.

There was undoubtedly a certain element of weakness in the military situation for the Bulgarians in this fact, that it was necessary for them to win decisive victories at the very outset, and then by a vigorous and unrelenting pursuit give the enemy no opportunity of adopting the tactics of a war of positions, in which that enemy's best chance of success manifestly lay. This, however, does not mean that there could be any question whatever as to the success of the Bulgarians, but the *importance* of that success might be very seriously affected. For Turkey had long been known to be an opponent who thoroughly well understood how to save the situation, even when defeats at the outset have made it seem hopeless, by a stubborn defence of positions on the line of retreat; and then by calling in the Asiatic reserves, and bringing diplomatic action to bear, so

that the victor would have to be content with seeing a reward fall to his lot that seemed much less than he originally expected.

In the present case the Bulgarians required not merely a victory, but a rapid and complete victory, that would require no second blow to be struck, but would itself suffice to stretch Turkey, helpless and defenceless, at the feet of the victor. And in order to secure such a success the Bulgarians would have at the outset to avoid Adrianople and make their attack to the eastward of the fortress, directly against the Turkish field army.

For such an operation the Bulgarians possessed the advantage that they could advance from the eastern part of East Roumelia, in the region between the river Tundja and the sea, eastwards, too, of Adrianople, on a front of about a hundred kilometres (rather more than sixty miles), defeat the Turkish forces on that side, and then push on straight for Constantinople while at the same time a subsidiary force effected the investment of Adrianople.

Now while the operations of the Bulgarian main army were, on military grounds, important beyond all others for the attainment of the object of the war, the operations in the west were undertaken for essentially political reasons. From an exclusively military point of view it might have seemed that the plan indicated by the situation would have been to confine the operations in this the western theatre of war to a defence of Bulgarian territory, and this with the greatest economy of the force employed there, so as to send all that could be spared to the main decisive point in Thrace. But the fact that, for Bulgaria, suc-

GENERAL RATKO DIMITRIEFF,
COMMANDER OF THE THIRD ARMY

GENERAL IVANOFF,
COMMANDER OF THE SECOND ARMY

cess in this war, waged for the liberation of her compatriots in the Ottoman Empire, would result in her obtaining possession of those parts of Turkey that are inhabited by Bulgarians, made it a necessity for her to be able to effect an actual occupation of these districts. And this pointed to the necessity of carrying on offensive operations in this part of the theatre of war also, the more because Servia and Greece, though allies of Bulgaria, were secretly her rivals, and were in a position to carry out their main advance without serious resistance, and take possession of the districts to which they laid claim.

Bulgaria thus found herself compelled to put into the field considerable forces in Macedonia as well as in Thrace, in both cases for an offensive campaign. And though this gave the impression of tactics leading to a division of forces, nevertheless both lines of action led to victory, thanks, above all, to the absolute superiority over the Turkish forces that Bulgaria had secured by the enormous exertions she had made.

Under existing conditions various possible ways of opening the war with a decisive victory presented themselves to the Bulgarian leaders. An attempt might have been made to capture the fortress of Adrianople by a surprise attack in overwhelming force. This possible course of action was for some time the subject of serious consideration, and it was only rejected out of regard for the grave consequences of a failure.

And, indeed, it must be admitted that such a capture of Adrianople by surprise could only be attempted on the basis of a thoroughly unscrupulous policy, for the attack would have to be made not im-

mediately after a formal opening of hostilities, but in time of peace as a prelude to the declaration of war. There were, it is true, many precedents in the past for such a course of action, and a reckless policy of violence has not always troubled itself about the principles of international law. Thus, for example, Strasburg was seized by the French in 1687 in the midst of peace, and the foundation was thus laid for a French command of the middle Rhine during nearly two centuries. As Adrianople was only one day's march distant from the Bulgarian frontier, it would have been possible to concentrate in the border district to the north of it a considerable mass of troops, under the pretext of manœuvres, and then by a surprise attack seize the commanding groups of forts of the north and northwest fronts of the place, — those about Arnautkoi and Chatalja, — and thus at one blow place Adrianople in the hands of the Bulgarians.

Such an enterprise would of course have to be very carefully prepared by taking advantage of Turkish carelessness and by introducing Bulgarian officers and soldiers, months beforehand, under the disguise of workmen, into Adrianople and the villages near the forts that were to be surprised, perhaps even into the works themselves. From a military point of view the undertaking would certainly have been practicable, notwithstanding the strength of the Turkish garrison at Adrianople, and such dash as the Bulgarians displayed in the attack of Kirk Kilissé would doubtless have given them a great chance of success in a surprise of Adrianople in the midst of peace. And if that fortress were once in the possession of the Bulgarians the cause of Turkey was lost.

But it would have been a serious question whether the delicate international situation of Bulgaria would not render such a flagrant breach of the peace far too daring a policy. For such undertakings have always been successfully carried out only by powerful statesmen and nations, at the time of the highest development of their strength, and in the year 1912 Bulgaria had not attained this position. The course of action that the situation dictated was rather to retain the sympathies of Europe by a strictly correct line of political conduct, and avoid anything that might lead rapidly to the intervention of one or more of the Great Powers.

But if at Sofia the idea of opening the war in this way by a surprise of Adrianople — as for instance the Japanese had done in their surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur — if, as we say, this idea was rejected, it might well be doubted whether an attack in force could possibly be attempted against Adrianople fourteen days after the general order of mobilization, without the necessary preparations putting the enemy fully on the alert; also, whether the risk ought to be taken of engaging the main army in what would certainly be an exceptionally sanguinary struggle, the result of which would be very uncertain. The strongest fortress may be taken by treachery and surprise, but even with a weak place, if its garrison is ready for the attack, an open assault by force will always, under present fire conditions, be a very risky undertaking. All the more would this have been the case at Adrianople, which in recent years had been considerably strengthened by Abdullah Pasha, and had by his new fortifications been converted into a formidable entrenched camp.

The situation therefore did not make it appear advisable to attempt to secure a decisive result by the reduction of Adrianople. There then remained only two possible alternatives: either to move southwards and force the line of the lower Maritza, and avoiding the line of Adrianople–Kirk Kilissé to advance directly upon the Lule Burgas–Chorlu positions; or, on the other hand, to operate from the north against the Adrianople–Kirk Kilissé line. The move against the line of the lower Maritza would have to be carried out under very difficult tactical conditions; the army would have to advance from the valley of Philippopolis through the mountains to the south of it, where hardly any good roads are available; it would have here also to reckon with the resistance offered by the Turkish divisions from Dedeagatsch, Demotika, and Kardjali; and the forcing of the line of the Maritza would have been all the more difficult an operation, inasmuch as the element of surprise could have no part in it.

One can, therefore, easily understand why this alternative was from the first rejected, and it was decided to attack from the northwards against the front Adrianople–Kirk Kilissé. Here the normal concentration of the Bulgarian army placed the troops in the position best adapted for the advance, and it could be carried through at all points simultaneously in full force and under the simplest conditions for attaining the object of the offensive.

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF KIRK KILISSÉ

THE considerations that have been discussed in the last chapter decided the points on which the Bulgarian army concentrated for its advance and the distribution of the forces, and the precise objective assigned to each for the attainment of the special purpose of the operation.

The Bulgarian eastern (or main) army was formed of the greater part of the troops from the First, Second and Third Military Inspection Districts, and was concentrated and distributed as follows along the southeastern frontier.

The Second Army, under General Ivanoff, with the Eighth and Third Divisions, west and northwest of Adrianople, and with the Second Division in two masses at Haskovo and in front of Tamras.

The Third Army, under General Dimitrieff, with the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Divisions, to the eastward, with the Tundja valley opening to the south of it.

Finally, between these two armies, portions of which had had to make long marches on foot to reach their places of concentration, the First Army, under General Kutintscheff, with the First and Sixth Divisions, was pushed forward, after having been brought to the front by rail by way of Philippopolis and Jamboli.

In the west, in the Kustendil and Dubnica district,

was the Seventh Division, which, as well as the Second Division, was joined by large bodies of Macedonian free corps. It must here once more be noted that the total strength of the divisions, with the reserve brigades attached to them, reached such a figure that each division was actually equivalent to an army corps with a smaller proportion of artillery.

The importance of Kirk Kilissé and the weakness of its fortifications, were points of which the Bulgarian Staff had the most precise knowledge. It was accordingly decided that the Third Army, forming the left wing of the general advance, should march directly upon Kirk Kilissé as the principal column of attack, while Kutintscheff's army engaged the enemy's troops to the west of the place, and at the same time Ivanoff's army advanced against the west and north fronts of Adrianople.

The Second Division was to occupy the districts of Tamras and Kirdjali, disperse the Turkish troops there, and then with its main body turn eastwards along the Arda valley and advance against the south front of Adrianople.

At Stara Zagora on October 17 King Ferdinand issued the order for the advance. The extreme right wing was already on the move in the afternoon of the same day, and in the night of the 17th–18th the whole line began its advance. Kurtakoi was captured almost without opposition, but in the neighbourhood of Mustapha Pasha there was hot fighting between the soldiers of the Eighth Bulgarian Division and the Turkish troops pushed forward to the frontier. To the eastward the Third Army was moving forward under General Dimitrieff in four

columns from the north against Kirk Kilissé. Of these the western column moved by Odzakoi and Petra; the two next by Erikler and Kovkas–Asklica and by Derekoi–Demirdza, and finally an eastern column by way of Malco Tirnovo.

To the west of the Third Army, the First Army pushed southwards in five columns.

On the side of the Bulgarians it was expected that the Turks would be found in entrenched positions at Kirk Kilissé and to the west of it. Contrary to all expectation, they met the Turks advancing against them to the north of the line Adrianople–Kirk Kilissé. According to Turkish accounts this offensive movement was only a reconnaissance in force, with the object of compelling the enemy to deploy for action and show the extent of his forces, and at the same time, of thereby delaying his advance. But before it came to a decisive engagement, the Turkish forces engaged in the reconnaissance began to retire, and avoided the onset of the invaders. This method of reconnoitring played a considerable part in the military teaching of Europe in the last century, but since then it has been somewhat discredited. For it involves this drawback, that it may easily bring on a pitched battle with the enemy which was never intended, and the troops engaged in the operation, instead of gaining information, may lay themselves open to a serious defeat. The battle of Kirk Kilissé looks like a fresh instance of such an experience.

According to another version, the fighting did not develop out of any pre-arranged plan on the part of the Turks, but the responsibility for it rests upon the ill-judged initiative of the subordinate Turkish com-

manders, Mahmud Mukhtar and Prince Aziz, who in presence of the Bulgarian advance pushed their troops forward to the attack.

The fact is that the Turkish army, formed of the First, Third and Sixteenth Corps, had on October 22 begun an advance in a northerly direction from the line Kirk Kilissé–Adrianople on a front of about forty kilometres (twenty-five miles). This movement was covered by two Nizam divisions pushed out to the eastward from Adrianople. The result of this movement was that, as they advanced, the troops of the Third Corps, under Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha (Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Divisions), came in contact with the centre of the Third Bulgarian Army; and that to the westward of the Third Corps, the advance of the Sixteenth Turkish Corps came into touch with the right wing of the Third Army, and the eastern column of Kutintscheff's army, the centre of which met the forward march of the First Turkish Corps.

Early on the 23d, the opposing forces were in contact all along the line. The main attack of the Bulgarians was successful in the direction of Petra-Kirk Kilissé. The Turks at first made a stubborn resistance, especially in the fighting in the woods, which was carried on with the greatest fierceness man to man, and with heavy losses on both sides. But in the afternoon a wild panic broke out in a Redif division of the Sixteenth Corps, and in a Nizam division of the Sixteenth Corps, and spread to portions of the Eighth and Ninth Divisions. The Turkish troops left the battlefield in a disorderly rout, and fled in panic terror beyond the reach of the Bulgarian weapons.

The Bulgarians pressed the pursuit energetically, and by evening were in front of the fortified positions to the north and northwest of Kirk Kilissé.

Kirk Kilissé itself lies in a hollow, and is commanded by the two forts that stand close to it on the high ground to the east and west. The heights round the town are covered with vineyards. The place has, therefore, only very slight value from the point of view of defence.

As a preparatory operation to clear the way for the capture of Kirk Kilissé there was a night attack, which was carried out by the Bulgarians with splendid dash, notwithstanding an awful thunderstorm with a deluge of rain. This made them masters of the Demirdja and upper Demirkapu positions on both sides of Sejtandere. The struggle for these positions on high ground, which had been strongly entrenched by the Turks, was a very sanguinary one, and they were only captured after fierce hand-to-hand fighting that lasted for some hours. The main body of the Turkish troops had already fallen back in the course of the night, and this stubborn resistance was the work of the Seventh and half of the Eighth Division.

The Bulgarians at once placed artillery in position on the captured heights, and in the grey dawn of October 24, they began a bombardment of the town, which was soon set on fire by the bursting shells.

At the same time the Bulgarians moved up their infantry along the whole front from Demirdja to the Malco Tirnovo–Kirk Kilissé road, and by Karakotsch and Raklica eastwards, from Petra for an attack on Kirk Kilissé that was to be of the nature of a *coup-de-main;* while another column marched east-

wards over the heights of Jundala, between Kirk Kilissé and Uskub, to reach the road to Bunarhissar in order to cut off the Turkish retreat in that direction.

In the vineyards to the north and northwest of Kirk Kilissé there was now a series of desperate hand-to-hand encounters between the Bulgarians advancing to the attack and the troops of the Turkish garrison. During this stage of the battle a Turkish brigade dashed forward to a counter-attack on the eastern flank of the Bulgarian troops. But it was almost torn to pieces by the fire of the Bulgarian artillery and machine guns. Although the Turks had a strong support in the two forts to west and east of the town, and many field entrenchments, they could not withstand the assault of the Bulgarian infantry, who came on with a contempt of death and danger, that no words can describe.

At 10 A.M. the first of the Bulgarian troops forced their way through the vineyards northwest of Kirk Kilissé, and pushed on into the town, where a desperate fight in the streets began.

It was only after an hour that the struggle was decided, and the Bulgarians were masters of the place. Despite the general exhaustion of the men, a pursuit of the Turks was at once begun. They were retreating in complete rout in a southeastern direction towards Bunarhissar.

The last fierce fight took place near the limekilns to the southeast of Kirk Kilissé. There a Turkish rear guard under Colonel Hilmi had taken up a strong position on the heights east of Bujukdere. The Bulgarian column that had gone out by way of Jundala had been able to march only at a slow rate, for the

roads were deep in mud after the heavy rain of the night. But without waiting for its help the Bulgarians, following up the enemy in hot pursuit, determined to take the Turkish rear-guard position by a direct frontal attack. They suffered very heavy losses, but finally the Turkish troops who had made this last stand were partly dispersed, partly taken prisoners, and the rest killed or wounded.

The Bulgarians captured at Kirk Kilissé seven batteries of quick-firing guns with their waggons and a great quantity of ammunition, eighteen field-pieces of older patterns, and twelve heavy siege-guns. There fell besides into their hands several depots of provisions, a great store of military equipments, many tents and two aeroplanes. These last, however, were quite useless, for they had been exposed without hangars to all the inclemency of the weather, and they had been ruined by the storms and the downpour of rain of the last few days. Finally, the whole of the personal baggage of Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha was captured, including the sword of honour given him by the Sultan. Some fifteen hundred men were taken prisoners.

The total strength of the Turks at the Battle of Kirk Kilissé amounted to about 70,000 men. But of these a considerable number were in action for only the briefest time, or took no part whatever in the actual fighting. The chief part of the fighting and the defence of Kirk Kilissé were the work of the Seventh and some of the Eighth Division under the command of Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha.

There were of course soon plenty of theories to account for the Turkish defeats. One may indicate

as the principal reasons, besides the superiority in numbers of the Bulgarians, the ill advised offensive movement of the Turks, to which attention has already been called, and the wretched condition of their men, who seem to have been for some days without full rations, were short of ammunition, and had been left to shift for themselves by the officers. Besides, the *morale* of the Turkish troops would seem to have been greatly shaken and their confidence in victory not to have been very great from the outset.

Just as the Bulgarians began their night attack a terrible storm burst over the hills, and the thunder-claps mingled with the raging cannon-thunder. In the woods of Amikapu several of the trees were struck by the lightning. Some of the Anatolian prisoners told me of the terror caused among them by this storm at such an unusual time of the year and in the midst of such surroundings. The superstitious Mohammedans saw in it a sign of the anger of God, and a Hodja [1] cried out, "Allah is punishing us! We have sinned against the law of the Koran!" The words ran like quickfire from man to man and shook the courage of the troops. But at what a low grade must the *morale* of soldiers stand when a heavy thunder-storm is enough to break their power of resistance! As has already been mentioned, there were also wide-spread panics, such as sometimes seize even upon troops who are making a brave fight and send them running back in wild flight. Panics of this kind seem to have been especially common among the Redifs, and they helped to demoralize the other troops.

But there is also no doubt that the element of sur-

[1] A student of the Ulema.

TURKISH OFFICERS ARRIVE AS PRISONERS AT STARA ZAGORA, AND ARE QUESTIONED BY GENERAL VEZTSCHOFF

prise played a considerable part. About a week after the battle of Kirk Kilissé I had a talk in their quarters with three Turkish officers, who had been taken prisoners. One of them, a captain who spoke German, told me: —

We were not yet ready when the declaration of war came, and we thought that the main attack of the Bulgarians would be made upon Adrianople. We were convinced that the Bulgarian army would be bleeding itself to death before Adrianople, and that meanwhile we would be able to complete our concentration. The Bulgarian advance on Kirk Kilissé came as a complete surprise to us. Our men fought very bravely, but we had most unfortunate arrangements for the command of them. Many of the commanding officers were only appointed at the outbreak of the war, and they did not know what demands they could make upon their men. Some of the Redif divisions were very deficient in their training, and nevertheless they were used as if they were old troops. One commanding officer would want to stand on the defensive, another to attack, and so it came about that part of the army would be advancing and another part standing still, and general confusion spread amongst us. In the bayonet charge the Bulgarians are irresistible. Even if hundreds fell before the fire of our repeating rifles, hundreds more would come rushing onward over the corpses.

This statement I can fully confirm by what I myself have seen. Thus I watched the charge of two battalions at Avan Ajvali and Milleti before Adrianople. The Bulgarians attacked in dense masses, in which the Turkish shrapnel tore great gaps. Nevertheless the charge was not checked; the gaps were at once filled up and on it went. In a situation such as this was, on open, uncovered ground, in front of an enemy who were posted in well protected positions, and

kept up a murderous fire, this was no ordinary human courage. It was a disdain of death that bordered on fanaticism, and my heart still beats faster when I remember that awful yet glorious sight, and others like it.

Although it was not the great battle of the war that was fought at Kirk Kilissé, yet to this action a decisive importance may be attributed. It has especially that significance which is always attached to the first serious fighting in a war. It has long been recognized as a feature in wars that the issue of the first battle is all important for the issue of the whole campaign. Not, indeed, that it is all important in the sense that it can give an impetus decisive of the entire war, and a direction to the whole development of its events, but its significance lies in the fact that it is the first touchstone of the fighting power belonging to the two opposing armies, that it supplies the first reliable data as to the military value of their troops.

Up to the moment of the first engagement all estimates are without any really solid foundation and therefore practically of no value. We had already, in the case of the Russo-Japanese War, had occasion for seeing to what an extent even experts of the greatest experience are liable to be deceived in these matters, and, as is well known, the Balkan War has supplied another example and a most striking confirmation of this fact.

What a high opinion of the capacity for war of the modern Turkish army prevailed in Europe, and how quickly this popular judgment veered round to its very opposite when the news arrived of the fall of Kirk Kilissé! It is true that there was on the other hand a high opinion of the Bulgarian army, but it

ARRIVAL OF TURKISH PRISONERS AT STARA ZAGORA

THE SECOND CONVOY OF TURKISH PRISONERS (360) ARRIVING AT STARA ZAGORA OCT. (11TH) 24TH

was not believed to be capable of winning a decisive victory over the Turkish troops. One even heard men whose views carried great weight speak of the possibility of a Turkish invasion of Bulgaria. It was only after Kirk Kilissé that public opinion received a clear direction, and henceforth no one who had any insight into the situation doubted as to the final victory of the Bulgarians in the campaign. The extent of that victory was the only point on which there was any controversy.

The actual series of events in the campaign has since then shown with convincing consistency that in this war too the law of "the continuity of success in war" has asserted its force, and that once more the issue of the first great engagement set its seal on the course of the whole campaign. It is true that there was a good deal of fighting before this, and in every instance the Turks had to give way; but these actions had not the importance of the battle of Kirk Kilissé, which was the first engagement that set a decisive impress on events throughout the whole theatre of war. Until a decisive engagement had been fought in Thrace, the events in the other theatres of war might be regarded as affairs of minor importance, as indeed they were. The victories of the Montenegrins, Greeks and Servians were so many "noughts," that would not represent any big number until a figure "one" was put before them. This figure "one" was a decisive victory in the chief theatre of war in Thrace, and the overture of this decisive victory, including in itself the leading idea of the whole drama that was to come, was the battle of Kirk Kilissé. Its effect was, as it were, to unite all the separate successes in the

other theatres of war into a victory of the Balkan League as a whole, and the partial defeats of the Turks into one general spectacle of the military collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

For Bulgaria this victory was the reward of long years of persistent and methodical preparation for war with the traditional enemy, and at the same time a proof of her superiority over the military power of Turkey.

With a surprising and almost scrupulously precise simultaneity of action Bulgaria had assumed the offensive all along her southern border on a front of over three hundred miles, and this not by a concentric advance bringing the separate units to bear upon one fixed point, and thus acting on the principle of "marching separately and fighting united," but on various, to a great extent divergent, lines of advance and operation. This simultaneous movement on widely separated lines of operation, and the strong forces assigned to each of these lines, gave the impression of a dangerous splitting up of the available fighting power, and the advance at the same time against Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé on a front of nearly sixty miles suggested the danger of separate detachments and columns being attacked by the Turks in superior numbers and beaten through being isolated from the support of the rest. The reports that Bulgarian troops were advancing and winning successes in Macedonia, in the district of Tamrasch, towards Kirdjali, and in the Maritza valley, might suggest the impression that through having devoted so much of their forces to subsidiary objectives, the Bulgarians would be too weak at the central decisive point.

But Kirk Kilissé gave the proof that the Bulgarian army was not only strong enough for this decisive struggle also, but further that it could carry it through in a way that revealed a striking power in the offensive that most people had not suspected the Bulgarian troops would possess. And precisely this circumstance that Bulgaria had conquered, not after having anxiously scraped together all her forces, but in spite of a fairly widespread dispersion of them, is evidence of the essential all-round superiority of the Bulgarian army as a whole over the Turkish army, of each individual Bulgarian soldier over the Turkish soldier, and of the whole national organization of Bulgaria over that of its Ottoman opponent.

The victory of Kirk Kilissé marked the day when the position of the predominant power in the Balkan Peninsula passed from Turkey to Bulgaria.

Since this day of Kirk Kilissé a name has become generally known throughout the world, which had long enjoyed popular fame throughout Bulgaria itself — the name of General Radko Dimitrieff, the victor of Kirk Kilissé, and the commander of the Third Bulgarian Army.

The officers and soldiers call him "Napoleontscheto," not only on account of the likeness of his profile and his general build to that of Napoleon, but also because he is the hero of Kirk Kilissé, Lule Burgas and Chorlu. It was a piece of good fortune for Savoff and Fitscheff that it was just a leader like this that had to solve that most difficult problem — the march from Jamboli and the attack on Kirk Kilissé. But it was also a glory for the Third Army, the Eastern Army, that it showed itself worthy of a leader who

possessed the most heroic temperament of the entire force.

But whence came Radko Dimitrieff? What was the past career of this hero, undoubtedly the most popular leader of his time in Bulgaria? He was born in the little town of Gradez on September 24, 1859, and after a successful course at the Military School of Sofia, passed out as lieutenant on May 10, 1879. He then distinguished himself as a student at the Academy of the General Staff at St. Petersburg.

When the annexation of Eastern Roumelia was proclaimed by Prince Alexander at Philippopolis, he was sent with most of the Bulgarian army to the Turkish frontier, for naturally the general idea was that Bulgaria would be attacked by Turkey. But the foresight and the expectations of Natschovitsch, who was then ambassador at Bucharest, were justified, and it was not the Turks but the "Servian brothers" of Bulgaria who were the invaders.

It is well known how difficult it then was, on account of the want of railways, to transfer Bulgarian troops from the south to the northwest of the country. Radko Dimitrieff took part as a captain in this operation. Marching his men at headlong speed he was in time to be present at the decisive battle of Slivnitza as one of the famous left wing. But then came the unfortunate dethroning of Prince Alexander, the result of a conspiracy organized by Russian Panslavists among the officers who had studied at St. Petersburg and were enthusiasts for the Czar, "the Liberator from the Turkish yoke." This affair involved the otherwise amiable and astute Radko Dimitrieff in politics. He had to leave the service and go away to Russia,

GENERAL PAPRIKOFF

GENERAL TOSCHEFF (WHO IS SAID TO HAVE SHOT HIMSELF AT KIRK KILISSÉ)

where he was again employed as an officer, this time in a foreign army.

He distinguished himself in various ways in his work as captain and soon received promotion. But homesickness grew upon him, and he often regretted that he had allowed himself to be drawn into politics.

Ten years after his exile began he was enabled to return to Bulgaria under the Government of Stoiloff, who had brought about a reconciliation with Russia. His whole conduct in his relations with others and his zeal for his military duties soon opened for him the advancement that he so well merited.

In 1902, under the premiership of Dr. Daneff, when General Patrikoff was Minister of War, Radko Dimitrieff was appointed Chief of the General Staff. In this position he displayed an exceptional mental power in the working-out of wide-reaching combinations. First of all, he drew up a carefully detailed plan of campaign for a war against Turkey. The General's labours were directed to obtaining the best possible results under existing conditions and with whatever resources the Sobranje could be persuaded to vote for the army.

The Stambulovists had protested strongly against the recall of any of the exiled officers from Russia, and when they came into power Dimitrieff could not retain his position as Chief of the General Staff. But it was easy for the new government to find a high appointment for this valuable officer — all the easier because the development of the army organization under his guidance had created such appointments — and he was named Inspector-General of the Third Army District.

In this appointment General Dimitrieff showed more than ordinary ability in preparing all the resources he would have to rely upon in a future war. Frequent staff-rides in the open country, the ideas and schemes for which were always very original, and manœuvres with the troops, made him greatly liked and generally popular with the army. When he appeared among his troops, which was very often, one could see in the faces of the men their enthusiasm for him.

At the last autumn manœuvres, which were more trying than any that had preceded them, Dimitrieff was given the task of marching from Tirnovo and taking the fortress of Schoumla. And Schoumla represented Kirk Kilissé. The attention of every one, and above all that of the King, was attracted to the General and his army, and in spite of the bad rainy and frosty weather, which the autumn brings early in this region of the Balkan Peninsula, he accomplished his task in two days less than the allotted time, solving the problem in a much more artistic and brilliant way than any one had anticipated. A few weeks later he repeated the triumph at Kirk Kilissé.

After this success of Dimitrieff at the manœuvres, they were at once broken off, for the main problem and that which gave them all their significance had been solved. Naturally many of the foreign newspapers expressed surprise at the manœuvres being so abruptly ended, and this was taken to be an indication that, notwithstanding the warlike agitation in the country, hostilities were not on the point of breaking out. It was logical enough to make such an assertion, but it was not correct. But who could have

known that Dimitrieff would take Schoumla so quickly — quicker than any one had ever suspected to be possible? And at Kirk Kilissé the captor of Schoumla excelled himself when opposed to Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, as he had when opposed to Kutintscheff in the manœuvre campaign. Now that it was real war Kutintscheff stood by the side of Dimitrieff, instead of against him. He commanded the First Army, which was advancing to the west of the army of Radko Dimitrieff.

Kutintscheff has the general reputation in Bulgaria of a very capable general, and his soldiers have a special affection and admiration for him. Entering the service as a private, he has risen to the command of an army. He was born at Rustchuk on March 25, 1857. After serving in the ranks and distinguishing himself by his intelligence, zeal, and spirit of discipline, he was admitted to the Military School, which he left, on May 10, 1879, with the rank of lieutenant. In 1885 he commanded a battalion in the Servian War, and distinguished himself at Slivnitza. In command of the First Army he acted on the right flank of Dimitrieff and did his work thoroughly well.

CHAPTER XI

THE FIRST BULGARIAN DIVISION AT THE BATTLE OF KIRK KILISSÉ

SOON after the battle of Kirk Kilissé reports gained some currency of fighting having then taken place in which the First (Sofia) Division had been unsuccessful and suffered heavy loss, and it was said that on account of this General Toscheff, the commander of the division, committed suicide.

One of the officers of his division, Lieutenant Waklin, has spoken out in defence of the honour of his general, who began his career as a private soldier, and was one of the most distinguished leaders of the Bulgarian army. Lieutenant Waklin writes: —

Notwithstanding the brilliant operations of the First (Sofia) Division from the day of the declaration of war onwards, one has with regret to remark that certain unscrupulous persons have succeeded in giving public currency to reports that seriously affect the credit of the division as to its conduct in battles in which it played a leading and decisive part.

We suspect that the ground for these rumours was the heavy loss suffered in the fighting at Edzeci Geckinli by its First Brigade and especially by the First Prince Alexander Regiment of Sofia.

In the interests of truth, and as one who fought in this division, I consider it my duty to give a brief and hastily written account of this engagement, and thus to refute a calumny which must be held accountable for the reported suicide of General Toscheff, the commander of the

division — a calumny as base as it is revolting and repulsive.

The following was the course of the action: The First Sofia Division was marching southwards divided into two columns, the First Brigade on the way from Tscheschmekioi to Tartarlar and Jadzalii, and the Second Brigade from Tartarlar in the direction of Domurdzalii. The Second Brigade had to move over very broken ground, and when it joined at Tartarlar the artillery, which had had to come in by a circuitous route, the march was at once continued in the direction of the village of Jadzalii.

According to army orders our division was this day to take up the following positions — the First Brigade at the village of Jadzalii, the Second Brigade at the village of Domurdzalii, the divisional staff at the village of Saro-Talischman.

About two o'clock in the afternoon we were at this last village and the telephone section was installing the telephone there. About half-past two we heard the thunder of cannon away to the southwards. The divisional chief of the staff at once mounted his horse and rode out in the direction in which the fight was developing — a fight that was not expected that day. No cavalry had been given to our division, and the work of reconnoitring therefore fell upon infantry patrols. These had found the Turks in front of them, just as our First Brigade had begun to march up towards Jadzalii.

No sooner had the Turks fired their first shot than our quick-firing batteries took up a position and began to shower shrapnel on the enemy's artillery. The Sixth Tirnovo Regiment (the "King's Own") and the First Infantry Regiment (Prince Alexander's) formed for the attack, and went briskly forward against the Turkish division, which, quite unexpectedly, had run up against our column.

It is characteristic of such encounters between two opposing forces, meeting thus on the march, that the one which shows the most determined attitude wins and the

other is put to flight. The Turks almost at once began to withdraw before our first fierce attack. Our men charged with the greatest impetuosity and with frenzied shouts of "Hurrah!" Our artillery mowed the enemy down mercilessly. The fire of the Turkish batteries was slackening. And now began a terrible onset, in which the fury of the Bulgarians knew no bounds. Under a hail of shrapnel and bullets officers and soldiers rushed forwards.

The general commanding the division rode into Jadzalii about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the fight was already in full swing. He ordered the advanced troops of the First Brigade to be reinforced, and that they should be supported by the Second Brigade. He himself took direct command of the troops that were still in hand. Seeing that the First Brigade was pushing on too far, he gave the order that the enemy's retirement should not be followed up any further.

But who could hold back the troops, who were now in a state of over-excited enthusiasm? The shouts of "Hurrah!" continued, as they pressed upon the Turks, who were now in flight, some of them directly to the southward, the rest towards Adrianople. Our men rushed upon two Turkish batteries, captured them, reached the village of Geckinli, and fell upon the enemy from two different directions. There were heavy additions to the Turkish losses.

The First Regiment, which had been pushed forward towards the village of Saliorloff, went beyond it. Night put an end to the pursuit, but not to the fighting, for fresh Turkish troops tried to recapture the batteries. Ours attacked again, and once more drove them back.

When the commander of the division saw the isolated position of the First Brigade, he sent order after order for the separated bodies of troops to fall back, but no one would hear of a retirement: for to withdraw would have meant to abandon the captured guns to the Turks.

At last, as the result of strongly worded orders, the First Brigade, about 3 A.M., began to withdraw in the dark-

ness to the points indicated for them, every man in the highest degree irritated at having been compelled to retire. The guns were dragged by the men themselves for a certain distance, but at last had to be left at a point where the heavy rain had made the ground into a quagmire. Next day the two batteries were brought with twelve limbers into the village of Sare-Schalischman.

The losses of the Turks were enormous. On the hills and round the villages the fields and ditches were full of lines of their dead. A whole Turkish division had been beaten and forced to retreat in disorder to the southwards, and another division hastening to their assistance was involved in their disorderly flight. Two days later, as our troops continued their march to the south, we saw some of the results of this most bitterly contested fight. Another Turkish battery was found abandoned in the village of Gerdelii; there were also tents, wounded men, rifles, medicine-cases, baggage waggons, shells, and strewn all over the ground were cartridges. According to the accounts of prisoners and of inhabitants who came into our lines, the flight of the Turks was panic-stricken.

In this action, for the first time and in decisive fashion, the two armies measured their strength. Our Sofia Division had been engaged against the Second and Third Constantinople Divisions, which had the reputation of being the best of the Turkish troops. It has been ascertained that the Turks, after leaving a division behind the fortifications of Kirk Kilissé, moved two other divisions under Turgut Pasha towards Adrianople, to attack our left wing. We were marching towards villages on the flank of the Kirk Kilissé–Adrianople road, and on October 23, when they found our First Brigade approaching the village of Jadzalii, — near which the road runs between two and three miles to the south of it, — the Turks, in order to protect themselves against a possible flank attack, found themselves, contrary to their original intentions, compelled to enter into an engagement against us. The determined valour of our officers and soldiers spoiled their

plan. Beaten and demoralized, the Turks retired southwards, and in this way exposed the flank and rear of their troops in the direction of Kirk Kilissé. The result was the fall of the place on the following day.

So ended this successful encounter, that ought to be known in its smallest details to every Bulgarian, for it should add to his national pride. In fact for the division there was nothing in the least discreditable, but on the contrary a solid gain to the fame and glory of the Bulgarian arms. The captured guns were trophies of a splendid fight. The most brilliant gallantry was displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Poscheff and Lieutenant-Colonel Notscheff, who fell like heroes and true sons of their native land. The latter was killed by a bullet as he dashed at one of the guns, and many of his heroic soldiers fell around its wheels. This was how the guns were taken.

Heavy as our sacrifices were, no one can say that the Turkish losses were not far more serious. And the panic-stricken flight of the enemy after this defeat counts for something.

That the First Regiment had the greatest losses might be inferred from the situation in which it was placed on that day. Besides, throughout, the enemy held higher and commanding ground.

With all this it would be a pity to give credit to rumours, which have found many to listen to them, and which talk of failures of the division due to its commander. With regard to this, one need only reflect that the record of the engagement in question, even though it is here described by one who does not claim to be an authority on war, is an heroic chapter added to our recent history. And here it may be added that this same division took a very active part in the battle of Lule Burgas. Every one must feel heavy at heart who knows what really happened, and what evil was spoken of it.

The general in command of the division did just what was his duty as a commander and as a soldier, and the calumnies against him are therefore all the more revolting.

CHAPTER XII

THE BATTLE OF LULE BURGAS–BUNARHISSAR

AFTER the battle of Kirk Kilissé, the Third and First Bulgarian Armies continued their advance southwards, the eastern flank column pushing forward towards Bunarhissar and Viza.

The region which the Bulgarian columns now reached in their southward march, derives its special character from the number of streams and rivers, flowing in roughly parallel courses in a southwesterly direction, that have worn valleys for themselves in the long slope that falls from the mountain mass of the Istrandza Dagh to the Ergene River. The landscape, with its series of ridges rising one beyond the other like waves, gives one the impression of a sea that has suddenly been solidified. The range of view seldom extends beyond the next wave of the ground, and when one reaches its crest one sees again just the same prospect before one.

The valleys that form the hollows between these waves are fairly wide, and after rain they soon become swampy. This was the case at the time of the Bulgarian operations, as in the last week but one of October there had been several heavy down-pours of rain.

An advance directly across these ridges and valleys, on account of the unfavourable weather, would have to be carried out under difficult conditions, and from a tactical point of view it would present no easy task.

For the enemy would have a good open field of fire from the hill crests, and the series of ridges, one behind the other, would enable him, as he fell back, to occupy a succession of defensible positions.

The crests of the ridges are generally bare or covered only with heather and low-growing bushes. It is only in the intervening valleys that one finds here and there ploughed fields and bits of cultivated ground. And here, too, are the few villages, mostly groups of straw-roofed huts, having no military importance.

Roads, in the European sense, there are none. Even the highway from Adrianople, by Baba-Eski, Lule Burgas, and Chorlu, is only a series of wagon-tracks across the country. Of a paved road there is not a trace. The monotony of the landscape, and finally the absence of all landmarks to serve as points of direction, makes it singularly difficult precisely to identify one's position in this region, which at first sight seems all open to the view.

The maps, too, of this part of the theatre of war in Thrace are of very limited value.

Thus, for instance, the Austrian general map, on the scale of 1/200,000 (about three miles to the inch), though from a technical point of view it is beautifully reproduced, and though it can be remarkably easily read, and gives an excellent general impression, is only moderately accurate, because, of course, it is not based on exact topographical surveys, such as were made for the sheets that show Austro-Hungarian territory. One can, therefore, only take the data of this map as approximately correct, making a varying allowance for error.

In view of the decisive battles they had before

GENERAL KUTINTCHEFF,
COMMANDER OF THE FIRST ARMY

GENERAL THEODOROFF, COMMANDING THE
7TH DIVISION, WHICH MARCHED ON SALONICA

them, the Bulgarians had brought up all available reserves to their main army, including strong detachments from the Second Army before Adrianople. One may estimate the total strength of the Bulgarian troops at the battle of Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar at about 220,000 men.

Whilst the left wing of the Bulgarian Third Army pushed forward in pursuit of Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha's divisions in their flight towards Bunarhissar, the centre and right wing of the Bulgarians at once continued their advance in a southern direction.

Notwithstanding the recent fighting and forced marches, the troops were only given just the necessary rest while the supply of ammunition and provisions was brought up to the full amount. The victory of Kirk Kilissé had to a remarkable degree raised the *morale* and spirit of the men. They now regarded themselves as invincible, and each individual was convinced that all that was needed was to give the Turkish army no time to concentrate and strengthen its positions. No one believed in the possibility of a defeat.

The Bulgarian First Army, under General Kutintscheff, that was advancing by the line of Keremetlija–Kukiler and Demeranlija, detached its right wing column by way of Skendeskoi to complete the investment of Adrianople, while the main body turned from Haskoi and Jenidze in the direction of Baba-Eski and Jenikoi. The Bulgarian cavalry division attached to Kutintscheff's army, by a rapid dash succeeded in seizing Baba-Eski and the bridge at Demotika, and captured at Baba-Eski railway station a military train (the last from Adrianople) which had been left there.

The intention of the Bulgarian staff was to engage the Turkish army at all points by a simultaneous attack on its western wing at Lule Burgas, and the advance of the Bulgarian left wing on Bunarhissar and Viza, and if possible to drive considerable portions of their adversary's force away from their line of retreat on Chatalja. This intention could not be completely carried out, owing to the counter-measures adopted by the chiefs of the Turkish army.

The direction taken in their retreat by the Turkish troops which had been defeated at Kirk Kilissé, as is nearly always the case, corresponded to the direction from which the main assault of the enemy had come upon them. Thus, the mass of the Turks, who had been posted west of Kirk Kilissé, in the region of Petra, united with the army corps posted further back, six or seven divisions strong, and retired towards the south upon Baba-Eski and Lule Burgas; whilst the defenders of Kirk Kilissé itself, about two divisions strong, under the pressure of the enveloping attack of the Bulgarians from the northwest, retreated in a southeasterly direction on Bunarhissar.

Thus, the main forces of the Turks reached the middle course of the River Ergene at Baba-Eski and Lule Burgas, and what was left of Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha's divisions reached the country to the eastward. The army received reinforcements that had arrived from Constantinople (i. e., from Asia Minor).

The defeat experienced at Kirk Kilissé had placed the Turkish leaders in a very difficult situation. I have already mentioned that the leading idea of Von der Goltz's plan of campaign was that, at the outset, the Turkish main army should occupy the strong posi-

tion on the upper Ergene on both sides of Chorlu, with its right wing in the neighbourhood of Saraj-Strandza, while Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé were held by strong garrisons. Now after Kirk Kilissé had fallen in so unexpectedly short a time, and the "reconnaissance in force" of Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha had had such a mournful ending, the Turkish Army of the East found itself in a situation in which it was not possible for it to reach the Chorlu position on the upper Ergene without fighting a battle.

The left wing of the army was in the region of Baba-Eski, and in view of the way in which the Bulgarians were pushing forward, it was obviously impossible to withdraw this division to Chorlu. Again, on the right wing there were Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha's troops in disorderly retreat on Bunarhissar, and these were in danger of being attacked in flank and dispersed by the Bulgarian columns advancing on Viza. Obviously there was a danger of a Bulgarian advance in the direction of Strandza, threatening his line of retreat, and it would be impossible to withdraw in time behind the Ergene the bodies of troops that were still far out to the west and northeast. The Turkish commander therefore decided to push forward his right wing in the direction of Bunarhissar and Viza, towards Kirk Kilissé, with a view to recapturing that place and driving the Bulgarians, who had meanwhile pressed on to the south of it, back upon Adrianople. The left wing was meanwhile to hold on to the strong positions of Lule Burgas and Turk Bej.

On the right by Viza and Chongara the Turks were able to push forward in such superior force that they succeeded in driving the Bulgarian advanced

troops out of the zone of forests between Viza and Bunarhissar, and after a long and hard-contested fight retook Bunarhissar from them, and compelled them to retreat.

The situation southeast of Kirk Kilissé thus assumed a critical appearance. When General Dimitrieff's report of a successful Turkish advance on Bunarhissar reached the Bulgarian headquarters, it caused a certain amount of anxiety there, and for a short time there was a rumour in circulation that the Turks had also retaken Kirk Kilissé. But by immediately bringing up his reserves and all the troops that were out to the eastward, it was possible for the commander of the Third Army to begin a counter-attack by the early morning of the 29th.

This was carried out by an advance against the Turkish front by the Kirk Kilissé–Bunarhissar road and a flanking movement on the line of Usküb–Hadzifakli and the Monastir Dagh. The Bulgarians, attacking swiftly and with extraordinary dash, succeeded at the first onset in breaking through the Turkish line, retaking Bunarhissar, and hurling the enemy back behind the Karagash. But now, on account of the superior numbers of the Turks, who were continually throwing fresh reserves into the struggle, the fight was stationary, no further progress being made for about the next forty-eight hours. During a whole day and night almost without intermission the conflict raged fiercely and continuously, each side in turn attacking the other, but finally the fighting endurance of Mahmud Mukhtar's divisions (some of which had already been beaten at Kirk Kilissé) was almost completely worn out. The Bulgarians themselves, too,

were so exhausted that the situation in this direction was fairly evenly balanced.

Westward on their left wing the Turks had taken up a position about Lule Burgas with four army corps, including the First and Second Corps. Here Abdullah Pasha was in command. Despite the extraordinary exertions of the men, in consequence of the wretched state of the roads, which had been reduced to quagmires by the recent heavy rains, the Bulgarian advance on this side was slower than had been intended. This was why the attack upon Lule Burgas was not made in force till the 29th, notwithstanding the critical position of the Bulgarian left wing about Bunarhissar.

In the battle that followed on this day in front of the Turkish positions west and northwest of Lule Burgas, about Telandere and Ajvaledere, it was the destructive fire of their artillery that contributed most largely to the success of the Bulgarian arms. Without allowing themselves to be drawn into a duel with the Turkish artillery, which was shooting badly and was obviously hampered by being short of ammunition, the Bulgarian artillery concentrated its fire on the Turkish infantry. This suffered heavy loss, and had its *morale* thereby so shattered that it had not any steadiness left with which to stand up against the attack when, at last, the Bulgarian infantry was launched against it in a wild onset.

In these charges the dash displayed by the Bulgarian infantry was something extraordinary, and went far beyond all that had hitherto been regarded as possible by tacticians in their deductions from earlier events.

When it came to realities, that is, to actual tactical work, the Bulgarian infantry raised their charging shout "Na nos!" ("With the knife," i. e. "the bayonet"), paying no regard to modern tactical theories. Four hundred paces or even more in front of the enemy's position, whole regiments in the firing line would rise up and hurl themselves upon the Turks in one irresistible rush, without pausing, without firing, and disdaining all cover. Each Bulgar longed literally to run his "knife" (bayonet) into the body of a Turk, and the officers were powerless to control the excitement of their men. Every attempt to restrain them was utterly useless. Even a regiment that had not yet been sent into the firing line, but was following it in support, would raise the wild battle cry and hurl itself upon the enemy, perhaps at the call of one of its sergeants, taking no notice whatever of the officers' orders to halt and lie down.

The same spirit was shown even by the newly raised reserve units belonging to the third Bulgarian levy, who came into battle in their civilian dress, having been given only a Mannlicher rifle, bayonet, and cartridge belt when they were called out. The mountain districts especially raised regiments that it would be hard to match for the endurance, fearlessness, and soldierly enthusiasm of the men of all ages who filled their ranks.

The Bulgarian generals, supported by a body of officers whose competence is thoroughly recognized by all, adapted themselves in their conduct of the war to this spirit of their troops, and did not regard it as part of their duty to try to restrain such eagerness by any exaggerated application of traditional

THE ENGLISH RED CROSS DETACHMENT

tactical systems. They contented themselves with so far guiding the energetic enthusiasm of the men as to secure unity of action and direction to the purpose in view.

At the same time it may be confessed that these attack methods of the Bulgarian infantry were in the highest degree responsible for the enormous losses the army had to suffer in this war. Against a more capable enemy, which was well trained and could shoot straight, such methods would obviously result in even more sanguinary repulses than those that, for instance, the Austrians experienced in 1866 in their charges through the fire of the Prussian needle-gun.

As it was, to revert to this present war, the difficult position in which the Bulgarians found themselves on the eve of the armistice must be attributed, above all, to the enormous losses their infantry had incurred by its wild and utterly reckless charging tactics. Nearly half the Bulgarian cavalry, too, lay buried on the battle-fields of Kirk Kilissé, Bunarhissar, Lule Burgas, Chorlu, etc., or wounded in hospital, and the attempt to fill the gaps in the infantry and cavalry by calling up young men still under the regular age for service, and by bringing in Servian troops and enrolling volunteers was only a makeshift. King Ferdinand himself, as well as the Bulgarian Ministers, was extremely dismayed at the sacrifices the war had entailed. A Bulgarian diplomat of high position, in my presence, complained bitterly that the generals and the other officers of the army had not avoided the necessity of this lavish bloodshed by employing more suitable tactics and manœuvres.

If I may venture to state an opinion of my own on

this matter, I must express my conviction that deplorable though these heavy losses of the brave Bulgarian troops may have been, and much as they certainly are regretted by the generals of the Bulgarian army, these leaders had no means and no possibility of making the conflict a less sanguinary one. There is no doubt that such an attempt could have been made only by seriously imperilling the chances of victory for the Bulgarian arms.

These wild charging tactics of the Bulgarian soldiers were the outcome of a whole series of factors, and only in a minor degree had their origin in the methods of training adopted in the army. In a much greater degree they were the direct result of the national character, and of the spirit of the people, which so completely inspired the Bulgarian army in this war against its traditional enemy, — a war desired by the nation for many a year. The attempt to mould this warlike spirit into another and a milder form would probably have only ruined it, — at the very least seriously impaired it. In that case how far is it probable that the Bulgarians would have penetrated beyond their own frontier?

Besides, after nearly every war complaints are made about the terrible sacrifice of blood entailed, especially on the victorious side; and most people are inclined to raise a discussion on the question as to whether the same results might not have been secured at a more moderate cost. Even Moltke himself after the war of 1870–71 expressed the view that by more frequent use of cover and by manœuvring the Germans might have saved themselves a considerable part of the losses they incurred, for example, by their

SERVIANS ON THE WAY TO MUSTAPHA PASHA

SERVIANS ON THE WAY TO ADRIANOPLE

methods of attack at the battle of St. Privat (Gravelotte). After the South African War and the Russo-Japanese War one often heard opinions of the same kind expressed.

The sanguinary fighting on Tuesday, October 29, had given victory to the Bulgarians both at Bunarhissar and Lule Burgas, but it was not yet decisive, for the Turks were bringing up all available reserves to hold back the Bulgarian advance.

But by Wednesday the 30th the Bulgarians had been reinforced by bringing up men from the army before Adrianople by forced marches. In the early hours of the day — after having pushed forward their troops into position under cover of the night — they attempted to break through the centre of the Turkish position by way of Kavakdere. By repeatedly renewed bayonet attacks, at the cost of much bloodshed, they succeeded about midday in penetrating the enemy's position. The success at this point, and a simultaneous attack upon Lule Burgas, had the effect of rolling up the whole of the Turkish left wing.

In the first hours of the afternoon the general retreat of the Turks from the Lule Burgas position began. They followed the direction of the railway line towards Chorlu.

The Bulgarians at once began a pursuit, and pressed it closely, notwithstanding the efforts of the Turkish cavalry to cover the retreat. This pursuit was kept up with extraordinary energy even during the night, turning the enemy's retirement into a disorderly flight, and producing a general break-up of the troops of the Turkish left wing.

At the same time the Bulgarians on their own

left, southeast of Bunarhissar, had worked completely round the Turks to the northeastward, and in the grey dawn of Thursday (October 31) there came from the direction of Urum Bejli-Viza a decisive attack upon the enemy's left flank. The Turkish troops, already shaken by their experiences in the earlier fighting, could not withstand this flank attack, and fell back towards the southeast, part of their force in utter disorder.

Notwithstanding the defeats they had suffered along the whole line, neither the Turkish commander-in-chief, Abdullah Pasha, nor the commander of the three corps posted on the right wing, Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, accepted the fact that they were beaten, but on November 2, with about two divisions, part of which had arrived by way of the Black Sea, they attempted another stroke by Viza against Bunarhissar. This, too, after some success at the beginning, finally resulted like their previous efforts in a complete defeat.

After the battle of Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar, and the delay caused by this fresh Turkish advance and the Bulgarian counter-attack in the direction of Viza, the Third Army, forming the left wing of the Bulgarian battle front, marched forward in strong columns by Saraj and Sultanbatsche, hoping still to cut off the Turkish troops posted to the southwards from their retreat on the lines of Chatalja.

At the same time in the centre and on the right wing the First Army was also advancing. It had been reinforced by the arrival of troops set free from the work of investing Adrianople. It now moved in several columns following the general direction of the railway

line, and throwing out a detached flank force to the southwards by way of Tschajrum to attack the Turkish troops which had taken up a strong entrenched position on both sides of Tscherkeskoi, to cover the retreat of the main body towards the lines of Chatalja.

The fiercely contested fight for this position lasted during the whole of November 4 and 5. The Turks, now under the command of Nazim Pasha, fought with much greater determination than was expected after their disordered retreat from the recent battle-fields.

When the Bulgarian flank column that had been detached to the southwards began to come into action here, the Turks directed a counter-attack from Kapakli Bunar against Uzun Hadji in the hope of breaking through the Bulgarian centre. But this effort completely collapsed under the fire of the Bulgarian infantry and artillery.

At the same time, too, a division of the Bulgarian Third Army coming from the country west of Strandza, pressed boldly home an attack against the Turkish right centre, posted to the north of Jenikoi, and drove it back upon Tscherkeskoi. The column that had counter-attacked towards Uzun Hadji was taken in flank and almost entirely dispersed. A great part of the loss the Turks suffered in the battle resulted from their failure at this point.

The immediate sequel of the collapse of the Turkish right centre was the retirement of all the forces they still had in strong positions at the southern end of their battle-front.

This retirement, which began in the forenoon of November 5, was directed mainly along the railway

line as far as Sinekli, while the left wing retreated on Canta. The movement was at first very orderly, but it was soon turned into a confused flight by the pressure of the First Bulgarian Army in pursuit, and especially by the way in which its southern column pushed forward and hung upon the rear of the defeated Turks.

An attempt which Nazim Pasha made to stop the Bulgarian pursuit by occupying a rear guard position at Sejmen ended at five o'clock in the afternoon in the retreat of the last Turkish reserves, which were here brought into action.

A further result of the Bulgarian attack on Jenikoi was the withdrawal of the Turkish right wing from the heights east of Strandza into the wooded country near Lake Derkos. Thus the resistance of the last Turkish troops that still tried to make a stand had broken down.

If we consider what were the causes of victory and defeat in the series of engagements in the Thracian theatre of war ending with the fighting round Chorlu–Tscherkeskoi, we can come to only one conclusion. In these battles there was on the victorious side the union of the fresh innate strength of a young nation with an organization perfectly adapted to the end in view, and a preparation for war according to the most modern principles. Hence came its triumph over the senility of a decaying state, which had found its attempted revival frustrated by political corruption, and which had made all too late and on ill-chosen lines the effort to form an army that would be efficiently trained for war.

By the series of victories from Kirk Kilissé to

Chorlu the Bulgarians have shown how a nation of only three and a half millions may contrive to secure victory over one that has a population of some twenty millions. In so far as concerned the numbers and efficiency of the troops, the difference between the opposing forces on the battle-fields of Thrace was the result of, on the one side, twenty-five years of preparation directed by a perfect appreciation of the end in view, and on the other — notwithstanding occasional outbursts of energy — a chronic neglect of the whole public administration, of all branches of popular education, and of the armed forces on which the state had to rely for its defence.

On the Bulgarian side the infantry as well as the artillery had a thorough training, and was prepared for war by plenty of practice on the ranges and in field firing. On the other hand, with the Turks there were no manœuvres whatever until 1909. The infantry very seldom, and then only under a special order from the Sultan's Government, had any rifle practice; and even when this took place only *eight* shots were fired by each man. One may say that the artillery never got so far as firing any practice shots at a target. Of the formation of an efficient body of officers there was practically no question. It is therefore self-evident that when two such opponents came into actual conflict in war there could be no doubt as to what would be the result, even if there were not the further factors of the disorders introduced by politics into the appointment of officers, and the enlistment of the unreliable non-Mohammedan element in the ranks. The only point on which any discussion would be possible before such

a conflict would be as to the greatness of the success that would be won by the victors, and the extent of the disasters of the defeated side.

Even the most far-seeing supply organization can never absolutely prevent the occasional occurrence of such a mischance as that some of the troops engaged in a campaign should find themselves for a while without food. This may, for instance, occur during forced marches, and when great masses of men have been suddenly concentrated within narrow limits of ground. But it was a proof of the absolute neglect of even the simplest preparations for the conduct of a great war that the Turkish troops should be left starving for days, and in the decisive battle found themselves in a short time handicapped by the want of ammunition — this, too, not after having penetrated for hundreds of miles into a hostile country, but when they were still in their own territory, and on ground which had long been known as a likely scene of active operations. In the case of Kirk Kilissé, this occurred in the neighbourhood of a great fortress; and in the case of Lule Burgas, close to a railway line leading to the capital.

It is true that on the Bulgarian side there were also cases of the troops having to go hungry, and interruptions in the regular arrival of ammunition supplies. To name actual instances, there were such occurrences in the last phase of the campaign after the series of battles from Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar to Chorlu, and during the progress of the operations in front of the Chatalja lines. But these temporary failures were the natural results of the difficult situation which the operations had reached, the wretched

roads, the blocking of the only thoroughly efficient line of supply by the prolonged resistance of Adrianople, and the rapidity of the advance from the frontier to beyond Chorlu. When one has seen the practical working of the Bulgarian supply and line-of-communication department, and the wonderful skill with which it has availed itself of all the resources of the country and all the machinery of its civil life, one must realize how carefully everything, down to the smallest detail, had been studied in advance, and what efforts had been made to master by the simplest and most natural methods the serious problem of maintaining a great army in full fighting efficiency at the front.

The tactical result of the battle of Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar–Chorlu was the destruction and dispersion of the greater part of the Turkish Army of the East, which out of a total strength of 150,000 men had some 40,000 killed and wounded. The battle, the total duration of which has been exceeded only by the battles in the war of positions in Manchuria, was also one of the most sanguinary in modern military history. The Bulgarians reported their loss at 15,000 men, but one may take it that this figure is decidedly an underestimate, and one may safely say that 60,000 is not too high a figure for the total loss of the armies engaged in this battle. This total is not far from that of the battle of Borodino, though there the percentage of loss was much greater, on account of the smaller numbers of the opposing armies. In the battle of Königgratz (Sadowa) the Austrian army (including the Saxon Corps), with a combatant strength of 215,000 men, had the heavy loss of 23,600 killed and

wounded. But it must be remembered that the battle lasted only eight hours, while that of Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar went on for five days. If we compare the analogous decisive situations of the Manchurian and the Balkan War — Port Arthur and Mukden in the one, with Adrianople and Lule Burgas in the other — we see, of course, that the extent and duration of the fighting and the losses incurred were on a far greater scale in the former.

The strategic results of this decisive battle of the Balkan War were less than had been at first anticipated. For the Bulgarians succeeded neither in cutting off a considerable part of the Turkish army from its line of retreat, nor in realizing the hope that they would be able to penetrate into the lines of Chatalja at the heels of routed troops streaming back into them in confusion. If they could have done this they would have prevented the Turks from concentrating and reorganizing in this, the last, position covering Constantinople.

This disappointing result of the battle must be attributed chiefly to the way in which the forces on both sides were distributed and grouped in the series of engagements, and the direction given to the movements by which each of them sought to obtain a decisive result. On purely strategic grounds the Bulgarian attack might have been expected to secure the greatest results if it had been made on the side of Bunarhissar and through the wooded region to the east of it, and carried out in the direction of Saraj-Strandza. The success of such an attack would have destroyed the Turkish right wing and completely cut off the main body of the Turkish army from its line of retreat.

A SENTRY ON THE MARITZA

BURNING OF A FARMSTEAD AT JURASCH

On the plan, that was actually adopted, of pushing forward the main strength of the Bulgarian army in a generally west to east direction against the wing directly opposed to it, the only result to be obtained would be the driving back of the Turks in the direction of their natural line of retreat. Only by a simultaneous attack carried out by the left wing of the Bulgarians and its victorious advance on Saraj would the defeat of the Turkish army have become a catastrophe.

But besides, this left wing was too weak for the operation, and all the more because the Turks, recognizing the danger that threatened their line of retreat, had pushed forward on this same side in strong force, and at first obtained not inconsiderable successes. And then, when the successful advance of the right and centre had already taken place, the Bulgarians on the left or eastern wing also moved forward and pushed home their attack, and the Turks after two days' hard fighting were forced back on Viza. The main body of the Turkish army had by this time already extricated itself from the danger zone between Lule Burgas and Chorlu, and its eventual retreat on Chatalja was safe enough.

It would, however, be unjust to make the plan of the battle, and the direction given to the decisive attack, a subject of reproach against the Bulgarian Staff, or to think of charging its leadership with neglecting a great opportunity. That the strategical situation indicated as the best course a main attack made from the eastward against the right wing of the Turks, the Bulgarian Staff knew well — quite as well as their critics. But obvious and self-evident as the

idea was, it was equally difficult to reduce it to actual practice under existing conditions.

The carrying out of the main attack in this direction would have required that the Bulgarian leaders at the very outset in the concentration and advance from Eastern Roumelia should send their chief force into the wooded region towards the coast and direct the march of the left wing by way of Malco Tirnovo, Samokov and Strandza, and this would have involved traversing the whole mass of the Istrandza Dagh, for more than sixty miles in all. As has already been mentioned, this region is a roadless mountain-land, covered with thick woods, with much dense undergrowth, so that it is quite impracticable ground for the operations of a large army. Besides, during this movement, in consequence of the simultaneous advance against Adrianople, the Bulgarian armies would be separated from each other on a front of about seventy-five miles, and this would have been a very serious situation.

One can, therefore, perfectly easily understand why it was that the Bulgarian Staff kept the line of advance of the left wing fairly close to Kirk Kilissé, sent only small columns and detachments into the Istrandza Dagh region and towards the Black Sea coast, and pushed forward the main body of the army between Kirk Kilissé and Adrianople. From this situation at the outset came the development of the further advance and the actual distribution of forces before the battle of Lule Burgas–Bunarhissar. It was the simplest and most natural solution of the problem. It brought the troops into the presence of the enemy without complicated changes of position that

would have entailed much loss of time; it facilitated the bringing up of reinforcements from the Second Army before Adrianople; and it created no confusion on the lines of supply in the rear.

The battle front was thus determined as the result of dispositions made long before on both sides, and the Bulgarian leaders could not avoid adopting a main attack that tended only to force the Turks back directly upon their line of retreat. One may even say that in this instance the geographical and strategical situation favoured the Turks, who by the direction of their line of operations and supply were led to transfer their chief effort to their eastern flank, and managed moreover to do this in the simplest way.

CHAPTER XIII

CHATALJA

THE retreat of the Turks from Lule Burgas, Bunarhissar, and Chorlu to behind the lines of Chatalja was carried out for the most part under conditions that indicated a considerable breaking down of the tactical organization of the army. The destructive effects of several days of unsuccessful fighting, the extreme exhaustion of the troops from want of food, and the concomitant panic that finally spread among them, made it seem quite unlikely that this army would any longer be worth reckoning with as a serious opponent. All who saw the spectacle that the Turkish retreat presented considered any further resistance of their army, even behind the fortified lines of Chatalja, as altogether out of the question.

On all the roads leading eastwards towards Chatalja were to be seen, to an extent that one can hardly describe, the most striking and convincing tokens that the retreat had degenerated into a wild flight — abandoned cannon, overturned ammunition wagons, broken-down draught cattle, dead horses, and whole parties of unarmed, listless-looking Turkish soldiers, who sat huddled by the wayside, in ragged uniforms, hungry and dead-beat. They were glad when they were made prisoners, for then they had at least a hope of getting something to eat.

It was no longer an army. It was a mob of men, in

a pitiable state of wretchedness, incapable any longer even of defending their own lives. And such troops as these were to hold the old earthworks of Chatalja against the irresistible onset of the Bulgarian storming columns!

I had a talk with a Turkish officer, who was taken prisoner on the second day of the battle of Lule Burgas. He described the fire of the Bulgarian artillery as something awful. There could be no possibility, he declared, of standing up against it for any length of time, and then, when the storming columns of Bulgarian infantry dashed forward in their final charge, a wild panic ran through the Turkish ranks, and all turned in flight.

The officers were helpless against it; their orders and words of command were not obeyed; even the cutting down of individual fugitives had no effect on the rest, and any officer who put himself in front of the runaway crowd, and tried to rally the men, was flung down by the rush of the mob or shot by one of them.

Still more terrible was the struggle at Chorlu. It must have been something like the Beresina. For days after the river was dammed with corpses and war material in several places, and tinged red with the blood of the dead and wounded.

In the northern part of the scene of these engagements it had come to fierce fighting at close quarters in the woods, and so great was the fury of some of the men that they threw their weapons down and tried to strangle each other with their hands.

There were also terrible scenes at the taking of Strandza and during the unsuccessful stroke of the

Turks from Kapakli Bunar to the northwestward. As overwhelming forces closed upon them from three sides the Turks broke into a wild flight, and ran back towards Kapakli Bunar. But before they could reach it they were decimated by the Bulgarian artillery and infantry fire.

It is easy to understand how seriously the resisting force of the Turkish army was broken down by these awful experiences. That this was nevertheless not the case to the extent that was generally expected, and that in spite of it Nazim Pasha succeeded in organizing behind the Chatalja lines an army that was still capable of resistance, is to be attributed on the one hand to the stubborn vitality the Ottoman State has always exhibited even in the most critical situations, and on the other to the exhaustion that had come upon even the Bulgarians themselves in consequence of long days of battle and continuous forced marches. This gave the Turks an unexpected respite of which they took advantage to reorganize the defence.

On the Bulgarian side there was a firm resolve to reap the utmost profit from the victories that had been won, and without delay deal the finishing blow to the enemy they had thus prostrated to the ground. But in the execution of this resolve they had to face difficulties, before which, at last, even the iron energy of the Bulgarians was temporarily checked. The advance against Chatalja was indeed ordered, and carried out; the Turkish rear guards were driven from the woods round Lake Derkos and from the ground near the village of Chatalja; but the pushing home of the main attack against the lines had to be

deferred again and again, in consequence of the difficulties that had arisen in the working of communications and supply.

The entrenched lines of Chatalja, twenty-two miles west of Constantinople, stretch from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora, covering the approach to the Turkish capital. They take their name from the village of Chatalja, which lies a little in front of the main line of defence. The fortified line itself runs along a ridge of high ground which extends from Lake Derkos on the north to the southern end of the Lake of Bujuk Chekmedje on the shore of the Sea of Marmora. The total length of the line is about twenty-five miles, but the actual front to be defended is reduced to about fifteen by the lakes and arms of the sea that encroach upon it at each extremity.

As the Turkish fleet commanded the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora, and the narrow necks of ground between the lakes and the seashore were easy to defend, being not only under the guns of the warships but also protected by forts, the position had its flanks secured in an ideally perfect way.

The line is strongest in its central and southern sections. The northern section is weaker on account of the extensive woods in front of it, which stretch close up to the works. The Turks have burned down a considerable portion of these woods. Another belt of wood in front of the southern section of the line consists partly of mere low-growing bush and scrub that is no serious impediment to the defence.

The Chatalja position played a part in military operations for the first time during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Blum Pasha was then entrusted

with the laying-out of the fortifications. Of the thirty-seven works which he planned, however, only twenty-one were actually erected. And as the fortification of the position had not been completed and there were only 20,000 men available to hold it, it was not defended. It was evacuated without any fighting when the armistice was signed at Adrianople on January 31, 1878.

After the conclusion of peace, work was resumed on these fortifications. Several improvements were also made, and of the two hundred heavy fortress guns intended to be placed in position about one hundred and forty were actually mounted. The famous military engineer, the Belgian General Brialmont, suggested a plan for the fortification of the Chatalja lines which included seven strong permanent forts. But of these in the course of years only three were built, and almost all the rest of the works now existing date from the year 1878, and are round earthworks of high profile, to which nowadays no great military value can be attached. The armament amounts to about three hundred fortress guns, some of which, however, are of antiquated types.

The Turkish army in flight from Lule Burgas and Chorlu reached the lines of Chatalja in a condition that seemed to make any further resistance hopeless. Although Nazim Pasha succeeded in at least partially restoring them to order again, the *morale* of the troops had sunk to so low a level, in consequence of the defeats they had undergone, that an immediate attack by the Bulgarians would hardly have met with any great opposition. Of fresh Turkish troops there were only two divisions available, and even these were

short of many necessaries, and most of the works of fortification were in a very bad condition.

But this desperate state of affairs (which gave grounds for the worst fears at Constantinople, and led the Sultan's court to make preparations for a flight to Asia Minor) improved from day to day, and was for all intents and purposes a thing of the past before any Bulgarian attack could be made. It is true that shortly after the last of the defeated troops had fallen back, the Bulgarian vanguard had appeared before the position, and driven back upon the main line of defence the Turkish rear guards which had been posted in the woods near Lake Derkos, and on the high ground on both sides of the village of Chatalja. When the reports of these successes were sent back, the view was accepted, even in usually well-informed quarters, that a footing had already been obtained in the enemy's main position. This was a result of the impression made by the series of victories already won by the Bulgarian arms.

As a matter of fact, this was not the case. And the delay in the main Bulgarian advance caused by adverse circumstances affecting the line of supply gave the Turkish generals time to organize the defence in such a way that, by the middle of November, the possibility of taking the position by any of the ordinary methods of an army in the field had to be regarded as almost out of the question.

Since then the lines have been further strengthened. The old redoubts, with their high profiles, have been only in exceptional cases introduced into the scheme of defence. New batteries have been constructed, mostly in covered positions for indirect fire. The

guns are mounted in gun-pits that are connected with each other by trenches about a yard deep. The batteries are carefully masked, and the old redoubts near them are used as observation stations.

New shelter trenches have also been dug for the infantry, and joined up with some of the old works by connecting lines of entrenchment. They are arranged for the men to fire standing, and besides are very well masked. In the rear of the front line of fortifications, two other lines of entrenchments have been made, mostly shelter trenches for infantry, so that the lines of Chatalja now consist of a series of three entrenched lines of works one behind the other. The annexed plan shows the distribution of the Turkish forces. Excellent arrangements have been made for the bringing up of plenty of ammunition and abundant food supplies. At first cholera claimed victims, and the state of affairs from the sanitary point of view was beyond all description. Since then, as the result of energetic measures taken by the chiefs of the army, it has improved, and the cholera has disappeared.

The advance of the Bulgarian armies against the Chatalja position was carried out in the following way: the Third Army virtually followed the line Strandza–Derkos, keeping to the south of it; the First and part of the Second Army followed the railway, only to the point at which it reaches the shore of the Sea of Marmora. The advance was made in deeper columns than had so far been the case. A strong detachment was pushed out towards Gallipoli.

The delay, which troubles on its lines of supply had caused in the advance of the main body of the Bulgarian army, had so increased the difficulties of an

assault on the Chatalja lines that the Bulgarian Staff had seriously to consider whether the advantage one might hope to attain was really worth the risks that would have to be taken to gain it.

From the military point of view it might be said that even the most complete victory would give no further advantage than had been already won, for the positions already held by the Bulgarian army in front of the Chatalja lines were amply sufficient for the military protection of the territory that had been conquered, and the retention of these positions by the army would entail no losses worth mentioning. But from a political point of view a victory over the last Turkish army would undoubtedly break down the resistance of the Porte and certainly compel the Sultan's Government to make peace on terms dictated by the Balkan States.

But if an attack on the Chatalja lines was to have any hope of success it would have to start from an entrenched position pushed forward close up to the front held by the enemy. For in this case there could be no question of an attack by surprise, and an ordinary attack pushed forward from a distance, in the normal battle order in the open, was only too likely to end in a disastrous repulse.

Considering the lay of the ground, the only place that could be selected as an advanced entrenched position from which an assault might be made was on the further side of the Katarshi Brook. At the same time, the way in which the enemy would act against hostile troops moving out to seize this ground in front of the lines would give the best indications as to the chances of the main assault itself.

In view of these objects an advance was made by several Bulgarian divisions across the Katarshi Brook on November 17. The result was a finally unsuccessful engagement, in the course of which the Bulgarians withdrew to the west bank of the brook.

The fighting began early on November 17 by a Bulgarian force, of about the strength of a division, advancing across the Katarshi Brook against the Mahmudieh and Karakal Notka redoubts. The result of this advance gave no favourable indications for carrying the attack further; and though the Bulgarians rapidly entrenched the ground they had reached, and renewed the attack on November 18, nevertheless on the afternoon of that day they went back to the west bank of the brook, and on the following day retired to the ground near Chatalja village.

On November 18 there was also an attack by Bulgarian infantry from the right wing, the incidents of which followed much the same course; and on November 23, the Bulgarians on this side also withdrew to the line of Chatalija–Indzegiz–Ciftlikoi. The experience of these engagements had shown that the storming of the Turkish entrenched positions would require an extremely heavy sacrifice of life, and that the risks of such an enterprise were altogether out of proportion to the advantage hoped for.

Even a general frontal attack by the allied Balkan armies on the Chatalja position would have had a very limited prospect of success, and, successful or no, it carried with it the certainty of an enormous amount of bloodshed. One can therefore understand why it was that the Bulgarian Staff took into consideration

the possibility of avoiding a frontal attack, and capturing the enemy's position in another way.

A main element in the strength of the Chatalja lines was the fact that both flanks rested upon the sea, which was commanded by the Turkish fleet. This not only made it impossible to turn the position, but also enabled the defence to rely on the coöperation of the warships on each flank. The Turkish fleet in this way made its presence felt to some effect in the fighting just mentioned before the Chatalja position.

This situation — extremely unfavourable as it was for the Bulgarians — would however be completely changed into its very opposite, if the Greeks — who alone among the allies had any sea power worth consideration — could succeed in forcing their way into the Sea of Marmora and defeating the Turkish navy. If once the Greeks could in this way obtain command of the Sea of Marmora, the position of Turkey itself would be hopeless, even if the warships of the Great Powers prevented the Greek squadron from appearing before Constantinople itself. The defile of Bujuk Ckekmedje on the left of the Chatalja lines, that is, the narrow strip of land that lies between the lake of that name and the Sea of Marmora, would be directly under the fire of the guns of the Greek warships, and could no longer be held by the Turks against an attack of the Bulgarians. Then the capture of the Turkish positions on their left wing, and the rolling up of the whole line of defence, would be only a matter of the shortest time.

For the Bulgarians the problem that had therefore to be solved was, first of all, how it would be possible to facilitate for the Greek fleet the perilous passage

of the Dardanelles. For the ships to attempt to force the passage was quite out of the question. For the most important point of all was to get the little Greek squadron into the Sea of Marmora in an undamaged condition, otherwise, notwithstanding the greater efficiency of their fleet, the chances of their obtaining a victory over that of the Turks would be very seriously diminished.

The plan adopted by the Bulgarian Staff was, therefore, by an advance by land against the lines of Bulair and a simultaneous landing of troops on the west coast of the peninsula of Gallipoli, to take the forts of the Dardanelles in the rear, and after their capture to put out of order the mine fields and firing stations on that side of the straits, and so secure a safe passage through them for the Greek squadron.

Turkey had already taken precautions against the dangers that threatened her from such a plan as that of the Bulgarians. The fortifications of the Gallipoli Peninsula had been strengthened during the war with Italy, and strong forces under Torgut Pasha were now concentrated there. On the Bulgarian side, as a preliminary measure, the Seventh Division was transported on Greek ships from Salonica to Dedeagatsch, which would be eventually a good base of operations for the projected landing in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The preparations in progress were interrupted by the conclusion of the armistice and the commencement of peace negotiations. But the Bulgarian Staff was resolved to resume its plan with still greater energy in case the negotiations led to no result.

CHAPTER XIV

THE TURKISH NAVY AND THE WAR

IN comparison with the military events in the theatre of war in Thrace, the operations at sea were of an entirely subordinate importance. Even beforehand there was no doubt that this would be the case. But, all the same, Turkey managed to disappoint even the comparatively small expectations that were built upon her fleet, and it is interesting here to indicate briefly the divergence between the forecasts that were made and what actually happened.

Under Abdul Hamid the Turkish fleet had not even a ceremonial and decorative use (though it had highly lucrative uses for some of the Ministers of Marine and their dependents). Even after its reorganization under the new Turkish Government no special importance was generally set upon its value as a fighting force. Nevertheless, compared with its opponents in the Balkan War, it was judged to have a very considerable advantage.

When, at the last moment, the conclusion of peace with Italy had restored to the Turkish fleet freedom of action in the waters of the Archipelago, it was to be anticipated that it would win, at the expense of an inferior adversary, the laurels that had been denied to it when opposed to an antagonist of overwhelmingly superior strength. It was expected that it would secure by fighting the command of the sea in the Archipelago, and thus accelerate the mobilization of

the army in Macedonia, which had been delayed by the Italian War.

Nothing of the kind. The Turkish fleet remained as inactive in this direction as if the Italians still held hostile command of the sea, or as if the Greeks were in possession of the Dardanelles.

But, on the other hand, it was active in the Black Sea, and with a promptitude that was very promising. The Bulgarian troops had crossed the frontier on October 18, and on the 19th a Turkish squadron appeared before Varna. On the morning of the 20th it threw a few shells into the place, and the same day it did some damage to two Bulgarian torpedo boats. Apparently, therefore, the chief antagonist of Turkey among the allies was considered to have a right to the chief attention of the Turkish fleet.

It would be beyond the scope of this brief record, and indeed purposeless, to examine the question as to what its action might have been if an enterprising, energetic spirit had inspired the Turkish fleet, and to discuss the chances of the operations it could have undertaken. The fact is that, with the exception of the incidents already mentioned, which had no importance whatever, there is hardly anything to record in the way of a noteworthy interference of the Turkish fleet in the course of events during the campaign. What had at first been regarded as the overture, or better still the tuning of the instruments, proved to be — in true Oriental fashion — the concert itself.

It was not till a month later that one heard of another meeting of the two antagonists in the Black Sea. Whatever we may have yet to learn from future accounts as to the details of this sea-fight, the estab-

lished fact that a couple of Bulgarian torpedo boats had had the daring to attack an enemy's cruiser in broad daylight, and had successfully torpedoed her, proves clearly that on the sea also Turkey belongs to the past, and Bulgaria to the future. After such a glorious baptism of fire upon the sea, we may say that this rising State, to which the coming peace will give free access to the waters of the Mediterranean, has excellent prospects of becoming a naval power.

Our estimate of the value of the Turkish fleet need not be altered even on account of its intervention at the two extremeties of the Chatalja lines, where they touch the sea. Its coöperation in this case was something obvious and inevitable. Moreover, its presence was, after all, of no essential influence, for the decisive attack was to have been made towards the centre of the Chatalja position and not near the coast.

The opening of the peace negotiations was accompanied by some cannonading in the Archipelago, which it was probably hoped at Constantinople would wake a responsive echo in London. But even the destruction of the Greek fleet could no longer alter the results of the decisive campaign in Thrace.

CHAPTER XV

THE STRUGGLE FOR ADRIANOPLE

THE city of Adrian, on the Maritza, has ever been the goal of conquerors, and many a foreign army has it seen within its walls since the days of the great victory of the Western Goths over the Emperor Valens in the year 378. Ages ago, in the fight of the "Cross against the Crescent," the watchword of Bulgaria in the recent campaign, Adrianople played a part when the hosts of the Crusaders marched on the highway from Europe to Asia against Constantinople and on to the Holy Land. In this city, too, the mighty army of the Emperor Barbarossa found quarters from the autumn of 1189 to the spring of 1190; and in its history is also chronicled the victory of the Bulgarians achieved in 1205 by King Johannes over the Byzantine Emperor Baldwin.

Then came the sovereignty of the Turks; Adrianople was carried by storm in the year 1361 by the Turkish Sultan, Murad I, who led his hosts by Gallipoli into Europe. The place was chief city of the Ottoman power until, in 1453, Constantinople was proclaimed to be the capital of their empire.

Then for hundreds of years Adrianople saw no enemy. During over two centuries the Turks were acting on the offensive, and pushing ever forward to the West, hemming Europe in. Towards the end of the seventeenth century their decline began, and a retrograde movement set in. Yet the defensive power

of the Empire was so considerable that for more than two hundred years no enemy was able to penetrate into the heart of the country. The first invaders to water their horses on the banks of the Maritza were the Russians, who under Field-Marshal Diebitsch-Sabalkanski pushed forward thus far in 1829 and forced the Sultan to make peace. During the Crimean War, it was friends of the Turks — the French — who occupied the city in their advance towards the Danube, but on January 21, 1878, the Russian enemy was again before the gates of Adrianople, when the horsemen of Skobeleff heralded the approach of the victorious invaders.

The military situation of the year 1878, so far as Turkey is considered, bears a sinister resemblance to that of the present day. Turkey is, indeed, better prepared now than she was then, but the enemy of to-day has more warlike efficiency and more striking power than had the Russian invaders of thirty-five years ago.

Adrianople, which was then girdled only by weak field fortifications, is now an entrenched camp of considerable strength. The experiences of the war of 1877–78 have taught the Turks the military importance of this position at the junction of three rivers. The political changes in the Balkan Peninsula resulting from the war and sanctioned by the Congress of Berlin, showed the necessity of barring the line of advance from the newly created Bulgaria upon the Turkish capital by the construction of an entrenched camp and *tête de pont* on the Maritza.

The fortifications then planned and begun form to-day the inner circle of the defences of Adrianople.

There were originally twenty-five redoubts (for the most part closed works with five sides), which were afterwards built up into forts. The whole circle has a circumference of thirty-five kilometres (about twenty-four miles).

The actual work of completing the fortification was carried out somewhat irregularly. Many of the forts were not really finished, and the armament was not by any means so powerful as had been originally intended. But the chief disadvantage of these works is that they lie too close to the city. The result is that in consequence of the great range of modern siege guns, they supply no adequate protection against a bombardment.

It was on account of this unsatisfactory feature of the defences that Abdullah Pasha, who was commandant of the Second Corps at Adrianople from 1908 to 1911, endeavoured to strengthen the fortress by the construction of modern works pushed further out. Though he had very limited resources at his disposal for this purpose, he succeeded in remedying at least the worst defects, and to-day Adrianople possesses on the most important fronts and at commanding points modern works thrown out to a distance of from eight to ten kilometres (five to six and a quarter miles). In the construction of these forts concrete and armour plates have been freely used. These new works have made Adrianople a practically defensible fortress. The strongest of these forts are on the northwest front (the Chatalja group) and on the northeast front. On the Chatalja front the Scheitan Tabia, Haderilk Tabia, and Karago Tabia are specially important.

The Bulgarians had determined to operate with

only a subsidiary force against Adrianople, whilst their main strength was to carry out the movement against Kirk Kilissé. For the attack on Adrianople, the Second Army, under General Ivanoff, was detailed; it was two divisions strong. Of these the Eighth Division was to advance along both banks of the Maritza, and the Third Division by both banks of the Tundja, hurling back behind the ring of forts those troops which had been thrown forward in advance of the fortress.

General Ivanoff, the commander of the Second Army, is a native of Kalofar, in Southern Bulgaria. He was born on February 18, 1861, completed his course in the Military School at Sofia, and received his sub-lieutenant's commission on May 10, 1879. At the time of the war between Servia and Bulgaria he had the rank of first lieutenant and distinguished himself by his bravery. This opened the way for him to rapid promotion, and he has held a number of important appointments in the army. He was Minister of War in Stoiloff's Cabinet, and as such carried out with great sagacity the reforms which his predecessor, Ratscho Petroff, had initiated. The present war found him occupying the position of Inspector of the Second Military District, the troops belonging to which, and known as the "Second Army," were given the task of besieging Adrianople.

On October 18, the Bulgarians crossed the frontier and occupied, after a short but sharp fight, the position of Kurt Kalé, southwest of the Turkish frontier station of Mustapha Pasha. The town and station were occupied by a Bulgarian brigade and a cavalry regiment, after the Turkish garrison, strongly

reinforced by cavalry, had been driven from the field.

Around Mustapha Pasha itself there was no fighting, but at the bridge over the Maritza there was a fierce struggle in which bayonets were used. The retreating Turks had partly demolished the bridge and the railway line, but both were put in order after a few hours' work. The Turks had left the telegraph station undamaged, and also the stores they could not carry away. Amongst them the Bulgarians captured nearly two hundred tons of oats and wheat, besides a large quantity of provisions of various kinds.

The troops of the Seventh Division in the valley of the Arda had some severe fighting southwest of Adrianople at Ortakoi and Seimenli against Turkish troops, which had been pushed forward in this direction, but were driven steadily backwards before the Bulgarian advance.

The Turkish troops which had been stationed nearest the frontier were surprised by the sudden and unexpected offensive of the Bulgarians. Amongst the first prisoners brought to Stara Zagora was Lieutenant Hussein Bey Nureddin. When I paid him a visit, he was sitting calmly at the window, smoking a cigarette, with that complete self-possession of the Oriental, whose inner feelings are not betrayed in his countenance. He talked to me about his capture: —

It was at Kadikoi, two hours south of Mustapha Pasha. We lay there, awaiting orders from our lines in the rear. We thought the enemy was still far away, and that the frontier guards would be finding him occupation enough for hours. We officers were sitting in front of the poor café of the little village, with cups of coffee

before us, when, all of a sudden, a tumult began in the nearest streets. There was an outcry, shots rang out, then shouts of "Hurrah," louder and louder, coming on like a wave. Now we knew what it was. Without a moment's warning our outposts had been rushed; there was the enemy before us! And the Bulgarians were everywhere, as though they had sprung up out of the ground; the air was filled with their hurrahs. We made a run for it and got our men together, and then for six hours, with bullets hailing on us, we made a stand, beating off one bayonet attack after another. We kept firing until we had no more ammunition, and of our battalion there were left only the 350 men whom you have seen here. We had to surrender to the enemy, who is not only brave but chivalrous. Amongst the prisoners were several wounded Anatolians, who have been brought into the Bulgarian hospital and were well taken care of. We have been unlucky, but it is an honourable defeat.

As I went out on the street, a half-company of captured Turks was being marched by — tall slender figures in handsome green uniforms, who strode by with downcast looks. In the evening I sought them out. There were fifty of them, who had been taken prisoners after a fight among the burning houses of Tamrasch. They are lodged in a barrack here, and receive the same fare as the Bulgarian troops. One of the prisoners to whom I gave some tobacco was talkative. I asked him where he came from.

"From Anatolia" (Asia Minor).

"Why are you fighting against the Bulgarians?"

"I have been sent against the Unbelievers!"

"What was the fight you were in like?"

"A Bimbashi (Major) led us; we had a hard time, and then we could do no more. Our Bimbashi is also taken. And out there among the dead my brother is lying."

I asked him, also, how he liked the Bulgarian barracks.

"Oh, very well, sir; I did not think this country was so good."

An officer told me that the men trembled like aspen leaves after being made prisoners, thinking they would be massacred. I asked the Turkish soldier before going away whether I could do anything for him. He shook his head, but then added, "But if you wish to be kind, give me tobacco!"

Then, dead-tired, he stretched himself on a bed. In the night a terrible sight was to be seen from the high ground north of the town. On the hills south of Philippopolis, one could see several villages burning. Through the darkness of the night the masses of flame far away shone like great glowworms. Such was the parting farewell of the retreating Turks.

In these first fights against the Turkish advanced positions near Mustapha Pasha, the Bulgarians fought, in a sense, under the eyes of their king. About eleven o'clock in the forenoon of October 18, King Ferdinand, with the Crown Prince Boris, Prince Cyril, and General Savoff joined the First Army at Tirnovo-Sejmen, travelling by motor-car from Stara Zagora. Here they received the report of General Ivanoff, commanding the Second Army, that the advance which had been ordered had been successfully made. Then the King held a long consultation with Generals Savoff, Ivanoff, and Petroff. The King after this went on to Hermanli, and later to Belica, to the west of Hebijevo. He arrived there about three o'clock in the afternoon and watched from the heights the advance of the troops against Mustapha

Pasha and the neighbouring Turkish positions, and their subsequent capture.

During the journey the King met the first soldiers wounded in the war. They belonged to the Twenty-Third Regiment of the Tundja Division, and had taken part in the storming of Kurt Kalé, and on all of them he bestowed the decoration for valour. The wounded pluckily expressed their desire to go back as soon as possible to the fighting line. On the return journey, the King took a wounded man in his motor-car to Stara Zagora, and saw to his reception into the field-hospital at that place.

On the next day the Turkish position at Chirmen was taken after several hours of hard fighting, and the attack upon the advanced works of Adrianople on the north and west began.

The Third Division advanced along both banks of the Tundja, the right wing by point 130 west of Haveras (on the Staff map of the scale of 1/200,000), the centre east of the Tundja by Arnautkoi, and the left wing from the northeast by Musubejli along the Kirk Kilissé–Adrianople road.

At the same time, to the westward, the Eighth Division, marching by Kadinkoi, south of point 125, attacked the Turkish lines on the Chatalja roads and heights.

South of the Maritza, the men of the Second Bulgarian Division from Sederli attacked the Turkish troops, pushed forward in the Arda Valley, and forced them to retreat on Adrianople.

The Bulgarians crossed the fords of the Arda near here, coming from Seimenli and pushed forward on Dondzars. This surprising advance across the Arda,

carried through with the greatest dash, caused a terrible panic amongst the Turks. Leaving behind them over one hundred dead and one hundred and sixty prisoners, they retreated in disorder on Adrianople. On the 23d, at dawn, the fighting was renewed along the whole line.

The Third Division took several of the advanced outworks of Adrianople with the bayonet, and further closed in upon the fortress. The other columns were also making good progress. That division had crossed from Arda, and got as far as Corekkoi, only four kilometres (two and a half miles) from the Adrianople railway-station.

Towards eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the Turks made a counter-attack to the northeast with great bravery, in the general direction of Arnautkoi. Although strongly supported by the artillery of the forts, their attack was repulsed with crushing loss. Their retreat was so like a disorderly flight that the Bulgarians, following them up, were able to take several of the advanced works. There was indeed a vigorous pursuit of the flying Turks along the whole line, and the heavy fire from the guns of the forts was unable to check this onward movement of the Bulgarian regiments.

The attack, made simultaneously from the north on the Meierhof works west of Arnautkoi on the Tundja, and on the Chatalja fort, ended, after a severe struggle, in the capture of these positions.

Darkness alone put an end to the fight, which eventually resolved itself into an artillery duel. From Eesten along the right bank of the Maritza a strong column advanced simultaneously with the attack

from the direction of the Arda, and, after heavy fighting at Jurus and Kujarli, reached the position on the lower slopes of the heights west of Maras. Upon the two columns then devolved in common the task of shutting in Adrianople on the southwest front along the bend of the Maritza, and afterwards of gaining touch with the blockading troops on the east bank of the Maritza south of Bosnakoi.

The Bulgarians were thus in position immediately in front of the chief works of the fortress, with three of its outlying forts in their hands.

General Ivanoff, after his troops by the successful fighting of the 22d and 23d had forced back the Turks behind their circle of forts on the whole of the north and west fronts of Adrianople from the river Arda to the Kirk Kilissé road, proceeded to a closer investment of the fortress on those sides, taking at the same time the necessary steps to cut off the communication between it and Constantinople.

The Bulgarian blockading lines, strengthened by hasty fortifications, began on the section north of the Maritza, and to the southwest of Kadikoi, then ran in a northerly direction by point 171 near Meierhof (Chiflik), and Ekmekchikoi, then eastward over the heights of Haveras to the Tundja. On the further side of the Tundja the blockading lines passed north of Pravodisnica, about five hundred yards north of Arnautkoi, and then in a southeasterly direction to Musubejli, on the road to Kirk Kilissé.

On the 24th the Turks made another sortie towards Arnautkoi, but like the former one it was repulsed with heavy loss.

In order to complete the blockade of Adrianople on

the east front also, a column of the First Army was sent eastwards after the battle of Kirk Kilissé, by way of Pravodija-Gadera to Musubejli on the Adrianople–Constantinople road, the task assigned to this column being the cutting of the communication between the fortress and the Turkish Eastern Army.

In view of the severe loss which would be incurred by storming the fortress, and information having been received — which, like much other information, proved later on to be unreliable — that Adrianople was insufficiently provided with food, it was decided at the headquarters of the Bulgarian army on October 28 to starve out the place by a close blockade.

This resolution was further justified by the perfectly correct consideration that the issue of the war would have to be decided on the field of battle, and that the forces thrown away in storming the fortifications of Adrianople would be better employed in strengthening the army in the field.

All the same the abandonment of the idea of storming the fortifications did not in any way diminish the fierceness of the fighting before Adrianople.

In the night of October 28 the Krupp siege guns, brought into position on the heights at point 17, near Meierhof and Ekmekchikoi, began the bombardment of Scheitan Tabia, Karagios, Biondscha and Kuru-Chesme, the modern Turkish works on the northwest front of Adrianople.

These works, as already mentioned, are among the strongest in the whole fortress. They are built on up-to-date plans and are comparatively well armed. They have bomb-proof concrete structures, and a certain amount of armour protection.

BULGARIAN SIEGE ARTILLERY MOVING TO TAKE UP A POSITION ON THE HEIGHTS OF KAMAL IN FRONT OF ADRIANOPLE

THE 2ND INFANTRY REGIMENT CROSSING THE BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER TUNDJA TO JOIN THE TROOPS BESIEGING ADRIANOPLE

The bombardment continued until half-past nine in the forenoon of the 29th and was resumed after an hour's pause. The effect was very considerable, whilst the return fire of the Turkish guns produced no effect whatever.

For me, these days and nights before Adrianople were a most interesting time. I have often sat by the camp-fire at manœuvres, and after long days of hard work on the Bosnian-Servian frontier, in Montenegro, and in Albania. There is something romantic in sleeping in the open by the crackling fire. The very odour of the smoke from the green wood has a kind of mysterious charm. But here on the western slope of the Kermal heights it was all different. I sat in the midst of a group of soldiers, asking questions and trying to get information. And as they lay down, tired out by the march from Mustapha Pasha — the troops belonging to the newly-formed Tenth Division had only arrived an hour ago — the anticipation of what might happen on the coming day would not allow me to sleep. The smoke rose straight up in the air, and, to any man susceptible to auguries, this might have seemed an omen of smooth things. Round about were lines of wagons and bivouac-fires. One could hear from the road to Adrianople the rumble and clatter of passing troops, with guns and convoys, which never left off throughout the night.

An elderly man brought a dark and apparently heavy burden to the next fire. It was a young soldier, whom he laid down carefully. I was told that a wheel had gone over him and the bones of his face had been crushed and the skin torn off his head. He was unconscious. Two or three words passed, and then two

of the men got up and carried the dying soldier to the doctor, who camped about a hundred and fifty yards away. But the doctor was not there. He had been called to a field-hospital, where that night there was much to do. But he could not have helped a man at the point of death. At another fire I was shown a man who bent over and stared into the fire with sightless eyes. A heartstroke had doubtless saved the poor fellow from the further troubles of the campaign. His comrades let him stay on by the fire. But death must have taken quite a considerable number of victims like this one. Much of the loss must be put down to the fatigues of the advance, and I observed that these troops had been much attacked by diarrhœa, doubtless as a consequence of sleeping on the ground during these frosty nights. The night otherwise passes tranquilly; nothing more than a few shots in the distance — rifle fire, probably, at the outposts. The cold makes itself felt notwithstanding my thick fur coat. The fire is nearly out; nobody attends to it; all are sleeping. The cold sends a shudder through our bodies. At last, at last, morning is creeping up.

Thus passed the night, the first I spent in war under the open sky. A drop of red wine (as a precaution against dysentery) and a morsel of white bread, both of which I had brought from Mustapha Pasha, are my breakfast. Before me lies the flat, marshy ground through which runs the Maritza; its banks are overgrown with willows and thickets. Along the winding roads troops are marching in endless procession against Adrianople, their silhouettes standing out dimly against the morning mist. Opposite the island cooking is going on, and horses are being fed. A

DAWN BEFORE ADRIANOPLE

peaceful stillness is all round us, and the day promises to be fine and warm. Yonder, across the Maritza, the ruins of Jurusch are pointed out to me, and one has to look closely to make out the traces of the burnt village around which so much blood was shed. We go out on the road, which has now assumed a more and more warlike aspect. For as some men of a rear guard pass by we remark among them wounded men with heads bandaged up, or arms in slings. They have been only slightly wounded, so they are hastening back to the firing line. In a ditch on the left are lying broken wheels, carts, saddlery, and the dead bodies of some buffaloes. Further to the left come some horsemen over a steep acclivity; a patrol very likely. On the right the ground of a marshy-looking meadow is torn up, as though by wild, fierce fighting, and a great flock of crows is flying off. The mist has gradually evaporated, and the morning sun comes out with a fiery radiance. The valley of the Maritza lies there in the dawn suggesting sharply the contrast of the place and the occasion; that little spot of ground was to be a place of historic importance. For through the idyllic calm of the beautiful morning a cannon-shot reëchoes menacingly over the valley — the morning greeting of Schukri Pasha to General Ivanoff. Boom — boom — comes the answer of the Bulgarians, as though the guns had been awaiting the challenge of the Turks. The thunder of the cannon grows ever more intense, until it is impossible to distinguish from which side a report comes. Troops march by singing a wild war-song, and soon pass out of sight. Down below, there behind Kadinkoi, they will doubtless form for battle, for the bloody work of the day has begun.

In the mean time the Bulgarian infantry has gone on towards Maras for the attack, whilst at the same time a strong force is pushed forward from Doudzaros-Cerekkoi against Karagash. On the ground about Maras, dominated by the Turkish works where all trees that could give cover had been cleared away, there was a terrible struggle long waged with doubtful result, and in which the Turks, continually bringing reinforcements into the battle, displayed extraordinary stubbornness. It was one of the bloodiest battles which the Bulgarians had as yet had to fight before Adrianople.

My own position was quite free from danger, being in a ditch through which a little water was flowing, and bordered by some bushy growth. About eighty paces to the right front a body of infantry, a battalion and a half strong, evidently a regimental reserve, was lying down. In the immediate foreground nothing could be seen, but far in front one could observe through the glass a thin dark line — the firing line. When I raised my head above the edge of the ditch I could at first see nothing at all, as is to be expected at the commencement of the modern battle. A sharp rifle fire could be heard, but no bullet flew over my ditch. But matters were soon to become more serious, and the whole line seemed to come fully into action. From all sides resounded detonations and cracklings, and in particular the characteristic nerve-racking snapping of the machine-guns could be distinguished, mingled with the deeper tone of the cannon from a considerable distance. Then all at once right ahead earth is seen flying into the air. Apparently the artillery is opening on the reserve. In our rear, wounded

men are being carried by on stretchers. Whence do they come? Whither are they going? And do they belong to the reserve?

But now one can make out something more, and the eye has got the hang of the ground. A long dark line rises into view. It is the enemy, the Turks. They make a plunge forward, and their artillery fire becomes unusually rapid. The Bulgarian guns seem to have gone further off to the right. The Bulgarian reserve near by us rises, the mass deploys, and goes forward. It is a question of checking the onward movement of the enemy, and now it can be seen that the Bulgarians are successfully forcing back the Turkish left wing. But the centre is unshaken, and so far as can be seen is still gaining ground. Meanwhile the Bulgarians are filling up the gaps in the firing line. The adversaries have got their teeth into each other ferociously. The lines alternately advance or are thrust back with an outcry which the wind brings back to our ears.

Denser and denser grow the Bulgarian firing lines. Again and again the men spring up and dart forward with rushes which the Turkish forces seem too weak to withstand. The enemy's attack seems to have no success, and their lines are now rolling back by the burning ruins of Maras. There, as some of the wounded told me, the corpses were piled up two yards high on each other. The Nizams, the Turkish regulars, stood up even against case-shot, and the heaps of bodies testified to the stubbornness alike of defence and attack. The energy of the Bulgarian advance gradually relaxed; exhaustion made itself felt even among them. Far away one could still hear the

booming of the guns. Terrible scenes were described by those who were brought wounded from this last phase of the conflict. Men grappled and tried to strangle each other with their hands, and there were orgies of the most horrible bloodthirstiness. Brutes vied with each other in cruelty. Dreadful was the fate of the poor wretches who fell into the hands of the Turks. Their vengeance was insatiable.

As the sun went down, the battle-field cleared; and when night fell the crackling of the firing ceased, and tranquillity reigned around us. Heavy cannon-firing, however, could be heard away across the Maritza. There Death the destroyer continued his cruel slaughter, and the cannon sang a dirge of more than human suffering.

The fight had begun about ten o'clock in the forenoon, and I had been watching it for hours.

The Bulgarian troops in this battle confronted death with astonishing bravery, not only the troops of the line, but also the newly formed levies of the Tenth and Eleventh Divisions, who had been sent here to replace the troops dispatched to the Army of the East, and who on this occasion had come into action for the first time.

The Turks replied on October 30 by a sortie with two divisions in the direction of Aftlik-Ekmekchikoi; they were, however, eventually repulsed by portions of our Third Division.

It appeared essential to strengthen the main field army, on which the decisive issue of the campaign depended. Accordingly at the end of October the Bulgarians brought up two divisions of Servians — the Timok Division and the Danube Division — under

General Stepanovitch, to the besieging army before Adrianople, which now consisted of these two Servian divisions and two Bulgarian divisions of the Second Line. The siege artillery was also strengthened by heavy Servian guns. At the beginning of November the investment of lines on the southeast and southwest fronts was completed by the occupation of Skenderkoi and Emirler, and the occupation of Demotika secured the besiegers against any attacks from the south.

In the Bulgarian camp the fall of Adrianople was looked upon as imminent; the garrison, on the other hand, showed that its fighting spirit was unbroken. November brought several Turkish sorties, and fighting was of almost daily occurrence at Maras. In response, the besiegers redoubled their efforts against the opposite front on the southeast, and succeeded on November 8 in capturing two important forts on that side.

The taking of these positions occurred on the night of the 7th to 8th. After a tremendous artillery fire, a brigade, with reserves following, was detailed for the storming of Forts Kartaltepe and Papaztepe, and notwithstanding the Turkish searchlights and the hail of shot which fell upon the assailants, both forts were in the end captured by the Bulgarian infantry. Reinforcements, principally artillery, were brought up, all the counter-attacks of the Turks repulsed, and the victors set about arming the captured positions on the side facing towards Adrianople.

Of the two forts thus taken, Kartaltepe was especially strong. It was on a hill 143 metres (470 feet)

high, and dominated the city, as well as the adjoining works in the ring of fortifications.

Notwithstanding this success, and although according to what prisoners told us, typhus had broken out in the fortress and the garrison had had many deaths owing to the lack of hospitals, the capitulation hourly expected by the Bulgarians did not come about. On the contrary, the activity of the garrison increased; minor sorties were made almost every night from one or other of the fronts, and the necessity of being always ready for them made the work of the besiegers more difficult. Whilst the Servian troops mostly confined themselves to repulsing the Turkish onslaughts, the Bulgarians often delivered counter-attacks, and advanced against the Turkish lines, the defences of which had been strengthened in various ways since the siege began.

The Turkish major, Nahil Bey, who had been taken prisoner in one of these sorties, after having been wounded by a fragment of a shell in the left breast, spoke to me as follows:—

I was in command of the reserve in the last sortie from Fort Karagjus Tabia against the Bulgarian artillery positions. The fire of the heavy Krupp guns of the Bulgarians had become intolerable in Adrianople during the last few days. The dull crash of heavy projectiles striking near at hand resounded continuously. In front of the entrenchments over a wide extent of ground, the earth is rooted up a metre deep like arable land by a gigantic plough. But our artillery could not gain superiority of fire over the enemy, and we had to watch from our works the raging of the hostile guns, without, for practical purposes, having a weapon in our hands. So we resolved upon a night attack.

In the afternoon we made a demonstration at Maras, which lasted with heavy fighting till it was dark night, whilst fourteen battalions were getting ready for the attack from Karagjus against the Bulgarian position.

It was a gloomy, inclement night, and the storm burst in howling gusts upon the fort. It had been a grey, rainy day, and our men had already been lying the whole afternoon in wet and mud in the trenches, waiting the order to advance. Twice the order had reached us, and twice there came a counter-order. It was terribly trying for the officers' nerves to have to keep on explaining the counter-orders and insisting on the necessity for quiet endurance to grumbling men who had been sent northeast two days before and had had nothing but biscuits with hot water — one could not call it coffee.

When finally the order to advance came for the third time, the men were tired and listless, and I saw whole companies that remained lying down indifferent and deaf to the commands of their officers. It was only by the influence of two military Imams (Turkish military chaplains) that the *morale* of the men was roused.

At last we got moving about nine o'clock. Whilst the searchlights on the west front threw their white light on the night-covered plains, we under cover of darkness marched onward. In an hour's time we struck on the Bulgarian outposts. From the front, from right and from left, came a dropping fire. First a few shots crackled from the trenches. Then all at once, as though these shots had fired some huge mass of explosives, we saw in front of us a great burst of fire, and the Bulgarian guns joined in, like bellowing monsters, the first shots falling in our ranks at the same time. This fight in the night was terrible, machine-guns rattling, and the cannon thundering out in a prolonged roar.

We had no clear idea as to the enemy's strength or the direction of his movements; some of our battalions lost all touch with the rest and missed the direction in the darkness and in impracticable ground cut up by water-

courses. Our reserves succeeded in getting forward, and without knowing exactly where the enemy was, were ordered to advance in this unknown darkness pierced by bright flashes of fire. We could not quite tell whether we were firing into the enemy or our own men. The Bulgarian batteries pitilessly sent their deadly hail on us. . . . Two hours later we found ourselves in retreat, all tangled up, when suddenly the thunder of Bulgarian "Hurrahs" broke on us from right and left. Now came an awful moment. It was as though all the evil spirits had broken out and were loose. I found myself in the middle of a crowd in the hollow of a narrow water course. We were being shelled, when I felt something hot on my breast, stepped on a few paces, and then I knew no more. . . .

I awoke from my unconsciousness a prisoner of the Bulgarians, and my rank as an officer was respected.

The Major spoke with great reserve about the situation in Adrianople. When I showed him on the map the victorious progress of the Bulgarians, he was astounded and said: —

They told us the contrary in Adrianople. We officers were informed that Mukhtar Pasha, victorious at Kirk Kilissé, was pressing forward, that we might soon expect the siege to be raised, and that we would then begin a great advance on Philippopolis. Allah has abandoned us. It is the punishment of Allah for our sins.

The garrison of Adrianople did not content itself with thus continually harassing the besiegers, but from time to time made serious sorties in force, as for instance those on November 11 at Ekmekchikoi on the northwest front, and that on the 20th against Fort Kartaltepe, which had been captured by the Bulgarians. But the Turks displayed quite an astonishing amount of energy in the general sortie which they made from all fronts at once with all their avail-

able strength on November 22. They were repulsed only after a fight lasting from four o'clock in the morning till night. Notwithstanding the heavy losses sustained by the Turks in this sortie, on November 24 they made a fresh attack on the southern section of the besieging lines. This display of energy was the more surprising because cholera was rampant in Adrianople and its surroundings, and was claiming many victims.

Just before the armistice was concluded, the besiegers in the first days of December made yet another general attack on Adrianople, which, however, proved ineffective, and the future fate of the fortress remained the most important question to be settled in the peace negotiations. The Turks lay stress on the fact that Adrianople has not been captured by the Bulgarians, whilst the Bulgarians point out that the capitulation of a fortress shut in on all sides is inevitable, and that practically, therefore, Adrianople must be considered as being already a Bulgarian conquest.

Be that as it may, Schukri Pasha, the commandant of Adrianople, has, for his heroic defence of the place entrusted to him, been honoured by the Sultan with the title of "Ghazi" (the Victorious); he has saved the honour of Turkish arms, and shown himself a worthy adversary of the brave Bulgarians.

Reckoning from the day of the first attack which the enemy made on its outlying works, Adrianople has withstood the siege for more than ten weeks. This may seem small in comparison, for instance, with the defence of Port Arthur, which held out for over six months, counting from the day of its being shut

in. But if we take into consideration the grievous conditions prevailing in the Turkish army, and if we make comparison with the miserable surrenders of the Macedonian fortresses, the steady persistence of the defence of Adrianople must be regarded as a soldierly and remarkable feat.

CHAPTER XVI

AN AVIATOR OVER ADRIANOPLE

IN view of the contradictory reports respecting what has been done by aviators in the Balkan War, the following account by the Russian aviator, Timothy Effimoff, of his flight over Adrianople will be of interest: —

It was October 18 at Mustapha Pasha — a day of new experiences for us in the field of military aviation. The weather was calm and warm, not at all like autumn. We all worked to get the machine ready; one putting the motor together, another assembling the remaining parts which had been taken to pieces. Our Russian correspondents were also present in the aerodrome.

The General walked thoughtfully round the machine, from time to time exchanging a word with us or with our countrymen, in quite familiar fashion.

It was nine o'clock in the morning. The General looked long at the map, considering all the possibilities of a reconnoitring flight. Then he put it to me that I should fly over Adrianople in order to make myself acquainted with its condition and to throw down into it a proclamation in Turkish, promising the besieged the most favourable treatment in the event of its surrendering. General Jankoff at the same time asked M. Brescho Breschowski to join in urging me to undertake the flight.

Although I was not prepared, and had not my goggles with me, I consented to try. There were two Blériot aeroplanes. One of them was an old friend, the other quite new, and quite unknown to me. After a short consideration, my choice fell on the "old one."

It had carried me a good distance over the wide world, and when I had satisfied myself thoroughly by examination that my old friend was in good condition I seated myself in the machine, took leave cordially of those remaining behind on earth, and flew higher and higher into the air.

The "old one" began by swaying gently as though to lull me to sleep in the air. The higher I rose the lighter became the breeze. Hills, forests, and prominent groups of houses swept away from me, and at last I saw in the distance the tents of the Bulgarian army and a number of small specks, these last being soldiers.

I look at the barometer — only six hundred metres. My friend has grown old and tired, and rises shockingly badly. I am worried by the idea that I shall not be able to rise to a safe height, and I endeavour to get the aeroplane up higher; but in vain — the barometer still shows the same level. I lose patience. My friend does not submit to my will.

I am exasperated, and give up looking at the barometer, and I try to forget that it is there. I settle myself at ease and contemplate my surroundings. It is a wonderful sight!

For now I see tents behind earthworks that look like so many little furrows. Upon them black guns are outlined like children's toys or little bits of stick, and all this is so prettily and symmetrically arranged.

The magnificence of nature is beginning to hypnotize me, to send me off to sleep, and my imagination evolves a terrible vision. Volleys of musketry, thundering of cannon and bursts of exploding shells bringing death into the midst of all this magnificence. On one hand resound the voices of the wounded and disabled calling for help, and on the other entreaties and curses. Here the destiny of whole nations is being decided, and all the world is following each movement of the opposing forces. But I hear nothing; all sounds of earth are non-existent to my ear because of the droning of the motor and the rushing noise of the air.

The picture spread out before me appears to me like a plaything, and I gaze upon it as upon a panorama. But around me high in air everything is calm and peaceful.

There is Adrianople already, and one can see the river which flows through it, the fortifications, the barracks, and the tents of the Turkish army, still five kilometres distant.

The barometer indicates a height of nine hundred metres. Such a moderate height is very dangerous, and I turn. I fly once more over the Bulgarian entrenchments, and in forty minutes I rise to thirteen hundred metres. But I lose all patience, for the "old one" refuses decidedly to go higher.

Thereupon I decide to fly by Adrianople, keeping three kilometres outside of it. I began to fly round the city to the left, and slowly drew nearer to the works, passing a large parade ground with barracks built round it. There are soldiers, on the parade, and they take aim at me. I see the smoke coming out of the rifles. They shoot, but I am too far off. Still the hope of bringing me down must afford them great satisfaction. I go further away, and the smoke of the rifles disappears. But now there is smoke again, but I hold on my way without hindrance because I am flying well outside the circle of the fortifications.

I am disquieted by an idea which occurs to me: "What would happen if the motor were to stop?" I run over in my mind the condition of the motor and the causes of a possible breakdown. Everything, however, is in order, because I have always subjected it to a thorough testing.

So far I have been flying outside of the city, but now comes the most dangerous moment of my journey. For I must fly over the city itself and throw the proclamations into its midst. I make my preparations, and turn and set my course directly for it.

Now I am over it. The houses have green patches round them. I take a bundle of the Proclamations out of my pocket, and throw them out. At first they keep together, and then they scatter.

Now the shooting begins, and a bullet makes a hole in the right plane. I bring the elevator plane about five degrees down, in order to attain higher speed, throw out the second and third bundles, and alter the course of the aeroplane.

I notice that a second bullet has pierced the right plane less than two feet from where I am sitting, and much regret not having a bomb with me which would enable me to reply to the shots which have been fired at me, and I resolve that next time I will bring one with me.

I saw a burst of smoke, apparently that of a shrapnel shell fired by the Turks, and I afterwards found the lower surface of the left plane was pierced.

I saw the three projectiles from the Bulgarian lines fall in the fortress.

As I approached the ground held by the Bulgarians, I breathed a sigh of relief at feeling myself out of danger. Twenty minutes afterwards I was back again at Mustapha Pasha.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CAPTURE OF JAVER PASHA

AS has been said, our troops beat the Turks at Kirdjali, and marched victoriously into the town. The enemy retreated on Gumuldzina, where all the scattered Turkish forces assembled to the number of 20,000 men, thus at once threatening our line of communications and our troops besieging Adrianople.

Our army began the pursuit of the enemy, whilst at the same time a column advanced from Kirdjali against Gumuldzina and Dedeagatsch. Another column, supported by detachments of cavalry, marched by the right bank of the Maritza in order to cut off the enemy, who was continuing his retreat, and to prevent him escaping towards Gallipoli, whilst the third column of our army, principally cavalry, pressed on after him with the same object.

On November 9, our troops, which were pursuing the enemy by the right bank of the Maritza, caught up with him at Dedeagatsch, defeated him in the course of the night, and took the town itself.

On November 11, as it was ascertained that the Turks to the number of from 4000 to 5000 men were moving forward from Gumuldzina, our troops moved on Bedekli, our cavalry remaining at Ferre to observe the enemy. It was known also that our troops were advancing from Kirdjali against Mastakli, where the enemy had two battalions of Nizams, some Bashi-Bazouks, a quick-firing mountain bat-

tery, and two machine guns. Here we attacked the enemy sharply and drove him back in full retreat on Gumuldzina. It was a regular rout, and quantities of ammunition and war stores were scattered on the road taken by the beaten enemy, and he left some seventy hundredweight of stores behind at his bivouac near the village of Bagtaschlar.

On November 9 we attacked the Turks at Gumuldzina, but they succeeded in falling back by the railway to the station at Ferre, where they left a rearguard behind to cover retreat.

Our troops continued the pursuit of the enemy and reached Ferre, where they came into touch with our cavalry, which had advanced by the left bank of the Maritza. Thus followed up, the Turks fell back from Ferre on the village of Merahamli, and took up a position north of it. On the 13th, our troops came into contact with those of the Turks, and opened a heavy artillery fire which lasted till two o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy, finding they were being annihilated by it, hoisted the white flag and sent to negotiate terms. On this occasion the Turks did as they always do, and put forward conditions which we could not accept. Next day we reopened fire with destructive effect, and as the enemy found on the 15th that the position had become extremely critical, they finally surrendered about two o'clock in the afternoon.

Amongst those taken prisoners were the commandant of the Kirdjali corps, Mahmed Javer Pasha, his chief of staff, General-Staff-Major Hamdi Bey, the two divisional commanders, Colonels Fasil Bey and Emeuf Bey, 265 staff and field officers, and

15,000 men, besides 8 mountain guns, 2 machine guns, 1500 horses, a great quantity of ammunition and material of war, about 400 wagons, and 8 locomotives. Of the prisoners, only Javer Pasha, his chief of staff, and the two divisional commanders, were brought to Kirk Kilissê. The other officers, with the men under their command, were sent by way of Mustapha Pasha to various towns in northern Bulgaria.

Pleasant quarters were prepared in Kirk Kilissé for the Pasha and the Bey, and on the second day after his arrival the Pasha was taken in a motor car to headquarters, where he presented himself to the chief of the section of military operations, Colonel Neresoff, who received him most graciously. The Pasha expressed his surprise at the kindly and conciliatory reception accorded to him by the Bulgarians.

In the streets he was gazed at with curiosity by crowds which collected to see the captive Pasha, who is a well-built man with an imposing presence.

His companions appeared fairly intelligent, especially Fasil Pasha, who is a German scholar, married to a German lady, and speaks German remarkably well. It seems that the Pasha was unaware of what had happened to the other Turkish troops, and when our officers explained the existing military situation to him he drew in a long breath and said: "I am fortunate in being one of the last to surrender."

He was also received by His Majesty the King, who conversed very graciously with him, and permitted him and his companions to retain their swords. They expressed a desire to be sent to Sofia, and the next day this was done.

It is interesting to know the feelings of the Turkish

superior officers who were taken prisoners, and what they said regarding themselves and everything that happened to them and around them. It is not merely interesting to know this, but also important, especially in view of statements in unfriendly European newspapers that the Turks were very badly treated by the Bulgarians.

From the following letters it may be concluded that they are not barbarians, as is suggested by a German journal, the well-known Turkophil "Vossische Zeitung," which, however, does not prove its assertions by facts: —

Javer Pasha to his Wife

Dear Wife, —

Do not be anxious on my account. I am sound and well. Providence willed that instead of falling gloriously on the battle-field, I was to surrender myself and become a prisoner.

I was received yesterday by the Bulgarian King, who loaded me with great honours, and in order to honour us, and in recognition of our conduct in the field, our swords were not taken from me or from any of the other commanders and officers.

We never believed that so cordial and brotherly a reception would be accorded us by all the Bulgarian officers, so cordial and brotherly is it, that all the torments and heart sorrows which we felt have quite vanished. I kiss the charming eyes of my daughter and sons Zid and Fakri. I hear that there is illness there, and the children would do well not to go about God knows where, or eat whatever they can get at. I repeat that you are not to be anxious about me. I shall be going to Sofia in a few days, and will not forget to write to you from there.

Mehmet Javer,
Brigadier-General.

Fasil Bey to his Wife

(Original in Germany)

Dear Wife, —

I am in Kirk Kilissé. I wrote to you from a village that we had been taken prisoners. It is not yet clear how long we are to stay here. Very likely we shall go to Sofia. I am with our General. The Bulgarian officers treat us in a very friendly manner, which we did not expect. All is well with me, and I feel in good health. I am in no danger. I beg of you to write to mamma that I am well. For the present I have money, and if I require any I will apply to our General. Very likely also the Bulgarian Government will give us something. If you want anything, apply to the uncle.

I hear there is sickness about and beg you to take care of yourself and ever to keep well for me. My own wife, I have now no anxiety, and many, many dangers have passed away. At present I only think of you and our dear children. I hope for a speedy conclusion of peace. As soon as we are in Bulgaria, I will let you know my address. It is our desire to go to Sofia. I beg of you to greet the mother for me. I kiss both her hands. What are Aalien and Husinie doing? Are they well? Kiss them for me. I embrace you and kiss you heartily.

Your Fasil.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE GUERILLA WAR

THE conduct of the war by the Bulgarians was aided to an extraordinary degree by their kinsmen living in Turkey. It is in every respect advantageous to an army penetrating into an enemy's country when it finds the inhabitants friendly instead of experiencing open or concealed resistance from them, and when it receives intelligence about the enemy, provisions, and everything the country can give, without having to use force. The advantage becomes incomparably greater when this population is itself warlike, and, taking up arms in support of the invaders, rises in insurrection in the rear of the defenders and takes part, directly or indirectly, in the fighting which decides the issue.

Such was especially the case in this war by reason of the participation of the Christian peoples of Macedonia and Thrace in the struggle against the Turk. Many parts of the Balkan Peninsula are wild and difficult of access, and these make an ideal country for guerilla and partisan warfare. Moreover, the experience of ten years' struggle waged against Turkish despotism carried on by the races in the Balkans has trained them to an extraordinary skill in the conduct of guerilla operations, and this makes them very dangerous enemies and hard to grapple with.

In the late war, the support which the allied Balkan States received from the Thracian and Macedonian volunteers was of all the more value and importance,

because so far from it being necessary to improvise some kind of training and organization for those forces, they already possessed a long-tried organization, which had been elaborated and perfected in all its details. It rested on a national basis, and enlisted in support of the insurrection the principle of universal liability to service and the payment of a general war tax.

In Macedonia and Thrace throughout the recent campaign this partisan warfare exhibited the ferocious cruelty which had always characterized it. By neither side was quarter asked or given. Just as the Bulgarian troops showed their discipline on every occasion, so did the Komitadjis ever pitilessly wage a warfare of absolute annihilation against their deadly enemy, the Turk.

Just before the outbreak of war, one night in Sofia I was conducted to an old house of call of the Komitadjis. This cavern of boundless hate and burning thirst for blood was named "Lomski-Han." This han or inn has sheltered hundreds and hundreds of Komitadjis, whose bones are whitening somewhere in the Rhodope mountains. For years the Komitadjis have, with rifle, knife, revolver, and bomb, waged a terrible guerilla war in Macedonia against everything that is not Bulgarian. Turk, Albanian, Serb, and Greek alike trembled before these sons of Hell.

Even in Sofia one did not feel at home amongst them, and not even a dozen cups of Turkish coffee or a bottle of that indefinable compound of fusel-oil — "Macedonian cognac" — could bring the least glimmer of joviality to their gloomy countenances. These men seem never to laugh.

Woe to the enemy who allows himself to be surprised by a band of such men. Mercy there is none, even to old men, and women, and children. The same method of warfare which the wild Osmanli hordes introduced into the Balkans from Asia, is practised to the present day unaltered.

Over twelve thousand of these desperate men who recoil before nothing, have fought in this war on the side of the Bulgarian troops.

Among my friends in the Lomski-Han was a fine, wide-awake-looking fellow about thirty. He could neither read nor write, but was of astonishing natural intelligence, and I therefore drew him out.

"What are you, what calling have you learned?"

"Komitadji; for the last sixteen years, Komitadji."

"Where do you come from?"

"From Bitolia. We had our house there, near by. The Turk killed my father, mother, brothers and sisters. The house was burned down. I alone survived."

"How old were you then?"

"Don't know. I could carry a rifle, and went off into the mountains."

"Why did you not go to your kinsmen?"

"All of my blood have been destroyed by the Turks. I am the only one left."

"And have you taken vengeance for blood?"

"Yes, always, when I had the opportunity."

"Then you have killed innocent people! How could they help what the others did?"

"So were my father and mother innocent; they did nothing to anybody."

"And have you killed women and children also?"

"Yes. Did they not also kill my mother and sister?"

And they all are like that, every one of them. And with these rough comrades, students, doctors, barristers, merchants, have fought shoulder to shoulder in the same band, and fought in the same fashion. It is incomprehensible that people who have had the culture of the West in European universities could be of one mind, one disposition with these fierce men, and slaughter all, as they do. But there is no distinction amongst the Macedonians; professors or illiterate, they were all in the first place Macedonians, Komitadjis.

The Macedonian organization has in its time caused much talk, more particularly when the nationalists in Bulgarian society wanted war forthwith, while preparations were still only in the making. The organization was already in existence at the time of the annexation of Eastern Roumelia. At its head was its first organizer and founder, the famous Major Panitza, who distinguished himself in the war with Servia, in which he took part with his Macedonian bands. After the deposition of Prince Alexander, amongst whose favourites he was numbered and to whom he remained faithful to the end, he mixed himself up with internal politics, and fell a victim to the party struggle against the dictatorship of Stambuloff.

The dictator and his adherents feared the other dictator without a dictatorship, Panitza, whom the masses and a great part of the army obeyed. His authority was immense, and had he really devoted himself to the party conflict, then at fever heat, the political situation might soon have changed in aspect. Stambuloff and his followers would have fallen from power in that case, and a fall from power for the

"Tyrants," as they were called, meant danger for their lives. Panitza was condemned to death and executed. When Stambuloff, six years afterwards, was mortally wounded in the streets by assassins, it is said that he murmured the name of Panitza in the unconscious hours which shortly preceded his death.

After Panitza, a very highly gifted man of letters, Traitscho Kitantscheff, of Monastir, led the organization. Later, their president was Panitza's brother-in-law, General Nikolaieff, who, fifteen years afterwards, was War Minister in Malinoff's Democratic Cabinet.

General Nikolaieff soon reverted to the active list of the army, and the powerful and popular Damian Grineff became leader of the organization. Next to him in the "Committee" were his friends Gatze Djeltscheff and Matoff, college professors.

In 1902 the organization divided into a "Werchovna" (upper), with headquarters in Salonica, and a "Zentralna" (central), with headquarters in Sofia. The Werchovnists were presided over by Damian Grineff and the Centralists by General Zontscheff, a reserve officer, who was succeeded by the famous first lieutenant in the reserve, Boris Sarafoff.

The revolution broke out in 1893 under Sarafoff. Grineff and Djeltscheff were killed by the Turks. Sarafoff was at the head of bands which were partly composed of collegians and students. Things came to a fight at Melnik, where he defeated the Turks and entered the town. Then between the bands and the Turkish troops there was further fighting, in which the latter suffered severely, as, for instance, at Kruschevo, where Sarafoff was present.

The organization adopted the theory of doing

injury to European property and interests in Macedonia, hoping in this way to force intervention, and so indirectly to effect reforms. Thus was conceived the idea of perpetrating two bomb explosions in Salonica; one on the French ship Guadeloupe, and the other, the evening of the same day, at the Ottoman Bank. These outrages, which were accompanied by other minor attempts in various parts of the city, were prepared and executed with great foresight and calculation. Eyewitnesses depicted to me very dramatically the whole affair, which that night filled the population with terror. The gas and water mains were first cut; this caused something like a panic among the inhabitants of the city.

Despairing cries of "Aman! Aman!" — "Mercy! Mercy!" were heard in the streets. Then began outbreaks of fire, and soon the sky was all a glowing red, where lately it had been clear and calm over the stately city. Whilst the frightful panic still prevailed, especially amongst the Turkish inhabitants, there came a second outburst of alarm. For the Turkish soldiers fell upon the Bulgarians wherever they found them, in their houses, in the streets, anywhere, and massacred even the most innocent people.

At that time the head of the organization was Garvanoff, who was Professor of Physics in the Bulgarian College at Salonica. He had gone through his course of studies in the University of Vienna, and was a very cultured and honourable man, but an enthusiast who would stop at nothing.

The Macedonian movement went on as best it could. After the outrages at Salonica, English and Austrian warships arrived there, and a little later,

Austria-Hungary and Russia, with a European mandate, proceeded to introduce reforms. There were some peculiar features in this outbreak of anarchism at Salonica. The dynamite — and the Macedonians had a very great amount of it — came from Russia in sardine-boxes. On one occasion the attention of the Customs officers was aroused by the weight of the cases. But it is known that "Baksheesh" (a system of bribes and tips) is rooted in the soil in Turkey, and that even murder can be done there for Baksheesh. Opposite the Ottoman Bank, a "Bakalnitza" (a shop dealing in miscellaneous wares) was opened some months before the bomb-explosion, and this innocent, harmless-looking Bakalnitza opposite the Bank had, after some weeks, a subterranean connection with the foundation-walls of the doomed building. The doors of the Bank were guarded by Turkish soldiers. Some hours before the explosion, late in the afternoon, a young man, the student Bjeltscheff, disguised as a Turkish officer, came to the Bank, and told the director that he had better leave the building with all his family and servants, if he wished to save his and their lives. One cannot get round the fact that the men appointed to perform the terrible and criminal work of organization were guided by intelligence that often showed they must have been highly educated men.

But in course of time, disputes over the policy to be adopted led to a further degeneration of the movement. Sarafoff had gone back to Sofia. Sandansky, originally a National school-teacher, and in his youth an upright man, developed into a bandit in 1904–05, when he was in the fiftieth year of his age. He did

not agree with Tschernopejeff and others of the Macedonians as to the action of the "Centralists" under Sarafoff. What he was above all determined upon was to bring about an era of "deeds." There was a terrible outbreak of mutually destructive strife between two Macedonian parties under Sarafoff on the one side and Sandansky on the other.

To these murderous party struggles a number of victims were sacrificed, and finally Sarafoff and Garvanoff themselves, while at a supper in Sarafoff's house, were, after a violent dispute, done to death by Teodor Athanasoff, a fanatical adherent of Sandansky's, who had assumed the sobriquet of "Major Panitza" amongst the Macedonians. All the Nationalist journals in Sofia, of which even the least important has a Macedonian editor, came out next day in mourning. The murderer, Teodor Athanasoff, fled by way of Dupnitza and Kustendil to Seres in Macedonia. This city is the centre of the "Zarstvota na Sandansky" ("Sandansky's kingdom"). Sandansky, who lived in good relations with the Turks, and especially the Young Turks, up to the time of their outbreak, was condemned to death *in contumaciam* by Bulgarian courts.

When the Young Turks broke out in revolution, Sandansky made common cause with them, and brought his armed followers into Constantinople with Mahmud Schefket Pasha's army. He was also elected deputy by the Young Turks. Great was his disappointment over the failure of this movement to secure freedom for Macedonia, and he again took to the hills. He was now fighting against the Turkish army, and he broke up bridges and occupied positions

in the passes, with which he was well acquainted. His first lieutenant, Tschernopejeff, entered Drama and Kavalla with his bands.

The most prominent leader of the Macedonian organization in Sofia is now the college professor Christo Matoff. At an earlier period he was in the Bulgarian College in Salonica, and was banished to Asia Minor. He was amnestied by the Turkish Government as a result of the conciliatory policy of the well-known Bulgarian envoy to Constantinople, Natschovitsch ; he went back to Sofia, and owing to the favour accorded to him by the cabinet of General Ratscho Petroff, he was again appointed Professor in a college at Sofia. Christo Matoff is a very intelligent man, and had already as editor of the Macedonian journal "Narodna Wolia" ("Will of the People") attracted the attention of the nationalist press.

Another journal of the Macedonians which appears in Sofia is "Adarar," which before the declaration of war published remarkable articles by a Bulgarian diplomat under the pseudonym of "Zurenjsnik" ("Storm indicator"). Protogereff, a major in the reserve, has been a prominent figure for several years past in the Macedonian organization of the Centralists. He organized the Macedonians on a military basis and led them in the late campaign.

Such is, in brief, the history of the Macedonian organization, the most important outcome of which was the guerilla warfare. Directly and indirectly the movement produced the following results: —

1. The intervention of Europe, and the reforms.

2. The Young Turkish Revolution, which had its starting-point in Macedonia.

3. The Albanian rising, and the growth of the liberation movement which convulsed Turkey before the Balkan War.

The war waged by Bulgarian organized associations under conditions dictated by the perplexing struggle in Macedonia, made matters ripe for a war waged by the Bulgarian army sooner than would otherwise have been the case. The action of the Macedonian organization has also attained other ends. It taught the people in Macedonia to pay contributions to the national movement, where the government taxes were exacted only by constraint. Even though the policy of the guerilla bands was often repugnant to Ministers in Sofia, they had to tolerate them, first because they could not run counter to popular opinion — which considered the bands a necessary evil — and secondly, because Turkey never effectively guarded her frontier, but merely kept shrieking out to Europe, "The bands are coming into my territory!" But it was only in the revolution of 1903 and at times in 1904 that the Bulgarian guerilla bands crossed the Turkish frontier as organized bodies. Usually the bands assembled in Turkey itself, and she was powerless in the matter, and sometimes even favoured the existence of the bands, as, for instance, she protected Sandansky up to the declaration of war.

On the road taken by the Turks in their retreat on Koprulu there was evidence of the shocking atrocities they had committed. When the Bulgarian troops entered the village of Furneno, they found there men, women and children who had been slaughtered in the most horrible way. Before the eyes of an old man, his whole family in the house had been murdered, then

they bound the old man, threw him on the dead body of his son, and shot him. Bashi-Bazouks forced the inhabitants in one place to lie down on the ground, and then shot them, standing over them. All the villages through which the Turkish troops retreated in the valley of the Struma were left in fire-blackened ruins, amidst the smoking wreckage of which lay the half-burned bodies of their massacred inhabitants. Every hour brought news of inhuman deeds that cried to Heaven.

The Turks made an attempt to use the same weapon as their adversaries, and opposed to the Bulgarian guerilla bands Turkish guerillas, the famous Bashi-Bazouks. But in this they had little success. The Turks were lacking in dash, organization, and, above all, in *hate*. Only a people which has been oppressed, or feels that it is oppressed, can display that inexorable, unbounded hate which leaves it no repose until the death-rattle has ceased in the enemy's throat. Moreover, the Turks were too phlegmatic to wage a successful guerilla war with all the energy of their people at its back, and they lacked, as has been said, the necessary organization.

In consequence, the methodically arranged action of the Bulgarian guerilla bands and armed parties in close coöperation with the general advance of the Bulgarian troops produced far greater military results than the scattered and unorganized action of the Bashi-Bazouks. Thus, for example, there was the occupation, before the outbreak of war, of the defiles of Kresna on the middle course of the river Struma, by the leaders, Sandansky and Tschernopejeff with several thousand guerillas. This movement was, from

a military point of view, of the utmost value, for this position completely commands the important line of communication in the Struma valley by Dzumaja to Seres and Salonica.

One of Sandansky's exploits was to surprise and cut to pieces a Turkish column of infantry and artillery. It is true that a fight at Kriwa, near Gewegeli, had an unfavourable issue for the Komitadjis; here the Turks brought up a strong force with guns and managed to surround and destroy some of the bands.

Yet on the whole the activity of the Bulgarian guerillas, who succeeded in blowing up several bridges and damaging Turkish barracks, by bomb explosions, did much to interrupt the mobilization of the Turks, and thereby to make the situation of their army still more unfavourable than it had been from the outset, even without these incidents.

The large part taken by irregular fighters in this war, the hate inherited from past centuries, and the wild untamed nature of all these peoples, imparted, as has already been said, a character of peculiar ferocity to the fighting. The war turned into one of mutual murder and slaughter, in which no quarter was given and the utmost horrors were perpetrated; the guilt of all this bloodshed must, so far as regards the Bulgarians, fall only on Komitadjis, because the regular troops showed exemplary discipline; on the other hand, as regards the Turks, the troops in their retreat committed a long series of infamous deeds. Thus the Turks retreating on Koprulu behaved in the most brutal manner in the Bulgarian village of Furneno. When the

Bulgarian troops entered, they found the bodies of one hundred and forty-seven slaughtered men, women and children, mutilated in the most horrible manner; all the other Bulgarian villages through which the Turks passed were burnt down, and those of the inhabitants who had not made a timely flight were put to death. Bulgarian wounded who fell into the enemy's hands were tortured and massacred, their ears and noses cut off, and their eyes put out.

The Komitadjis retaliated in exactly similar fashion. The guerilla leader Tschernopejeff, for instance, caused hundreds of Mahommedans to be slaughtered in retaliation. It is a fact worth noting that those very bodies of soldiers and guerilla bands which treated the unarmed population most cruelly, were precisely those which behaved the worst on the field of battle. The greatest cruelties were committed by the Turkish troops in those localities in which they offered the least resistance, and in which they soonest took to flight, and in the Bulgarian army it was generally asserted that the Macedonian Komitadjis fought much worse than the regular troops.

The guerilla is usually accustomed to fight in ambush, and to make a speedy retreat before an enemy in superior force, and take up a position somewhere else. It is thus easy to understand why in the open field of battle, in difficult situations, he is rather inclined to falling back. Further, the instinct to murder, once it is awakened in the guerilla-fighter and let loose upon unarmed victims, destroys all soldierly characteristics and all true manliness, so that it is very often to be observed that the most

merciless monsters are the greatest cowards in the field.

Bulgaria, which had strained the entire strength of her people to the uttermost limits, was compelled to accept an iron necessity — the help and coöperation of the Komitadjis, who on their part had taken up arms spontaneously. It is to be hoped that the regular Bulgarian administration which has already begun its work in the conquered territories will be in a position to put an end to the further contention between opposing nationalities and religions, so that the sanguinary romance of the Komitadjis may soon belong to a sombre past.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PEACE NEGOTIATOR

DR. DANEFF, the leader of the Progressists, had already been Minister for Foreign Affairs in Karaveloff's Cabinet, and afterwards Prime Minister; thus when he became President of the Sobranje he entered upon his new position with the reputation of a distinguished statesman of many-sided ability.

He is extraordinarily skilful in the conduct of negotiations, as he possesses the useful faculty of being able readily to realize the point of view of the other party, while he never tries to demand more than he can and must obtain. He has repeatedly given proof of these characteristic qualities as the first advocate in the country in very intricate law-suits concerning business matters or civil rights.

Dr. Daneff went through his higher studies in Prague, having as a fellow student the well-known Czech politician, Dr. Kramarsch; he took his doctor's degree at the University of Heidelberg, and completed his training in Paris. The Bulgarians always go to Paris. There Dr. Daneff has very often listened with admiration to the elaborate speeches of French orators; yet later on during a stay in London he learned to prefer and adopted the English style of speaking and debating. He is always very quiet and very patient when listening to opinions expressed in opposition, or in contradiction to his own. Only at times, in a moment of excitement, a

DR. DANEFF, PRESIDENT OF THE BULGARIAN SOBRANJE

slight flush passes over his countenance, yet his tone of speaking remains the same, and his gestures, of which he makes sparing use, are not emphasized or exaggerated. And yet as a speaker in the Assembly he is very impressive, and this not merely on account of the originality of his ideas. Of him one can truly say he goes onward without getting old.

Dr. Daneff comes from a mountainous region, and has a passionate love for the mountains; climbing is his favourite recreation. What mountains are there in Europe that he does not know? One might also exclaim: What European capital has he not visited! He says, when one speaks to him of the places he knows, "I travel like an American."

This is not the only characteristic that helped to attract the King's attention before Daneff came into power in the present coalition. Even before that, under the Democratic Government, King Ferdinand sent him on a special mission to the Young Turkish administration, with which he vainly sought to establish friendly relations. He was then entrusted with missions, now to Cetinje, now to Belgrade, and last summer to the Russian Czar at Livadia.

It was said at Sofia that the King sent Dr. Daneff to Russia because the hour of an armed conflict with the Turk must soon strike, and Russia in these circumstances would feel very much offended if she were not fully informed beforehand. This had been so on the occasion of the annexation of Eastern Roumelia and the declaration of independence of Bulgaria. There may be a certain amount of truth in this, but in Sofia they go farther and say explicitly that to this is to be ascribed the fact that

Russia did not interest herself, as in the case of Servia, in the strengthening of the national aspirations of Bulgaria. Having been obliged to endure much unpleasantness from St. Petersburg after the declaration of independence, because Russia had not been given previous information, King Ferdinand wished this time — so I was told in Sofia — to act in another way.

But it would seem that the Russian Czar in his talk with Dr. Daneff spoke of the necessity of a policy of reserve. On account of the impressions received during this visit to Livadia, and also of the traditional friendship of his party for Russia, Dr. Daneff now wavered in counselling drastic measures, and was for a peaceful solution of the Macedonian question. M. Gueshoff also was not quite resolved, although his sympathy with Daneff decidedly increased. But the Minister of Finance, Teodoroff — the "Tiger" — urged war; on the ground, mainly, that the whole social life of Bulgaria was at a standstill and was being seriously affected by the strained relations with Turkey, and that the business world was suffering loss from the mysterious uncertainty of public credit. After the massacres at Kotschana, which soon followed, Dr. Daneff saw that the warlike excitement of the people could be no longer repressed.

He quickly adapted himself to the new situation, and throughout the war showed himself quite at home as a campaigner. He was almost the whole time with the King, accompanying him now to Mustapha Pasha, now to Kirk Kilissé, Jurusch, and the rest. Then when the relations between Austria-

Hungary and Servia grew worse, and the position became critical, he went on a mission to Budapest. Then at Chatalja he took part in the armistice negotiations, and when he had completed that task, we see him indefatigable as ever, making a long series of diplomatic visits — on his way to London, interrupting his journey at Bukarest, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris. At the Balkan Conference in London he was assisted by that very capable statesman, Mihael Madjaroff, the minister there, and by General Paprikoff, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs under Malinoff at the time of the declaration of independence.

There is some talk of an early retirement of M. Gueshoff. Every one in Bulgaria expects that in that case Dr. Daneff will be his successor.

CHAPTER XX

MY EXPERIENCES AS A WAR CORRESPONDENT

FROM the amount of political and military information in the preceding chapters, the reader will have formed an idea for himself of the difficulties I had to overcome, in order, in so short a time, to be able to set forth this account, as a whole, of my impressions and experiences among the Bulgarians and of what I learned from them.

The secret of my successful activity as a war correspondent — one result of which is that in various ways I have had to experience the hostility of some of my less successful colleagues — is, I confess, to be sought in the circumstance that I was able to bring to bear upon my task more certain guarantees of success than any of my competitors could command.

Above all, I was a perfect master of the Bulgarian language. The son of an engineer, I grew up among the Balkans, and as a boy learned to speak Bulgarian, Servian, and Bosnian. Though a native of Vienna, I thus obtained such a knowledge of the ways and thoughts of the southern Slavs as one cannot acquire from any books, or any amount of study in later life.

When I left the high school at Agram for the university of my native city of Vienna, I devoted myself with special predilection to the study of the history of the Balkan peoples. Later as a reserve officer I enlarged my military education by special studies, and I had opportunities of testing my know-

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ledge in this department. I might further note that I was a special correspondent in Servia during the time when the King was assassinated, and at Cetinje during the affair of the bombs. A special task, which I undertook at this time, was the foundation at Serajevo in Bosnia of a German daily paper, the "Serajevoer Tagblatt" — an organ of the press intended to promote the future annexation of the province.

I will not deny that for much of my success as a war correspondent I have to thank relations I had established with influential circles in Bulgaria, in which I received a most friendly welcome.

As for my flight from the headquarters of the First Army, that is an incident of which I am specially proud. It is also the key to my later successes. On October 28, enthroned on luggage, belonging to my colleagues of the press, that had been piled up in a buffalo wagon, I entered the place I had so ardently desired to reach — the town of Mustapha Pasha, called by the Bulgarians Svilengrad ("Silken-City"). The foreign military attachés were better off, for motor-cars had been placed at their disposal, after a special train by which we travelled together had brought us from the dull little town of Stara Zagora to the threshold of these scenes of bloodshed. As the car that conveyed the representatives of the Triple Alliance swept by, they smiled and called out words of greeting.

By shouting out in good Austrian fashion "Hu! Hu!" to my team, I got the lazy-going Bulgarian buffaloes over three miles of road, amid clouds of dust raised by marching troops and convoys of

wagons, and crossing the old Turkish bridge found myself in Mustapha Pasha.

Quarters were assigned to me at the "Jewish Club," with the remark that, if I liked, I could change my lodgings to one of the many Turkish houses that their owners had deserted. When I went to my quarters I found that the two available bedrooms had already been occupied by some French correspondents under the guidance of M. Nandeau, famous for his work on the war on Manchuria, and the well-known Herr von Mach, who had become a Bulgarian military professor. An old sofa, which the latter had pushed out into the anteroom, I marked as my own by laying my travelling bag and visiting card upon it, and then I went out to reconnoitre.

First of all I wanted to satisfy my hunger. All the inns and shops were full of soldiers. Wine and brandy flowed in streams, but not a bit of bread was to be had. In a little shop I caught sight of a stray sausage, a Turkish mutton-sausage of the poorest sort. This I made my own at a good high price, and ate it half raw. As I came out of the shop, I met a cheerful-looking figure. The war correspondent of a great Berlin daily paper, a comfortable, self-satisfied and older colleague of mine, was coming along in a wagon piled high with furniture, bedding, and boxes of provisions. He was dragging with him to the war enough household goods to set up a young couple. What did I look like then with my little handbag! Yet how well did this slender outfit serve my purpose in my later wanderings, when it brought me to the firing lines before Adrianople!

In places the streets were a morass that one could hardly wade through. Fresh troops came continually tramping in over the old Turkish bridge across the Maritza, past the mosque and through the town, bound for Adrianople. There were to be seen among them many grey-bearded men, who had buckled on the short bayonet over their peasant dress, and carried over the shoulder, in Russian fashion, the Mannlicher rifle, with which the newly formed units were armed. All sang as they marched through the town. Then came field artillery — these, too, were reserve formations. The teams were hard-worked horses with harness that came with them from the farms. Serious-looking and silent the gunners tramped past us.

The scene changed like the shapes in a kaleidoscope. These pictures of war have much beauty and charm for any one with soldierly tastes. Some little horses next — they were pushing on further at a steady pace. Just to the right of the bridge a wagon park was formed. Part of the transport had been ordered to spend the night here. It is impossible to describe the picturesque medley of the baggage-train men, old, often grey-bearded peasants, and their escort, men of the third levy, wearing sheepskins and armed with primitive-looking, old guns — to tell of their energy, their shouts to each other, the confusion of carts, wagons, and tumbrils, oxen and buffaloes. Loads of provisions and forage were all the while rolling by, and slaughter cattle were being driven past us. At the edge of a swampy meadow was a gipsy camp. Further off, at a field forge, set up in the open, axle-trees and wheels were being repaired. It was a picturesque scene of campaigning life.

I had soon found my way about Mustapha Pasha. And now I wanted to telegraph my impressions to Vienna. The press censorship was installed in the first storey of a large building. An extremely amiable captain of the General Staff, who spoke German fluently, "censored" and passed my dispatch with an intelligence that delighted me. I hurried off to the military post office opposite.

Here already some twenty war correspondents had crowded in with dispatches, some of which ran up to three thousand words. The Englishmen especially had enormous sums of money at their command. *One solitary telegraph clerk* was counting the words with deliberate slowness, and when he got to 680 or 860 he forgot which figure it was, and began again at the beginning. Under such circumstances, that I should ever be able to arrange a regular service of telegrams was not to be thought of.

Besides, I had learned that the censorship had in the strongest language warned the war correspondents that they must on no account leave Mustapha Pasha, and that any one who was found two kilometres — that is a little over a mile — outside the place, must at once expect to be expelled from the country. In fact, as I heard later, this fate overtook quite a number of correspondents almost immediately. I was not one of them, for by that time I had long since got away from Mustapha Pasha. This hospitable place was a kind of trap for the correspondents. No one there could see or hear of anything that happened; and if nevertheless one of them went to see the censor with a beautiful dispatch, in the course of which he tried to make up for the lack

of precise knowledge by a brilliant imagination, his message seldom reached the newspaper to which it was addressed.

So there was nothing for me to do here! As twilight began, I requisitioned an army wagon, brought my little bag out of the "Jewish Club," and drove straight back to the railway station. I had spent *only three hours* at the headquarters of General Ivanoff. Mustapha Pasha saw me no more! It is amusing to be told, as I have read in the newspapers, that some of the correspondents will have it that they saw me there day after day. Let us hope that their other observations were more reliable than these!

I was lucky. Just as the wagon brought me into the station, a military train laden with fifteen-centimetre Krupp guns was standing there nearly ready to start for Kadikoi, in the direction of Adrianople. On the platform, busy about getting the train away, was a major I had known well at Stara Zagora, a thorough soldier of the right sort. I introduced myself to him, and soon after that I was sitting in the guard's van beside the conductor, who broke off half of a loaf of white bread for me. Heaven knows where he had learned such courtesy! A short whistle, and away we went into the cold, misty night, while my dear colleagues at Mustapha were, I suppose, competing with each other for some place to lie down and sleep in. The red armlet denoting the war correspondent wandered away into my little bag. I had for a while ceased to be *officially* a war correspondent.

For five days the headquarters of General Ivanoff counted me among the "missing." The telegraph was at work in all directions. At the royal head-

quarters at Stara Zagora it was feared that I had met with an accident such as often happens in war.

Meanwhile I was before Adrianople, on the heights of Kemal. I was an eye-witness of the splendid artillery duel between the Bulgarian batteries and Forts Karagjuz and Scheitan Tabia. I crossed the Maritza again to the right bank, stopped to see the ruins of Jurusch, and then was able to watch at close quarters one of the most heroic attacks of the Bulgarians on the Turkish positions near Maras. I had seen many — very many things. I made the return journey with a trainload of wounded. My travelling companion was a Bulgarian officer whose left breast had been literally torn open by a fragment of a shell.

When the train reached Mustapha Pasha I went away into the last compartment of the carriage to hide in case of spies being about. The stop was a very short one, thank God, and we went on again further and further from the dangerous neighbourhood of the censor.

The first Bulgarian station after passing Mustapha Pasha is Lubimetz. Here I got out and reported myself to the military commandant of the station as "returning to the royal headquarters."

He was a very old-fashioned officer, called back to the service, who did not quite know what to make of me. We had not much to say to each other, for he had his hands full. In front of Adrianople they wanted very badly some heavy siege artillery and a Blériot aeroplane, reported to be on the line. But the train for which the commandant was making such anxious inquiries was stopped somewhere midway between the stations over by Harmanli.



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ENSORED TELEGRAM FROM LUBIMETZ

I had soon decided on my plan. I went into the telegraph office, intending to risk an uncensored message. Part of the newly formed Tenth Division was just then marching through the place, bound for Adrianople, and the "Natschalnik" (director) came hurrying back into the office, and, with many excuses for his absence, took from me my message of enormous length.

He had never before seen a war correspondent, and with the insignia of the red badge on my arm he took me for a commissariat officer. I had no reason to put him right as to my duties. He insisted on sending off the "important dispatch" himself by way of Philippopolis — I took good care he did not send it to Stara Zagora. In return he had from me an account of the brilliant deeds of arms at Maras.

For a moment there was a painful situation for me. It was when the good man expressed his astonishment that I, whom he took for a commissariat officer, should want to pay cash down for the telegram. He thought it was some sort of government message, and he kept talking about a "mistake."

I had much the same experience at Tirnovo Sejmen.

I was meanwhile being looked for under the suspicion that I was a Turkish spy. A German and an Austrian colleague — their names were mentioned to me by a competent authority at Sofia, but I shall spare them and not give the information here — had meanwhile, out of a fear of competition, become anxious at my disappearance, and had taken every means to set the censor, Dr. Radeff, busily to work

on my account. This affair of mine, it was said, did not look at all correct, for this Wagner had military sketches and other technical data with him, and who knew if he was not in the service of the Turks? The efforts to get hold of me were therefore redoubled.

Meanwhile in a waiting-room of the railway station at Tirnovo Sejmen I had spent the night with a son-in-law of the chief of the Bulgarian Staff, General Fitscheff, who was stopping there with the court painter to the King, Professor Veschen and two Bulgarian officers. And here I must thank these gentlemen, as well as the commandant of the station, M. S. Dulgherski, for the kindliness of their reception of the solitary Austrian traveller and for all their friendly conduct towards me. While the hunt for the "Turkish spy" was in progress, I was enjoying very select society. It was also here at Tirnovo Sejmen that I made the acquaintance of the leader of the Social Democrats, the Deputy Janko Sakazoff, an interesting and very gifted man.

Though such journeys, rides and flying visits to the front are very useful for gaining an insight into the everyday life and ways of war, yet it is a mistake to believe that the whole business of war correspondence consists in the correspondent spending his whole time in riding or tramping about on the firing line or at the outposts, or creeping round in shelter-trenches, so that he may have impressions to send to his readers. With the enormous extent of ground covered by the battles of our day and that characteristic feature of them which has been aptly described as the appar-

ent "emptiness of the battle-field," [1] the correspondent, under these new conditions, can only get a sight of and describe isolated and local incidents, or brief episodes. These can be only of subordinate importance in relation to the great action taken as a whole. With the conditions that the power of modern weapons has imposed upon the tactical methods of to-day, it has become almost impossible for him to see plainly and closely enough any really decisive and important events in the actual zone of the fighting, and to grasp a correct idea of their connexion with the great whole.

So it comes to pass that the correspondent, who remains all the time at the front, mostly finds himself in a position to report only isolated actions and events behind the actual fighting line, such as the bringing up of reserves, the artillery taking up position and opening fire, the movement of ammunition columns, the work of the ambulances and the like. Then he adds some descriptive touches about the "awful thunder of the guns," the "whistling of bullets," "the groans of the wounded," the "wild confu-

[1] Before recent improvements in the armament of troops the position of every gun in action was clearly marked by an enormous mass of smoke; and the advance of firing lines, even in the most dispersed order, and the precise positions of the opposing infantry could be easily made out by the long fringe of smoke that hung over them. But with smokeless powder and the abundant use of cover on both sides, it is often extremely difficult even for the most practised eye to see where the troops are and what they are doing. Hence comes what Lieutenant Wagner describes as the "emptiness of the battle-field." A British officer, who had served in the South African War for nearly the whole of the time it lasted, gave an impression of what the modern battle-field is like, when he said, "In all our battles I never actually saw an enemy — not even a smoke puff to show where he was. Men would ask, 'What shall we aim at?' and often they would be told, 'Aim at the sky line,' in the hope of their hitting some Boer shooting from the crest of a ridge or the top of a rise in the veldt." — (*Translator's note.*)

sion of masses of broken troops," and introduces here and there some incidents that tell of the discipline or insubordination of the men, the great exactness or hopeless irregularity of their movements, their warlike enthusiasm or lack of spirit, and so forth.

This is the result of the impressions that come crowding upon the war correspondent at the moment. They are interesting and exciting enough, and it will certainly be an experience he will always remember, but his description will only give his far-off readers a repetition of generalities they have often heard before.

And it is especially when the correspondent finds himself on the side that is carrying forward a great offensive movement that it is almost always only by a lucky chance that he can be in a position to watch from a favourable point of view any decisive phase of the fighting. And even then he will find it enormously difficult to make a right estimate of what he has seen in its bearing upon the whole of the battle. Generally there will come in an unconscious tendency to exaggerate the importance of events that one sees happening near, and more especially when it is a case of the local panics that occur in war.

Thus incidents that are seen near at hand — though they may be quite insignificant — will often assume an aspect of the most gigantic proportions, whilst there is not a glimpse of the really decisive event that has taken place farther away. The whole perspective of the picture is wrong, just as a photograph, though it reproduces with absolute truth what was before the lens, may all the same be distorted, through the camera having been held too near the object. We must conclude that in modern war the individual corre-

spondent by his personal observations can never produce a picture of the events as a whole that is even half correct.

If a newspaper were to decide to give its readers, on the basis of such personal information, such a complete report of the course of events in a campaign, it would have to send out a whole host of correspondents to each separate army in the theatre of war, and these would have to be distributed among the army corps and divisions like the umpires at peace manœuvres. These correspondents would then have to send in their reports to some common centre, where they would be examined and reduced to one complete account of the whole. This means that much the same kind of work would have to be done as is now performed on a larger scale by the General Staff of an army in drawing up its full report on events in war.

But this is obviously impossible, both because of the difficulty of sending out the right kind of men in sufficient numbers, and also from the necessity of getting the news published in time. The individual correspondent who wants to give his newspaper and its readers a punctual and, as far as is possible, a complete, clear and generally correct account of a battle, cannot do better than place himself directly or indirectly in close relation with those quarters, where, in the regular course of the service, full reports of the engagements and movements that have taken place are received, and where he can also obtain a general idea of operations that are contemplated or are actually in progress.

In my opinion the material so obtained must form the foundation of the whole of war correspondence.

The correspondent can supplement and enliven all this by describing his personal impressions; but this lighter part of his work can only form a subordinate and supplementary addition to what is its real basis and essential element.

One may take it that the war correspondent nowadays seldom rides out on patrol. His chief duty is rather as quickly as possible to get at the essence of the information that reaches those who are in command, or are in positions that keep them in close touch with those who direct the operations.

That I have done this has been made a subject of reproach against me. It has been said that I was "spoon-fed" with the news I sent in my dispatches; that they were not original reports of my own. I grant that I could only have seen a part of what I telegraphed to my newspaper, and that in the majority of cases I was only the intermediary in sending on information obtained from others. But in all special correspondence for a newspaper the news is the main thing, and the methods and ways by which it has been obtained are only subordinate details; and the next point of importance is to get the news through in good time. All the rest — the personal presence of the correspondent as an onlooker, the details of where he put up, the adventures he went through — all these things, I repeat, are non-essentials.

In my opinion, so far at least as great wars in Europe are concerned, the heroic or romantic epoch of war correspondence — such as it was in the days of the famous English correspondents — now belongs to the past. The war correspondent of to-day is no longer the knight-errant of the year so-and-so, who with his

field-glass and note-book rode out like a "vulture of history-making events," to quote the ironical words of Otto von Gottberg, himself a war correspondent. In those days the journalist could accompany the marching columns and ride out into the battle-field, in search of personal impressions to send home. But this is not allowed by the leaders of modern armies, who themselves no longer, like Skobeleff, take post in the foremost fighting line, and who would not, like the famous Russian general, agree to a whole staff of war correspondents riding to the front with them.

I might, indeed, say that the work of the war correspondent of to-day is much more like the business of a diplomatist than that of a soldier in the field, as it formerly was. For the most serious task of the war correspondent under existing conditions reduces itself to this — to put it briefly — to get at more information than the official bulletins afford. And with the extraordinary way in which secrecy is now observed as to even the most unimportant operations, this is, as I can assert from personal experience, never an easy task, and often a very thankless one.

All the war correspondents, who were at the Bulgarian headquarters during the recent campaign, have told how very difficult the Bulgarian officials made it for them to obtain any information in what had hitherto been the usual way, or to send it off when obtained by the ordinary channels. All were kept back far behind the front, and one could only quite exceptionally and with the greatest difficulty get through the cordon of surveillance, and reach the front on a flying visit. This was what every one of us was trying to do even in his own personal interests.

Moreover, the provisions of the official regulations for war correspondents clearly showed how closely the Bulgarian Staff had followed the Japanese precedent in imposing fetters on the journalists at the seat of war.

It was forbidden to publish any information as to the organization of the army corps, the distribution and strength of the troops, the preparations in progress, the views and projects of the General Staff or of subordinate commanders, the working of the line of communications, and the distribution of the reserves. It was further forbidden to give the official designation of the army corps that was moving to any point, or the name of its general, for fear of this information throwing any light on the general grouping of the army. It was also forbidden to describe the armament and equipment of the army, the armament and state of the strong places and other fortifications, the working of the supply department and the general health of the troops, or to mention the effect of the enemy's fire, the numbers or names of the killed and wounded, the departure or arrival of troops and convoys, the carrying out of marches; or to write about the condition and traffic capacity of the railways used for the transport of troops and war material, as well as the state of the roads in the theatre of operations.

One was also forbidden to publish any information obtained about the enemy, if this publication was in any way likely to prejudice the future work of the Intelligence Department by giving any clue to the source of information. And finally the censorship would not permit any news to be sent about reverses

or defeats of the Bulgarian troops, or any criticism of the orders, dispositions and arrangements of the generals and the Staff.

The war correspondent's personal freedom of movement was also extremely restricted. Unless by special permission of the press censor's department of the General Staff, one must not leave the appointed place of residence, which was always far behind the front of the army. This permission was extremely seldom given, and even then only with considerable restrictions. The commander of the body of troops to which the correspondent went with such a permit had the right to cancel at a moment's notice, "on military grounds," the permission thus given by the censorship.

All letters and postal packages, whether of a public or private character, and whether directed to some place in Bulgaria or to be sent abroad, were to be submitted to the military censor and for this purpose were to be left open. All these were dealt with by a severe postal censorship. Photographs were to be taken only with the special permission of the commandant of the district.

To sum all this up briefly, it was categorically forbidden to send any news that was at all worth knowing, or to take any steps by which one could get possession of any such news. Each one can from this judge for himself what difficulties had to be overcome under these circumstances in order to succeed in obtaining in good time even incomplete information, and then to get it sent off notwithstanding the censorship.

I myself escaped arrest at Stara Zagora only as if by a miracle. I had gone back alone to the royal

headquarters. There I was greeted with an interest, that can easily be understood, by the military attachés, who after a stay of only a few hours at Mustapha Pasha had been brought back safely to Stara Zagora. They asked if it was true that I was the first correspondent who had actually been under fire at the front.

And now there comes a gap — an interval of three days, during which I fulfilled a special mission, about which, however, I am not even yet authorized to say anything. But I can assure my dear colleagues that here there was no question of "spying." By this time the royal headquarters was perfectly well informed as to my presence at Stara Zagora and as to what I was doing there.

After the battles of Lule Burgas and Chorlu had been fought, I returned to Sofia. And there it happened that a patrol was waiting for me at the railway station. They came looking for me while I was talking to the Staff Captain, whose acquaintance I had made in the censor's office at Mustapha Pasha. I was telling him about my experiences. He had actually been sent from Mustapha Pasha — from which a number of correspondents had meanwhile been expelled — in further pursuance of the spy story that those amiable colleagues of mine had started about me, and he had been given orders by one of the subordinate commanders to get hold of me at all costs.

And here I think with gratitude of all my Italian colleagues, and especially of two war correspondents who are well known for their work in the Tripoli campaign, Ernesto Vassalo of the "Corriere d'Italia" and Zoli of the "Secolo," who warned me in good time

of the danger that threatened me. All my Italian colleagues always showed me the greatest and most unselfish friendship. When I left Sofia on a special mission to Nish, some of them accompanied me to the railway station, where they bade me farewell, with the wish that the friendly relations established by the diplomatists between Austria and Italy might be drawn yet closer by mutual acquaintance.

The Prime Minister, M. Gueshoff, had on this same day of my arrival at Sofia told me, by telephone, to come to him. He received me in the presence of the Austrian envoy Tarnowska, and greeted me with a smile and the words: "I congratulate you on your brilliant successes. You are the correspondent who has won. But now you must confess to me everything that happened."

And I confessed everything, and received from His Excellency a general absolution. Will my less successful colleagues be able to refuse it to me any longer?

At this same reception M. Gueshoff had the kindness to give me an interview for my newspaper on the subject of the statement Count Berchtold had just made.

While at Stara Zagora they were hunting in vain for me as a suspicious character, I was seated in the *salon* of the Bulgarian Prime Minister.

I am far from making any complaint against the leaders of the Bulgarian Army. The changes they made in the regulations for correspondents were, no doubt, absolutely necessary in the interests of victory for the Bulgarian arms. For, as is well known, it has more than once happened that through the news sent by war correspondents, operations, that had so far

been kept secret, were revealed to the enemy, and the plans of the general who was conducting them thus made to end in failure.

I need only refer to the well-known instance in the Franco-German War of 1870–71, when it was by means of news telegraphed from London by way of Berlin that the German Staff got its first information of MacMahon's flank march for the relief of Metz, where Bazaine was then shut up. The German leaders were thus enabled to take at once the necessary steps for the operations against the relieving army, with the result that they inflicted upon it the disaster of Sedan.

I must here add the remark that I, too, when I returned to Vienna from the theatre of war, found that some, who could speak with authority on such matters, blamed me for having, in my news of the continuation of the Bulgarian advance after the battle of Kirk Kilissé in the direction of Lule Burgas and Viza, given information that was prejudicial to the Bulgarians. It was said that this news was telegraphed back to Constantinople by Turkish officials, whose business it was to forward in this way all news bearing on the situation that came from the armies of the Balkan States; that it thus reached the Turkish staff; and that it was an essential factor in Nazim Pasha's decision to meet the danger threatening his line of retreat by throwing the right wing forward against Bunarhissar.

Even if in this way, notwithstanding serious defeats, the Turkish army succeeded in keeping its retreat to the lines of Chatalja open, I was in no way whatever responsible for having by my dispatch prejudiced the success of the Bulgarian arms. I was, and still

am now, of the convinced opinion that my dispatch was from the journalist's point of view sent on at the earliest possible moment, yet the military situation had so far developed that the news could not have any *essential* influence on the measures to be taken at the front. For the actual situation must already have led Nazim Pasha to exert his main strength on the right wing, and the news from the Bulgarian camp could at the very utmost do no more than confirm him in his decision, but could not possibly have suggested it to him.

Now with reference to the general value of the information sent by a war correspondent, we must not forget, as has been already pointed out, that he can personally report only a small part of the really important matters, and these mostly only in such a light as is cast on them by the impression of the moment, and that if he wants to give news of the situation in general he must go beyond what he can thus see for himself. And indeed, with the enormous extent of modern warlike operations and battles, what he hears from others will again be, to a very small extent only, matters of personal knowledge, or impressions his informants have themselves received; it must be remembered, too, to what an extent such reports are circulated and repeated from one to another in such numbers that it is impossible to check and verify them all.

It is only out of absolute malice then that any one will make it a subject of reproach against a war correspondent that he has not always avoided mistakes in his impressions and in the news he has sent. For

even the whole of a headquarters staff, and the General Staff itself, is sometimes for hours, and even for days, misled as to the facts of a campaign. The reader who reads such criticisms has of course no idea of the huge number of reports that come pouring in, many of them widely divergent from and contradictory to each other, and how during a crisis that may last for hours the wildest rumours are flying about at headquarters and sometimes find their way out of it. The Bulgarians are certainly distinguished by an extraordinary amount of self-possession and self-control, but when there came a dispatch from General Radko Dimitrieff, the commander of the Third Army, reporting that by the unexpected advance of the Turks in superior force he had been compelled to abandon Bunarhissar — notwithstanding the last words of the dispatch, "I shall retake it" — the news spread like lightning that the Turks had recaptured Kirk Kilissé.

Still more difficult to check are the reports of successes at particular points of the battle-field as well as of the general course of the fighting; and how easily incorrect information can be accepted as true even in the highest places, is shown, for instance, by the false report of the surrender of a whole Turkish army at Monastir. For two days this was officially asserted, only, after all, to be declared quite incorrect. Another source of error is the fact that troops in action are only too apt to mistake an advanced post they have captured for part of the main position of the enemy. This is familiar to every student of military history, and can, moreover, be easily explained by any one who has endeavoured to penetrate the psychology of

the battle-field. That in this very respect even leaders of the first rank can be mistaken is shown by the example of what happened at the farm of St. Hubert on the afternoon of August 18, 1870, during the battle of Gravelotte.

Finally, it is a very cheap kind of triumph to point out in a war correspondent's dispatches, long after they were sent, isolated mistakes which one has discovered only by reading official and non-official publications on the war, the result of weeks and months of labour based on a mass of documents. The war correspondent is not writing a staff history of the campaign, and for the matter of that even official histories prepared by a General Staff and based on the most authoritative materials have repeatedly been shown to be liable to the gravest errors.

This book of mine on the events of the campaign in Thrace, is largely based upon the news originally published in a daily paper, and for this very reason can make no claim to be anything like a final and complete record, and I hope it will be judged from this point of view.

THE END

APPENDIX

THE ARMAMENT OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES

The Bulgarian Army

Infantry

The first and second line are armed with the Mannlicher repeating rifle, Mark 88/90 and 25. Maximum range, 2600 paces. In war 150 cartridges each are carried by the men, and 100 with the reserve.

The third line has the 10·7 Berdan rifle, Mark II, a single loader with a bolt breech-closing action (sighted up to 1500 paces). The men carry 80 cartridges.

Cavalry

Armed throughout with the 8 millimetre Mannlicher repeating carbine, Mark 90 and 95. Ammunition supply, 60 cartridges per man.

Artillery

The Field Artillery consists of 108 batteries with 7·5 centimetre Q.F. Schneider-Creusot guns, and 8·7 and 7·5 centimetre Krupp guns. As a rule, the ammunition for each gun is 500 shells, including shrapnel (fused up to 5900 metres) and common shell.

Besides there is the Heavy Field Artillery, made up of 9 light and 9 heavy batteries of field howitzers, of 12 and 15 centimetre calibre from the Schneider-Creusot Works. Ammunition, from 200 to 450 rounds per gun.

The Mountain Artillery (36 batteries) is armed partly with 7·5 centimetres Q.F. Schneider-Creusot guns, partly with 7·5 centimetre Krupp breech-loaders. Ammunition supply, about 400 rounds per gun.

The Turkish Army

Infantry

The first and second line are armed with 7 millimetre and 9 millimetre Mauser repeating rifles. Ammunition per man, 120 cartridges, with 180 more in the reserve. The Landsturm has the Martini single-loader with 375 cartridges per rifle.

Cavalry

These are armed with the 7 millimetre Mauser repeating carbine and the 9 millimetre Mauser carbine, as well as the Martini carbine.

Artillery

The Field Artillery has the 7·5 centimetre Q.F. Krupp gun, and 8 and 9 centimetre Krupp guns.

The Heavy Field Artillery is armed with the 12 centimetre Krupp field howitzer.

Ammunition for field batteries, about 500 rounds per gun.

The Mountain Artillery is armed with the 7·5 centimetre Schneider-Creusot Q.F. gun, and the 7 centimetre Krupp gun. The supply of ammunition is 130 rounds per gun.

From this comparison it will be seen that Bulgaria as well as Turkey has used in the war guns of both German and French make, and that there is no question of a proved superiority of French over German guns, such as French chauvinistic writers have claimed.

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